EDUCATIONAL PLANNING

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Journal of the International Society of Educational Planners

The Journal will print articles on the theory and practice of educational planning, case histories, and articles from related specialties (economics of education, sociology of education, demography, town planning, institutional research, operations research, educational research, and applied mathematics) which are of interest to educational planners.

The Journal will also regularly include reviews of publications in this field and related fields.

Articles or publications for review should be submitted to the Editorial Board, c/o the address below. All articles will be assessed by three readers chosen by the Board from a group of consultants. The publication decision of the Board shall be final. Two copies of manuscripts should be submitted, together with return postage, if the author wishes their return.

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EDUCATIONAL PLANNING

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1975 ANNUAL CONFERENCE

of

The International Society of Educational Planners

Date: **June 22 - 25, 1975**

Place: **Hotel San Franciscan**
          San Francisco, California

Theme: **Planning for Alternative Futures:**
          The Long and Short of It

PRELIMINARY PROGRAM

Sunday June 22, 1975

Registration: 4:00 - 7:30 p.m.

Keynote Address: 7:30 p.m.   Dr. Ken Hansen

President's Reception: 9:00 p.m.

Monday June 23, 1975

General Sessions: (1)   The Context of Alternative Futures

                    (2)   How Different Educational Planners Look
                          at Different Futures in Different Ways

The general sessions will be followed by parallel series of small group discussions, case studies, reports and workshops.

Tuesday June 24, 1975

General Sessions: (1)   Futures Invention vs. Futures Prediction

                    (2)   The Research and Training Implications of
                          Futures Invention/Futures Prediction

As on the first day, the general sessions will be complemented by a series of small group meetings.

Tuesday Luncheon — Business Meeting

Wednesday June 25, 1975

The closing luncheon will have as guest speaker Dr. Ted Bell of the United States Office of Education.

The Wednesday morning and afternoon sessions will vary according to the delegates' choice. Some special regional programs are being arranged; members may also choose to participate in a different set of small groups from those attended on the first two days of the conference.

Details of the program will be announced in the Newsletter.

There will be reduced registration fees both for members and non-members who register before May 7th, so make your plans early.

Early registration: Members $20, non-members $30, student members $10 (fee includes closing luncheon) **Late registration: $5 extra for each category of registrant.**

For conference information contact: Dr. Tom Olson, President, ISEP
                                            NWREL
                                            710 S.W. 2nd Avenue
                                            Portland, Oregon 97204

EDITORIAL

It has been decided that each year the January issue of *Educational Planning* will print the papers and proceedings of the previous year's conference of the International Society of Educational Planners. Our conferences generally are held in June. Thus by printing the papers six months later we give participants time to indulge in second thoughts and revise their statements and, at the same time, give members who were unable to attend the conference the opportunity to learn something of what occurred—before the views and experience are so out of date that their chief interest is archival.

The theme of the 1974 conference was *The Politics of Planning*, and the program permitted the topic to be discussed according to the locus of the planner, e.g., one employed in an advisory role at the national, state/provincial, or local level. Although most of the speakers described conditions experienced in the United States and Canada there were two sessions dealing with national planning overseas, the case of Chile and the case of Zaire.

Most sessions consisted of two papers presented to the entire conference, followed by small groups in which one paper was discussed informally with the author. There were parallel programs for the overseas case studies and the session dealing with planning for a local board of education. The latter took the form of a paper followed by a panel of five discussants each of whom made a brief statement.

In the printed version we have largely followed the conference format. However, the president's remarks appear at the beginning, instead of midway through the conference at the business meeting; the papers of the local level session appear at the end, instead of parallel with the overseas case studies; and the commentary and discussion of the small group sessions are lacking.

The final afternoon of the conference was devoted to a state-of-the-art panel discussion with many questions and comments from the audience at large. This has also been omitted. The session was taped, but the panel members (Dr. Bernard Kaplan in the Chair, Drs. Maureen Webster, Kay Palmer and Cicely Watson discussants) spoke informally from notes. They were unable to prepare formal papers in time for this publication and the editor did not feel equal to writing an adequate report from the tape record.

There is one other omission for which we make apology. The conference proper, which was held at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, in Toronto was preceded by a number of one-day and half-day workshops held in Buffalo, New York, on June 22, 1974. No record was made of these activities and, in any case, they do not lend themselves to print. Apart from these omissions this issue of *Educational Planning* records the proceedings and papers of the 1974 conference.

Don Adams*

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS

The viability of ISEP depends on the real or perceived significance of the field of educational planning. Educational planning may be viewed as one of the latest elixirs sold for, and taken as, a cure for various malaises of education ranging from its high cost to its persistent tediousness. Who is to say that educational planning will be anything more than a passing professional fad or an imaginative, but ephemeral, hope of harassed bureaucrats?

Nevertheless, with but little historical insight, I bravely predict that interest in educational planning at the local, state and national levels will continue to grow. This growth in interest will largely take the form of (a) faith that the newer technology of planning will promote efficiency in management or (b) recognition that it is politically necessary or appropriate to involve various groups in the planning process. If educational planning can satisfy either efficiency demands or broad scale involvement in decision-making, then commitment on the part of high level policy makers will be assured.

I predict that interest in educational planning will also grow in the institutions of higher education. This will be reflected first in the internal administration of colleges and universities and secondly in new instructional programs and courses. However, a large gap will continue to persist between the content of educational planning taught in the classrooms and that form of social combat which practicing administrators refer to as educational planning.

With growth in the study and practice of educational planning will come a better realization of the horrendous difficulties of planning at either a sectoral, institutional or program level. ISEP can play a crucial role in examining and publicizing the limitations, constraints and uncertainties as well as the potential benefits of planning efforts.

Assuming viability, the professional concerns of ISEP become two-fold, representing as it does both an occupation and a field of inquiry. Viewing educational planning as an occupation suggests such questions as: What are the sets of competencies needed by different types of educational planners? What are the current and potential roles to be played by educational planners? What is the relationship between educational planning and educational administration? Should comparative emphases be on the pre-service training through university graduate schools or the in-service training of administrators already in the field? How can ISEP bridge the generation gap existing between the younger, more technically oriented planners and the older planning generalists?

A professional society should be able to respond to such questions with authority and accuracy. Moreover, it should be able to assess the nature of the demand for planners and, by understanding the needs in educational planning, be able to influence both the level and nature of that demand, not so much perhaps by carrying the banner of a movement but by discovering, sharing and disseminating knowledge about educational planning.

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Viewing educational planning as a field of inquiry, we need models and paradigms of the educational planning process to generate debate and professional dialogue. We need to investigate the limits of the beginning conceptualizations suggested in the literature. For example, much of the literature generated by economists and systems analysts implies what might be termed a management or technological model of educational planning. Much of the effort represented by proponents of such a model is intellectually exciting but should not be seen as setting the boundaries of the skills and knowledge needed by planners. Moreover, no attempt should be made to hide our ignorance behind such devices as schematic systems charts devoid of content or deceptive little formulas lifted from mathematics and economics. The strength of those utilizing this model is their weakness— susceptibility to oversimplification. One sometimes gets the impression that clever young systems engineers believe they have unlimited options in redesigning education, including the redesign of kids.

By contrast there is a conceptualization of educational planning as political manipulation. To those who subscribe to this model the problem is determining how power and influence may be exerted in the allocation of resources in the making of decisions. The notion that planning is a process of social trade-offs and exercise of power has obvious support from many 'real-world' planners. Yet, our present state of knowledge is limited largely to anecdotal and essentially idiosyncratic accounts of how educational planning *really* happened. We have barely begun to understand the meaning of politics in planning and the nature of political roles of planners.

Still another conceptualization visible in the literature implies that the educational planner is essentially a group analyst. The basic educational problems are viewed as human, not technical. Solutions or decisions about future educational arrangements depend on communication, understanding and love. The educational planner thus becomes a gentle guide through an unthreatening group process of decision-making.

These and other conceptualizations can help ISEP evolve a clearer list of priority questions which need to be studied and researched. Inquiry needs to move toward such questions: In what ways does the process of educational planning differ from the process of planning in any sector? How are they similar? How do governance structures, types of educational systems and the socio-political environment influence the process of educational planning? What constraints does the field of education place on the technology of educational planning? What criteria might guide the successful borrowing of technology from other sectors? What is the role of technical information generated by planners in the process of making educational decisions?

ISEP, through its publications, research activities, training efforts and annual meetings, should become identified as a professional group which cares about such questions and is expanding its resources in their study. Such commitment coupled with tolerance for the variations among us suggest a formula for success. Let us agree with the systems scholar that educational planning may be an elegant process of quantifiable interrelationships. Let us also realize, however, that educational planning, like football and sex, in last analysis is a contact sport.

Alex J. Ducanis*

POLITICS, POLITICIANS AND PLANNERS

What I should like to speak about tonight has three main themes: something of the nature of politics, something of the nature of planning, and the interrelationship between the two. I shall try to interrelate planning and politics as I move through the three themes.

As I read through the overview of the program of this conference I was struck with the importance of the questions posed to the professional planner. How should planners move in a political environment? What are the critical issues involved in implementing educational plans in different settings? How do decision-makers view planners? How can we narrow the gap between planners and decision-makers? This is heavy stuff, the stuff of many esoteric treatises, and I have no doubt that the conference program will explore many answers to such questions. My task tonight, in opening the meetings, is to try to look at some of the conditions which give rise to these questions. Why is it important for the educational planner to know how to move in a political environment? Does the need arise from his instinct for survival, from his commitment to certain plans, or from his insistence upon advocating a particular value system? Why is it important to know the critical issues involved in implementing plans? Such a question presupposes that either the planner is also the implementer, or that the planner wants to ensure that his plans are implemented unchanged. Should the planner be the implementer? How do decision-makers view planners? This implies that decision-makers do indeed have a view of planners. Does the evidence suggest that this is the case? Another question which is posed is, how can we narrow the gap between planners and decision-makers? This implies an answer to the previous question. It also throws some light upon the concerns of this particular conference, which I shall paraphrase as follows: How does the planner make his peace with what seems to be hostile environment for planning; and why indeed does a political environment seem to be hostile? To explore these questions let us first look at planners and the planning process.

Planning presupposes change and, moreover, intervention in the *process* of change. Needless to say, change itself can be a very threatening experience to individuals and groups in any social system. Change elicits concern about going from the known to the unknown, with the natural fears that are generated by the unknown. The planner, intervening in the process of change by attempting to initiate it, define its direction and extent, and monitor its pace, becomes an agent of change and thereby a generator of fear. Is it not then inevitable that the change agent will be looked upon with scepticism, especially by those who are most comfortable, most powerful, and who benefit most from the *status quo*?

What then do I take as a working definition of planning? My view of it is as follows:

Planning is a means of rational assessment of what it is we wish to do, or be, and the means necessary to reach that state. (Too often it deals only with the former and not the latter.) It is, therefore, a process of deciding which of several alternative futures we wish to have and what would be necessary if it might be obtained (in varying degrees) over time.

The concept of alternatives is central to planning. Often this is not recognized, especially by those "planners" who are so bound by their own system of thought and their own objectives that they do not recognize opposition to their plan as the expression of one or more equally valid *alternative acceptable futures*. Part of the planning process, then, is the way in which we decide what are acceptable alternative futures. It must be an interactive process in which we continually attempt to determine what our current actions will likely mean in terms of the future—what future condition they will produce. In this comparison we must identify as desirable and undesirable the future results of current action. Then the process must include assessment of possible courses which will maintain the desirable consequences of future condition stemming from current actions and replace (or minimize) the current actions which produce future condtions we wish to avoid (or current ones which we do not wish to perpetuate). Finally planning involves choosing which course to follow and defining the way in which it can be followed with some likelihood of a success-ful outcome.

Please note that at each stage of the process the operant phrases contain the words *alternative, acceptable* and *desirable.* We should then add the phrases, "acceptable to whom", "desired by whom". The real problem in planning is to determine the accepta-bility, in our society, of various futures, and the acceptability of various means of expend-ing our efforts and resources to reach them. This model of course assumes some sort of "open" political system where many persons (to a greater or lesser extent, of course) share in the process of decision-making for the public sector. Planning, therefore, *is* a political process in the best and worst sense of that term. In this definition the question of imple-mentation is left open.

Planning, then, deals with the future and, in fact, deals with the distant future, since we wish to maximize the benefits (of the change which people and systems must undergo) accruing over the longest period possible. If the professional planner is serious about his planning effort he must try to look at the long-run implications of implementing the planned change. The assessment of long-term impact is an important part of planning. Along the same lines, the planner must try to assess the optimum use of resources to meet goals, and the timely allocation of the resources to achieve the goals without unduly affecting the realization of other goals. This of course will lead to deferring the realization of some goals while others are achieved.

The planner must also be cognizant of the very real constraints upon the realization of planned outcomes which are inherent in the change process itself—for example, the length of time it might take to retrain staff, to construct buildings or to engage in the various acts of implementation. The process of planning extends from the time of inception to the time of implementation; it deals with the long-term.

Man, however, lives in the short run and the political process is played out in the short run. Politicians are answerable to their constituencies on a very short-term basis. Con-sidering the possible impacts of plans at different points in time, it is apparent that in order for long-term projects to come to fruition they must have the continuing support of some large constituency as well as the political clout to maintain direction over a longer period than is generally possible in the political arena. The program of social action which survives a change in administration without major revisions or dismemberment is rare; it gives evidence of having viability beyond its initiator.

The lesson to be gleaned from this is that the political individual or body must seek immediate results. Therefore he is more likely to adopt plans which will show results in the short run than undertake projects which bear all their fruits at the end of the planning period—i.e., in the long run. The planner, on the other hand, by his very training tends to look beyond the immediate result to the long-term gains—in fact, if necessary, to sacrifice the immediate benefit if he can thereby enhance the long-term gain. There is herein a fundamental point of friction between the planner and the politician.

Too often the politician is the captive of his constituency; too often the planner is the captive of his techniques. In the realm of folk saying and proverb we have several clichés about leadership; about how far ahead the leader may safely get. It most certainly is true that the politician who loses touch with the reality which his constituency interprets as its most pressing needs soon will be in trouble. The most essential perspective he must bring to considering any plan, therefore, is how it will be viewed by his constituency. Planners may or may not have this problem (we will expand upon that later). All too often they do have the problem of being so enamoured of particular planning techniques that they fail to recognize the political realities which must be faced in implementing their plans. This calls to mind a story which you may if you choose label apocryphal; it illustrates the moral that quick and dirty data get used while refined data find their way into the textbooks. The story runs like this: A friend of mine was employed as a professional planner and a civil servant by a state government. This was in the early sixties during an election year. It was a bright October afternoon, and things were rather quiet in the office, when there was a call from one of the governor's staff. The upshot of the call was that a projection of the trained manpower needs of the state for the next decade was needed, and the planning specialist was instructed to mount an appropriate study. In due course the specialist brought together a task force of individuals from a number of departments of the state government to develop a plan for the study. After several meetings (which, by the way, were rife with interdepartmental political power struggles) a study plan was agreed upon and delivered in proper memorandum form to the governor's office. Within a few hours a phone call came back—"We don't want a three year study; we need this by Friday". This is illustrative of the divergent time scales and values the planner and the politician may well hold.

A related problem raised by the list of questions posed in the theme of your conference is the distinction made between the planner and the decision-maker. It may legitimately be asked, "Is the professional planner ever the decision-maker; and if he is, should he be?" If it is the role of the planner to explore and expose alternative directions for policy, must he be value-free? If he is not value-free then is not the planner engaging in a process which promotes his self-interest (no matter how pious that interest may be), and is he not, therefore, engaged in a political process? In this context the professional planner may be considered as the most dangerous of political decision-makers; he alone would have control of the data necessary to arrive at the most acceptable decision and be able to manipulate the outcome of the process. If this were true of planners (and planning agencies), then it would be readily apparent why there would be a gap between the planners and the decision-makers. The gap is related to the suspicion that it is the planner's self-interest which is dictating the views of acceptable alternatives, and to the anxiety of the politician or decision-maker as to whether he is getting a good picture of what the range of alternatives is. I leave it to you as professional planners to judge whether this is indeed the situation and whether the problem is amenable to solution.

Another problem which relates to a gap of trust between planners and decision-makers is that raised by Daniel Moynahan when he said, "The difficulty with setting goals is that they very quickly become the standards by which we judge not the future but the present." I would formulate the problem as follows: planners and planning tend to breed discontent with the present; politicians and the political process attempt to control and/or reduce the discontent with the present. In the same vein, politics must take into account the vested interests of competing groups who act out of self-interest, as they see it at a particular time. The self-interests may or may not have basis in fact—fads and politics become intertwined. But it is the planner's role to expose the fallacies of current fads. He must be a realist. He must not succumb to the cry of the moment, the popular panacea. For this he is not, and will not be, loved (and probably not respected either, at least not in his own time).

Related to this is the axiom that politicians in power try to minimize their errors. I would ask you how many times you have seen a study by a government agency pointing to a program initiated by the politicians in power as being a glaring error. Moreover, politicians try to reduce their rate of error by ensuring the fulfillment of the prophecies they made on the basis of fallacious information, whether or not the long-term effects are indeed salutary.

There is another point which has several implications for the process of planning and for the relationship of decision-makers to professional planners. I refer to the argument that the technical aspects of planning and the application of these techniques are devoid of political implications. What is claimed is that the planner and the planning process are (or should be) value-free; they should not attempt to influence decisions in the political arena. Political considerations come into play only when alternatives are considered and one set are chosen and implemented. The other side of this argument is the contention that no planning process is devoid of political considerations; particularly if there are divergent views on resource allocation the planning process can make no progress unless the planner moves it toward implementation by becoming involved in the political process itself.

These contentions strike at the very core of the planner's philosophy of planning, as well as the administrator's and the politician's philosophies of public administration and government. What is it we expect of the professional planner? What skills and techniques is he expected to bring to bear in discharging his duty of exposing and exploring alternative futures? What techniques must he master? How does he view his task? How do others view his task? How does he view his own value system? What are his definitions of "success" and "failure"?

First, it seems to me, there must be some degree of congruence between the way in which the planner and the others (the administrators and politicians who work with the planner and use the fruits of his work) view the task of the planner. This will come about through a process of role definition which I believe planners are now beginning. The formulation of the program of this conference is evidence that such questions as these are being raised and examined. Second, the technical competencies which a planner ought to possess are very similar whichever role he is playing of the cases I mentioned above. They must include the usual techniques of projection, modelling, etc. However, the planner cannot discern what viable alternatives there are unless he understands the political process and is able to assess its impact upon the alternatives he has defined. In other words, the planner who does not take into account the political aspects of his problem has built a planning

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model with a significant piece missing. If he cannot supply the political acumen himself he must collaborate with a political analyst. It is clear that, in some areas of planning at least, this is being recognized. Dr. J. William Smith of the University of Pittsburgh has conducted a study which analyzed the congruence between the objectives of health planning agencies and of training programs. The results of his study show that comprehensive health planning agencies want health planners who understnad the *political* and *legal* aspects of health planning. The agencies expect planners to be able to analyze various aspects of the health care environment, develop approaches to planned change, solicit cooperation and implement change—all within a political framework. The study also revealed that in addition to requiring a strong emphasis on organizational theory in the training of public health planners, graduates would be expected to be able to analyze community power structures, to respond to community mores and prejudices, and to understand relevant aspects of public relations. Finally, the agencies felt that the planner must be sufficiently self-aware to be able to discern his own value system and recognize how it would affect the process in which he is involved. Here then is the question: can a planner act only as a technician bringing to bear specific competencies on a set of defined problems or must he also make value judgements as to the direction the plans "should" go? Whichever is his answer it dictates a different response to the political context of planning. In this regard I would stress something that I alluded to earlier; that is, mutual trust is necessary if the gap between decision-makers and planners is to be narrowed. For such trust to develop the role and value system of each must be explicit.

All this has several implications for the role of the professional planner: the planner must be a master of techniques which make it possible for him to assess data concerning both the environmental and the political aspects of each planning task. These techniques are in a nascent stage of development. However, the need for self-awareness is equally important. If the planner is not aware of his own value structure and how this impinges upon the way he views and performs planning functions, he may well do a disservice to himself and others. The ethical aspects of planning are of importance to the professional planner. When he is imposing his own value structure upon any planning task, he must make the persons he is working with aware of this fact. For the protection of planners and the agencies in which they perform, it is essential that a code of ethics be developed. This is a proper concern for their professional organization. To refer only to one aspect of such a code—the topic of this conference: what would be the proper response of an educational planner if he were charged (by a member of the political party not in power, say) with "playing politics" in order to ensure the acceptance of his plan?

In conclusion, let me review some of the questions posed:

- How should planners move in a political environment?
  With full knowledge of the political process of planning and with full awareness of the value structures which will influence their own positions.

- What are the critical issues?
  Who decides plans, policies and alternatives and on what basis. Should the planner become involved in implementation? If he does, and is required (or expected) to, what technical skills should he bring to the task? What are the ethical limitations on his involvement? What loyalty does he owe the decision-maker? If he is expected to be the "honest broker" how does he establish and maintain "detachment"?

● How do we narrow the gap of trust between the decision-maker and the planner? Through examination of their respective roles, and development of understanding of the limitations of both.

In my opinion, professional planners must take care that they maintain their perspective. They must realize that to some extent they play a gadfly role; that they must be reality based and, therefore, sometimes must be irritating; that one of the planners' main functions is to make people aware of the long-term probabilities they would prefer to ignore— therefore not only will they not be loved, they will not even be well-liked, though they might be respected. This then is the planners' burdern.

Edward Stewart*

THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTING PLANNED CHANGE
IN EDUCATION AT THE LEVEL OF THE PROVINCE.

I welcome this opportunity to talk to planners—to tell them what I, as an administrator charged in many instances with taking responsibility for the implementation of a planned change, view as the politics of planning. I have never been a planner, at least not in the sense of ever having drawn up technical plans, although I have worked with planners, both as a senior civil servant and as a member of committees or commissions, to help define the goals of an educational change and the steps (the policies and procedures) likely to achieve the goals. I speak from the experience of an educational administrator for whom plans for radical policy changes were drawn up by planners. I have three points I wish to make—three messages if you will. And I shall illustrate them from the history of educational change in Ontario. These changes are sufficiently recent that the delegates who are from Ontario will recognize the items being discussed; yet they are sufficiently finished (i.e., they have been completed) to be no longer subjects of controversy.

Pacing

This leads neatly into my first point: If one accepts the definition of politics as the art of attaining the possible, then it has been my experience that planners are not sufficiently aware of the "politics" of planning. Because of this they often jeopardise the success of otherwise technically excellent plans. They know too little of those forces in the field likely to oppose the *manner* of the change (because they stand to lose by it or they are threatened by it), but which might not necessarily oppose the change itself if only it were effected in some other way. Because the planner knows too little about the alignment of forces in the ministry, in the boards, in teacher and trustee organizations the kind of plans which he produces often carry with them great political risk. And it is not the planner who carries the risk—he quite often is a technician, a consultant, a university professor, not even an employee of the educational agency. It is primarily the minister and to a somewhat lesser extent his advisors who carry the risk. This risk is much greater under some political and administrative conditions than others. If the planned goal must be achieved in steps over several years, it is the politician and administrator who carry the risk because little accomplishment is visible in the intermediate period when questions are raised and opposition expressed to the turmoil of change. If you cannot keep to the publicly avowed time-table of the change, the risk is great that the policy will be reversed before any accomplishment can be demonstrated. Planners are seldom taught the necessity of ensuring that some visible short-term change is made evident in the steps of the plan itself, rather than have all the change "fall into place" at the end of the plan. And yet, in my ·experience, this is absolutely indispensable for success in implementing change. When the Ontario post-secondary and university student assistance program was being planned we had some statistical forecasts of the numbers of students who might be eligible for assistance (grants and

loans) for a future period of years under various regulations. We had cost estimates of different types of plan. We had some agreed goals rather vaguely stated—i.e., that we were trying to extend the participation in higher education studies by providing financial assistance directly to the students, not necessarily eliminating all financial disincentive to university study but affecting the marginal student and making his attendance financially feasible.

On very short notice we mounted a student assistance scheme with the commitment to examine its regulations, administration and costs year by year as it developed. If we had waited for a whole array of research studies and completely developed plans—detailed forecasts of all the possible costs and effects of a wide variety of plans—the scheme would never have gotten off the ground. Yet that would have been held to be good planning. As it was, particularly in the first years, we faced political risks—for example, student discontent that the assistance was not greater; their objection to the policy that the undergraduates' grants should be regarded supplementary to an expected parental contribution based on the level of family income and family responsibilities. Risk was particularly high in the second and third year of operation when regulations were imposed to tighten up the administration of the scheme to eliminate the possibility that ineligible applicants receive aid. In implementing the scheme we had to steer between the pressures of student organizations wanting a more extensive general subsidy (the abolition of fees, for example) and citizen and parent groups wanting a subsidy more selectively and discriminatingly applied in inverse ration to ability to pay, and in direct ratio to academic merit. In this respect it is interesting to note a radical change in public opinion on student aid which occurred within a few years. In 1968 I would have hazarded a *private* opinion that within five years in Ontario we might well see the abolition of university fees. In fact at that time it would have been relatively easy to draw up long range fiscal plans relating to university financing, which would have achieved such a policy without adding to the costs of higher education. That is, we could have changed the *nature* of the public subsidy to universities without shifting the total subsidy, and ended with a system closer, say, to that of Sweden. This reform was being much discussed at that time. And yet, by 1971, when the Committee on Post Secondary Education had made their report the climate of public opinion had moved away from the notion of free university study; it recommended that the weight of assistance be toward student loans rather than outright student grants. This change in opinion is world wide, by the way, not unique to Ontario. Sweden itself has shifted to a greater dependence upon student loans than student grants, and the question of loans rather than grants arises each year in Britain—though recently their Department of Education and Science rejected proposals to change the emphasis of their policy. If we had, in 1968, been locked into detailed long-range student assistance plans leading to the funding of our universities through extensive student grants and free tuition, it would have involved considerable political risk to swing over in 1971 to a radically different system in response to a changed public opinion. The point I wish to emphasize is that the planner must so arrange the annual increments or steps of his plan as to permit great flexibility to administrators charged with their implementation—otherwise the minister and his administrators will be unwilling to commit themselves to massive policy changes which can be achieved only over a period of years.

This leads me to the second point I wish to make: Not only are planners often politically naive (and even pride themselves on their lack of awareness of the possible political

repercussions arising from the manner of their planning), they also seem unaware of some political conditions absolutely necessary for successful implementation of planned change. Let me list a few:

In effecting any massive change there is need for flexibility of pacing. When the planner draws up the set of annual policy changes (changes in regulations, procedures, budget) which will take the system from the present to the desired future, he tends to spread the change equally over the years. Yet this is seldom how human organizations experience change. In some cases it is easier to change rapidly, with considerable attendant chaos, and then consolidate by reorganization. Particularly is this the case when a new government takes office with a mandate for change. Then by the time the minister has to face the electors once more the fruits of the change have had some time to ripen. A minister is more likely to accept a radical reform recommendation if the planner can demonstrate there will be some "results" visible in the short term. In other cases the system must be led into the change slowly, by almost imperceptible steps—so that by the time the change has been accomplished it has become so acceptable to the public and all interested parties that the degree of change has been almost unnoticed. It is hard to convince planners that this "loose" planning is necessary. They like to see the steps of the change neatly codified and predicted. However, in some instances the planned reform is easier to effect if the old system is simply allowed to break down. At least in such cases there is then widespread public acceptance that radical change is not only desirable, it is long overdue.

The demise of the Grade 13 examination system in Ontario is a good example of a change which was widely heralded as long overdue. Until 1967 we had a combined secondary school graduation and university matriculation examination system on the British model. It had been periodically attacked by educators who saw it as a constraint on the programs of study of the entire secondary school. It had been periodically attacked by students and their parents, by the university professors who set the exams and the high school teachers who marked them. The history of investigations into the Ontario grade 13 examination system make interesting reading. There were literally dozens of committees and commissions which examined, reformed and made pronouncements about it. The oldest one recorded was 1897. By the mid 1960s it had become an intolerable burden by sheer weight of numbers and expense, and reports on it were running at the rate of one per year, starting with the massive University Matriculations Board report of November 1960 and ending with the Minister's Advisory Committee of 1964-5. At the first meeting of the 1964 committee, members were given copies of 76 background committee reports and papers relevant to the examination system. The exams were written in June each year. And in 1963 there were 39,934 students writing 207,659 papers in 461 examination "centres" in Ontario. Throughout July and August a veritable army of teachers gathered in Toronto to work non-stop grading them. The results, which at that time were the main basis for entry to Ontario universities, were not available to the universities until mid August and classes started in September. By 1965 when the Minister's Advisory Committee on Grade 13 prepared its report (which recommended abolition of the system and its replacement by ETS type admission tests) there was no contest—the public and all interested groups were convinced it had to go. And for some five or six years before that public consensus such offices as the Department of Educational Research of the Ontario College of Education had been working on entrance test development and studies relating to the predictors of student success at university, studies of the transition from secondary school

to university, and projections of university enrollment—in other words all the research background for planning the policy alternatives had been accumulating over the years that the matriculation examination system was breaking down.

Another example of a planned educational change of considerable proportions was the upgrading of the educational and professional requirements for entry to the elementary teacher force. This was accomplished in recent years in Ontario, but not at the pace envisaged by the planners in the reform commission which recommended the change. Entry to the profession was changed from a one-year pre-professional training course taken in a teachers' college following a secondary school graduation, to a four-year training which might be variously arranged (either a liberal arts degree followed by a one-year teacher training program, or a four-year concurrent BA/B.Ed degree program—both of them requiring study in a university). The requirement of a degree came into force in fall 1970. Political commitment to the goal, however, was made by the Minister of Education in 1965 when he accepted the recommendations of the McLeod Committee. The work of the McLeod Committee is an interesting example of good technical educational planning and the politics of planning. The committee sat from September 30th 1964 to April 5th 1965. It had as its chairman an eminent Ontario educator, Mr. C.R. McLeod, the Director of Education for the City of Windsor. Its members represented all the educational forces in Ontario—teachers' organizations, trustees' organizations, the teachers' colleges (which at that time trained elementary school teachers), the colleges of education (which trained the secondary school teachers), the universities and the general public. There was widespread agreement that upgrading the quality of the elementary teacher force was desirable and necessary. The task of the commission and its planner was to define the character of the desired new system of training, and demonstrate its cost and feasibility. The commission held widespread hearings and sponsored considerable research. Its research consultant and planner was Dr. Cicely Watson and one of her reports, which was never published and was not a part of the report of the commission, consisted of a series of feasibility plans, sets of tables showing how the supply and demand of teachers would be accommodated for the transition period from a one-year training scheme to a four-year training scheme. The great difficulty in upgrading a labour force is to maintain the supply of labour while the upgrading takes place. This was Dr. Watson's main task—to demonstrate to the commission members' satisfaction and then, on their behalf, to the educational authorities that the recommendations could be implemented without undue dislocation of the system—that in fact they would coincide with an expected contraction of elementary school enrollment and an expected large pool of student-teacher candidates graduating from the arts and science faculties of the universities. It is no secret that Dr. Watson's elaborate plans were not actually followed. The commission's recommended policy was accepted in principle, but implementation began more slowly than provided for in her plans. Not only was teacher preparation to be a longer process but the recommendation was that it take place in the universities and that the teachers' colleges be closed. At first negotiations with universities proceeded more slowly than was planned. But then their momentum gathered more quickly than had been planned. In any year between 1965 and 1970 Dr. Watson and the former members of the McLeod Commission would have been justified in saying that Ontario was running "behind" the plan they had proposed. But in any year since 1970 they would have had to admit that the province was "ahead" of their plan.

The point is that a planner must *not* so arrange the steps from the present to the desired goal several years hence that the change can only be effected in one way and at one speed.

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The plan must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate retardation, acceleration and modification, because there is, surely, what can only be defined as a "law of uneven development" which operates in the implementaiton of any major public policy change.

Undesired by-products

Not only are planners and reformers often politically naive about pacing, even more, often they give inadequate thought to the undesired by-products which are likely to arise from their plans. Too often in solving one problem they leave administrators with a new problem. I shall cite three illustrations of this, two from Ontario and one from Saskatchewan; all three are sufficiently long ago they are no longer embarrassing.

So often the planner is on the horns of a dilemma. He will create a new problem no matter how he solves the existing one—different solutions simply create different problems. Too often you cannot really *solve* a problem (not in the sense of solving it for all time); All that can be accomplished is to help the administrator decide to live with one set of problems rather than another. Where the problems consist of alternative logistics difficulties, planners seem to face up to them well. Where they consist of alternative political difficulties, they are less skillful, sometimes inept and sometimes short-sighted. Let us take the Saskatchewan case. In the 1940s Saskatchewan decided to upgrade its elementary teacher education and gave responsibility for it to a newly created university faculty of education. The provincial teachers' colleges were closed. As in every other jurisdiction where such a change has been carried out, the question had to be resolved of the future of the instructors who had been employed in the teachers' colleges. At that time the province had one public university, the University of Saskatchewan (at Saskatoon). In its negotiations with the university the Department of Education, quite properly, was at pains to protect the status of its former employees who, with the merger, would become university faculty. And it was agreed that all the staff with a certain number years of experience (five I think it was) would receive the rank of associate professor in the Faculty of Education. Now those of you who have done any manpower planning will immediately see the problem which this created. Think of the effect on the rank structure of the Faculty of Education of absorbing this mass of relatively young and relatively lesser-trained (in academic terms) staff at the middle levels of rank. Twenty years later promotion from the rank of assistant to associate professor was still difficult in certain departments of the Faculty of Education. In effect, there was no room on the middle rungs of the ladder. This led to rapid staff turnover at the lowest rank level, and premature loss of many promising assistant professors because there was little possibility of rewarding them with promotion.

Now let me describe a slightly different effect arising from something of the same conditions. In 1965 the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education was created by bringing together in an autonomous institution three small agencies which had demonstrated their worth to Ontario education—one was the Department of Educational Research of the Ontario College of Education. It brought to the institute a small experienced academic staff (about 8 people) which had for many years been involved in certain kinds of educational research: test development and administration, survey research, measurement and evaluation of educational programs, and prediction work for planning. The second was the Department of Graduate Studies of the college, which brought to the merger a small number of professors who had done some teaching in the master's and doctorage graduate programs in education of the University of Toronto, but whose main role had been to

organize and administer the programs. The third agency was a curriculum reform organization with very few full-time employees, none of them academics. So with a core of perhaps twelve professors OISE was given a budget and a mandate to grow. It did so at a fantastic rate, creating new teaching programs, mounting vast research projects and R & D efforts. It will be ten years old in 1975. But the exponential explosive growth took place in the first three or four years. Now there was a by-product to the planning decision to go quickly for size—to create a large institute rapidly while the political climate was favourable to its creation. I am not arguing that the decision for rapid growth was a wrong one. Instead I want to direct your attention to the *effect* of that decision on the academic labour force of the province. Consider, particularly, the effect on the pools of available academic personnel in the field of education, and the disciplines related to education, of building (over about three years) a faculty of some 150 from a core of 12 professors. Those of you who are economists can explain to the rest what happens to salaries when you have a sudden and heavy demand for specialized labour. Experienced professors of education with high academic credentials and research and teaching experience became a highly prized commodity. The academic markets of the world were scoured for their fruits, and many young new Ph.Ds were recruited to this institute. Analysis of the effect of this recruitment, on the academic salaries of *other* Ontario universities and of our Boards of Education, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of University Affairs would make a very interesting Ph.D thesis. One point that I am certain will come out would be that the planners of OISE, who took the decision to drive for the rapid staffing of a large institution, paid no attention to the effect their decision would have on the staffing of Ontario universities and on the teaching payroll costs of higher education in this province. A problem of growth was solved by importing a large number of highly qualified and expensive staff; a new manpower cost problem was thereby created. ("Created" probably is not quite fair since the university system in Ontario was also experiencing general expansion in these years; "exacerbated" is probably a more accurate term.)

My third example describes a problem by-product which was not permitted to develop. When Dr. Watson was asked, by the McLeod Commission, to draw up plans showing the feasibility of upgrading the requirement for entry to the elementary teaching profession, she was given certain policy parameters which the commission was considering. She also had sets of predictions which she had made. The transition was to be effected in steps or phases over 15 years (i.e., there would be 14 years of change and the transition would be accomplished by 1980). So she had sets of projections showing the number of elementary school children we might expect during the years 1966-67 to 1979-80, and the number of undergraduate university students from whose, midst the stream of teacher recruits would be drawn; and the capacity of the teachers' colleges (13 of them, varying greatly in size from an enrollment of 141 to 1,330 at that time) and their programs. There were six different types of diploma course, not all of which would disappear—some might be transferred to the universities as the teachers' colleges were absorbed.

Planners seem to find it difficult to resist linear modes of thought, and in solving her problem of how to get a cohort from a one-year to a four-year training over a period of years, phasing-in certain programs and institutions and phasing-out others, Dr. Watson dreamed up an ingenious device. She created some temporary programs of intermediate length—two year, three year. This was her first plan, meticulously worked out but turned down by the committee. Not even as evidence of feasibility would the committee members

use those plans! Why? Dr. Watson had failed to take into account the very human tendency to build empires. But there were several experienced administrators on that committee who were very familiar with the problems this creates. It would have been well-nigh impossible to dismantle these temporary intermediate-length programs as the teachers' colleges closed one by one. The amount of effort involved in creating a two or a three-year program, would ensure that the teachers' college masters who operated them would fight very hard to preserve them at the end of the five-year period. And their preservation would have represented a further constraint on the ministry negotiators when they were trying to effect the absorption of a particular college by a particular university. So Dr. Watson was asked to produce another plan, one which would bridge the transition period without *any* intermediate program course structures.

Commitment, visibility and consultation

I have mentioned the planner's need to recognize that major and massive planned change can only be successful if the ground work of public acceptance has been well laid, if there is provision for flexibility of pacing, and if the planner is careful not to create by-products or effects which constitute almost as serious problem-conditions as the one the plan is designed to reform. Finally I shall discuss three attributes of planning which are to some extent linked, and which I consider are political necessities—commitment, visibility and consultation. The planning of the university system of Ontario over the years 1950 to 1970 can be used to illustrate the importance of these qualities which are crucial to the success of the planner but cannot be provided by the planner alone.

A synonym for commitment might be stability. In Ontario there have been Conservative Party governments since 1943. We have the cabinet system of parliamentary government under which the party with the majority of members in the legislature forms the government, and through its members directs the policies of the major departments of government. The ministers responsible for the administration of public policy sit in the Legislature. No one would suggest that over these years there has been no change in government policy. Policy evolves. But there has been no drastic repudiation of former commitments. Under this system there is no division between the legislative branch and the administrative branch of government. And through the device of the parliamentary committee there is considerable bi-partisan discussion and agreement on the regulation and administration of public affairs, particularly those which have no direct party political impact. Thus, in the 1950s, Dr. R.W.B. Jackson's secondary school enrollment projections and population projections had demonstrated to the universities that they would unmistakably face a crisis of numbers in the 1960s. These estimates were scrutinized and accepted as reasonable by government supporters and opposition politicians alike; and once the government had publicly declared it would expand the number of university places to accommodate the expected influx—once these public stances had been taken—in Ontario there was a truly amazing degree of bi-partisan political commitment to the expansion of higher education, and to very high public investment in this educational sector.

The planning mode by which Ontario gained eight new universities between 1952 and 1965, and expanded the number of full-time undergraduate places from 20,621 in 1950 to 106,668 in 1970, was highly visible and consultative. The University Affairs Committee (a para-governmental agency representing government, the universities, and the public) was

created. Interested municipalities and regions lobbied and prepared draft plans to show why their communities might well "receive" one of the new institutions. But for all the visibility and consultation there was not anarchy or chaos. What emerged (largely I think because the planning was carried out by a small group of experts, politicians and public administrators) was a *system* of universities with a number of complementary faculties and schools. In spite of the looseness of the planning, in spite of the fact that no system was specifically designed—and the very notion of system was anathema to many of the interested parties—a system did emerge, one with very little overlap and much less wastage than might reasonably be expected given such a rapid expansion and the distribution of population in this province, with its few big cities, its populous south and its thinly settled north and west. I would not try to defend the university expansion in Ontario as perfect planning. There are many who were involved in it who would claim that we ended up with at least one institution we should never have had, some who would even claim we have two more than are desirable. There are critics who claim that the expansion cost more than it should have, and that if it had not been allowed to proceed in so expansive a fashion it would not have been necessary to curb the costs of higher education so firmly after 1971. A decade after the expansion the opposition political parties would certainly make these criticisms, and we would expect them to make such criticisms. Undoubtedly they would have carried out the expansion somewhat differently and we would have a different university system today if a different government had carried it out. All such a statement says is that successive Conservative governments *did* have a higher education policy and they carried it into effect. But assessed against the comparable expansion of other university systems we would claim that this change was effected in Ontario at reasonable cost, in a fairly orderly manner as planned, with little public controversy—at least during the actual expansion years 1950 to 1970. This was a political achievement of no mean order. It was not primarily the achievement of the planners. It was achieved by the cooperation of planners with the administrators and the politicians of all parties. It was achieved because the planners were astute enough to become aware of, to become sensitive to, the political needs of the situation. These planners did not try to work as a group of back room experts, technocrats devising a system for the edification of public servants and the public. They had the good sense, the political sense, to make partners of the politicians and the public servants. With their expertise they made the universities, civil servants and politicians aware of the indispensable minimum expansion which had to be accomplished. With their sound commonsense they revised their forecasts and estimates, trimming them to what government would agree to commit itself to, and what the universities would agree could reasonably be accomplished.

Conclusion

In concluding this paper, as a former educational administrator, now a public administrator, this is my message to you as planners: We should be partners, and as partners we should be sufficiently conversant with each others' work conditions to cooperate without creating problems for each other. Policy goals are decided by governments which are responsible to the public for the decisions. Generally these goals are dictated neither by administrators nor planners—although both can sometimes influence them. Once the general goals are agreed, however, it will take technical planning skill, administrative skill and political judgement to reach them successfully. Planning skill alone is not enough for success. And if the planner exercises his skills with little understanding of the politics of the system within which the change has to take place, then the skills of the administrator and the minister will not be enough either. 17

Gerald L. Freeborne*

THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTING EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, AS SEEN FROM THE STATE LEVEL

Introduction

Although this topic is a difficult one to address in terms of an intermediate agency such as a state educational authority in the United States, I shall describe some of our attempts to implement planned change in New York State. The emphasis of my paper will be on the state's role in assisting useful change in local school districts.

My presentation will cover three topics: First, since this is such a diverse group and we all come to the planning task with different perspectives, I shall outline my personal planning philosophy. Second, I shall discuss a preliminary model which links the state's role in trying to effect change with that of the federal government and of other constituencies. In describing the model I shall touch on some of the practical problems we have encountered and tentative solutions we have utilized in dealing with the politics of change. Finally I shall outline how New York State has implemented the model in two specific projects; the development and implementation of a reading effectiveness measure, and the development and implementation of what has been called the instructional evaluation or instructional support system. Even though the details apply specifically to politics in New York State the general principles should have applicability to many of the planning problems which you encounter in your work.

Personal planning philosophy

In our agency the orientation is towards improving planning, management, evaluation and decision-making in local school districts while at the same time defining the role of the state educational department in accomplishing this task—not only is this our policy, it accords well with my own priorities. (The major headings or tenets of my philosophy of planning are implied in the listing given in Figure 1.) In my experience such improvement of the capability of local school districts must be dealt with through a systems approach. I define the systems approach as a systematic analytical method which permits a logical sequence of activities which reveal the interrelated nature of a series of problems and alternative solutions. It requires a series of thought processes by which are precisely defined the problem, the causes of the problem, the effects of constraints on the problem, and the definition of possible alternatives; from these activities are developed the functional specifications of the ideal system. Another ingredient in the systems approach, at least as we have used the concept, is that problems are defined and examined in such a way that major portions of the system are analysed simultaneously. The "system" section under scrutiny, for example, may be a group of the department's numerous offices or the whole instructional process. One of the most difficult tasks in defining the problem, of course, is to draw the appropriate system boundaries. Limited resources and conceptual difficulties ·

prevent one from dealing with the whole universe at once. On the other hand, if viable solutions are to be generated, the *significant* relationships or linkages affecting the particular problem area must be identified.

Figure 1

I. Philosophy of Planning

    A.   Systems Approach

    B.   Gaining Acceptance of Planning

            1. Short-range

            2. Long-range

    C.   Reasons — Past Failures of Implementing Change

            1. Research and Development — "Hands-on"

            2. Implementation Assistance

            3. Categorical Emphasis

            4. Expectations Regarding Change

            5. Availability of Extra Resources

            6. Dissemination

As important as gaining an understanding of the advantages of the systems approach to planning is ensuring an acceptance of planning itself. Therefore the first priority should be short-range planning rather than long-range planning. I speak of the immediate future. By short-range planning I mean helping school districts deal with their current problems— ones which have been unsolved and festering for some time. As my specific examples will show we have found the largest problems involve local capabilities in improving the instructional process. One might almost say that this is a problem endemic to education—the system's dissatisfaction with its own instructional process varies at different points in time, and we are probably going through an unusually critical time, one when public and professional discontent with the instructional program is high. More specifically, local agencies need help in preplanning, instructional program planning, instructional management, monitoring and evaluation. There is a serious deficiency of feedback information. Another short-range planning need is the development of procedures for defusing the political situation that exists for local school agencies so that the technical management and educational aspects of problems may receive attention. Our recent experience in New York City highlights the importance of the role of politics in local school districts, and how the planners in the state agency must adjust their way of operating to deal with such realities.

Long-range planning I would define as being focussed on the problems of the future. How long in the future is long-range depends to a very large extent on the office from which one works and the administrative and political traditions of the system in which the work is being done. It also depends on whether one has some operating responsibility for the present, and can be held accountable for failing to ameliorate the evident deficiencies of the present. Three years from now can be the "long-term" future if you work on a year-by-year mandate, and ten years ahead can be as remote as another generation. Long-range planning seems to involve one of two basic approaches: 1. One may start with the present, estimating likely conditions year by year for a period of time and try to affect the conditions immediately, adjusting the future estimate year by year within some vision of

the "goal" and some knowledge of the "art of the possible"; or 2. Define "futures" at the distant point in time and work back, estimating the series of necessary states which must exist (back to the present) in order to achieve that future in precisely the way, and at the pace desired. Each in its own way is instructive and worthy of effort. But, in my opinion, until such things as basic instructional planning, management and evaluation capabilities at the local level are improved, long-range planning will remain an academic exercise.

Before discussing the three-level model which illustrates the role of a state in planning and implementing educational change, I should like to mention what, I believe, are some of the reasons that change has not been successfully implemented. (These are listed in point form under C in Figure 1.)

- In New York State, all too often, research and development in education have been carried out in isolation from the real operation of schools in the local school districts. The R & D programs have not been planned with local problems and constraints in mind. In our current work we try to have a "hands-on" relationship with local school districts. I shall describe later what this entailed in our work in community school districts in New York City.

- Another factor has been the inadequate provision of implementation assistance. The traditional assumption has been that officials of local school districts are capable of defining their own problems and, given sufficient resources, taking appropriate action to solve them. Our experience has shown that many school districts do not have this capability. They need outside help. Our effort to develop a better instructional management support system arose out of our field experience which suggested that school districts could not make such an improvement on their own.

- Undue and misplaced categorical emphasis has also been important in affecting the success or failure of implementing change in local school districts. Not only did many programs, for example under Title III, assume that local school districts could define their problems precisely and conduct the necessary R & D to effect change, but also that they could fit them into an overall linked change plan or strategy. I question this assumption. Many categorical programs tend to lead to a "parochial" rather than total systems view of schools. For example, the ESEA Title I Program in the United States has led many school districts to develop separate educational programs for categorical projects. Districts do not often make the effort explicitly to link the categorical projects to their regular instructional programs. It is part of the state planner's role to point out the fragmented nature of the total effort and underline the price being paid by this emphasis on categorical projects undertaken in isolation.

- Too often the implementation of change has been impeded by excessively high expectations regarding results. It has been my experience that local incentives for implementing change are not great. The barrier of the current condition looms too high. The state planners must be content with small incremental gains in the direction of their goals. We are talking of an evolutionary process. It is important to note that one cannot challenge authority and power structures dramatically and at the same time solicit their cooperation in implementing change at the local level.

- The availability of extra resources is important for success. There are certain start-up costs which must be funded. They generally have not been adequately provided.

● The last factor influencing the successful implementation of change is dissemination. There has been an all too pervasive assumption that writing general articles about successful educational programs in one locality would convince other school districts to adopt the reforms. I think there are at least two reasons why this has not worked: 1. People like to feel that they are creating something that is different and that it is a response to the problem that they understand best; 2. Such general articles really are not sufficiently detailed and prescriptive to show the local officials how to go about the task. Effective dissemination of educational change programs might well include visits of personnel to other school districts; the training of core staff to work on a continuous basis in districts; the adoption of procedures in a cookbook format showing how the program can be implemented step by step; and certain money incentive systems.

A model for implementing change

Now let us consider a macro model for describing the role of a state in inducing educational change, and indicate some of the political factors we have had to deal with in trying to implement this type of model.

Figure 2 identifies four constituencies that the State Education Department has to deal with in New York State. They include local school districts, the Board of Regents, the Governor and the Legislature, and the general public. Under local school districts in Figure 2 are five subprocesses which we consider are important for establishing a base for educational change in their jurisdiction. These are applicable both to instructional and to administrative problems which they might encounter. One of the department's recent studies indicates that these are five areas which definitely need improvement. The study focussed on the management of categorical programs for the disadvantaged. It included an evaluation of project proposals using 28 different scales which measured the quality of local planning and evaluation, at least as demonstrated in project proposals themselves. The measures reflected current planning, management and evaluation standards. It was found that local performance had improved slightly over the past four years but that it remained mediocre if judged by current standards of planning, management and evaluation. Our experience in districts in New York State, and currently our experience in New York City community school districts, confirmed that local school districts have had very little experience in planning, management and evaluation, particularly in terms of a total systems approach. There is not the time to discuss each of the items in Figure 2 in detail, but I shall briefly mention them.

Preplanning requires the development of a specific, well-thought-out set of processes to be used in persuading the various parties that educational change must be attempted. Even at this phase we have found the need for the provision of technical assistance from the state level. School district officials must designate who will be involved in the various activities (preplanning, program planning, policy planning) and what their roles and responsibilities shall be, the types of products they desire, etc. It is in the preplanning work that the "plan" for proceeding with the planning is worked out. Some of the work plan must deal with gaining acceptance of top-level people either through trips, explanations of the alternatives, meetings with supervisors and teachers, parents, unions, the central board in New York City—each of these groups, politically, has different interests. The issue of dissemination (i.e., presenting ways of communicating what the specific change is all about) must be addressed throughout and in detail before the work is begun. In

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Figure 2   State's Role in "Change"

Constituencies		State	Federal
I.	Local School Districts		
	A. Preplanning — Models	• Analyses	Resources based on acceptable State Plan
	B. Policy Planning	• Research and Development	
	C. Program Planning	• Pilot Testing	
	D. Implementation — Technical Assistance	• Expansion and Iteration	
	E. Evaluation (Feedback-Iteration) — Resources	• Dissemination	
II.	Board of Regents	• Analyses and Reporting	
III.	Governor and Legislature	• Budget Requests • Reporting	
IV.	Public	• Reporting • Service	

addition, the preplanning must include a plan for tracing such things as whether the instructional program plan has been implemented as designed, whether the management plan has been implemented as designed, etc.

For the *policy planning* there must be a mechanism, an organizational structure, which will permit the type of consultation which must be the basis for deciding in which direction a school district will proceed. Technical assistance must be provided to school districts to improve their performance of this task. One of our special emphases has been to help school districts define roles and responsibilities in the instructional process. This was much neglected in the past. Successful program planning necessitates getting a group of individuals to work together who, in the past, have worked fairly autonomously. As a specific example, we might consider a plan for the development of a comprehensive curriculum in, say, mathematics or reading. In the past, there was a lack of consistency and continuity in the curricular materials used within the same grade and between grades.

In planning for *implementation* we have found that there are many difficult tasks. The roles, responsibilities and relationships must be made explicit, for example, of school principals, assistant principals, teachers, resource people. How the categorical instructional programs should be integrated with the rest of the curriculum must be specifically determined. All of these require continuous technical assistance, research, development and feedback procedures designed to minimize the political pressures operating in local districts.

This *feedback* is a crucial element generally lacking at the lcoal school level. It is the state authority which must overcome this deficiency. It does so by research and development in designing a computer software system which will make evaluation and feedback possible. The individual school district can seldom take on this type of activity.

In summary, then, the state does have a role assisting local school districts with their educational planning, and in playing this role it must deal with the present in practical terms which recognize and take into account the political pressures in the local situation and the technical deficiencies of local officials. In our case we have tried to assist school districts in implementing change by the activities outlined in Figure 2.

The Board of Regents in New York State plays an important educational role; it has broad powers regarding the entire state educational system. It includes both lay persons and professional educators, and a considerable amount of the department officials' time must be spent trying to understand their views, preferences and biases and in presenting policy recommendations to them. The Board of Regents meets three days per month, except during August. The preparatory work for these meetings is tremendous. On the whole its members are fairly receptive to educational innovation, but the proposed change has to be presented with a clearcut plan and specific supporting information argued in a logical fashion.

The Governor and Legislature are also important actors in the process of change in education in New York State. Specific legislation and funds have to be secured from both of them. We have a strong executive budget system but over the last four or five years the legislature has played the stronger role in the budget process. An important point to make here is that the planner working within an agency must understand the environment in which it must operate and the balance of power forces. This is especially significant in terms of education, because each person considers himself an expert on the subject because he has gone through the system. This past year for the first time we have tried to improve

our relationship with the Governor and Legislature by preparing for them a comprehensive report on evaluation in elementary and secondary education. The report candidly reviews "state of the art" issues in testing, and the capability problems of local school districts in planning, management and evaluation. It suggests both a realistic "interim" and a "projected" program. In that document we tried to answer three performance-based questions they had been asking for some time:

- To what extent are students mastering basic skills?
- What types of instructional programs are most effective for students of different characteristics?
- To what extent are the best instructional planning, management and evaluation practices presently being used?

The questions were posed by a legislative commission several years ago and our report was written in such a way as to show what was now possible and what would be possible in the future if certain research and development activities were undertaken. We tried to be responsive to the types of questions legislators ask and at the same time be realistic about what could be done now and in the future. One lesson we learned from this activity was that even such a comprehensive written report is not enough. Firsthand and continuous personal involvement is required. The written word in itself is not sufficient.

The main constituency of the State Department of Education obviously is the public. The department's image is enhanced when its staff work with the representatives and officials of local school districts to provide them with necessary research and development and technical assistance. The main problem in carrying out this task is the limited number of staff available.

In the middle column of Figure 2, I have indicated three roles which, in my opinion, a state agency should play in fostering the implementation of planned change. First, it must develop models. The development of a reading effectiveness measure and an instructional evaluation system, which I shall describe later, was based on detailed, analytical work, involving the definition of the problems, research and development (especially in the area of computer support), pilot testing, developing models for expanding the implementation and iterating the efforts into the future. Second, it must provide technical assistance to school districts. Our experience, indicates that local school districts can most easily overcome their problems if experts are brought in from outside—not necessarily personnel of the State Department of Education. Our experience is that our "regulatory" role consumes more resources than our "technical assistance" role, and it is a policy question which the state agency must face as to which it ought to stress, which can be the more productive in improving education. Third, it must furnish financial assistance, especially with start-up costs. We confirmed this as recently as last year when we tried to implement an instructional evaluation system in New York City. The problem is how to pull together all the resources needed for bringing about significant change.

The role of the state's department *vis à vis* the Board of Regents is the traditional one of analysing conditions and reporting, but it is evident that it must be carried out with more detail, more systematically, and with more attention paid to explaining the problems in non-technical language. Similarly, its role in terms of the governor and legislature is the traditional one of reporting, preparing budget requests and legislation, but it must be performed differently. There must be continuous personal involvement with them and

their committees so that they understand what are the practical problems at the local level. In my experience governors, legislators and the public really do not know what are the problems of local school officials. School districts lack some of the basic tools by which they might monitor and assess their activities. For example, generally they do not have a comprehensive curriculum plan; they cannot compare the progress of various schools or classrooms (except through norm-referenced tests which are considered to be inappropriate mechanisms for evaluating the instructional process). Convincing people that these deficiencies are a problem which the state should attempt (and is attempting) to do something about is primarily a political problem.

The role of the federal government is difficult—particularly when one considers what it ought to be, as distinct from what it has been over the years. Differences of political philosophy are involved. From my experience, my personal opinion has evolved that federal resources should be provided only through a state agency and to an activity based upon an acceptable state plan. The Title III approach, which has assumed that local school districts could *independently* identify their problems, and come up with a viable plan to change the conditions, has proven successful only in some cases. Generally a broader view of local problems is needed and this can best be provided from state education departments. The state agency, however, has to prove that it can be a successful "change" agent. It must demonstrate that it has plans, models, technical assistance and resources. Such a state plan would have to be explicit and detailed.

In this section I have briefly set out a very complex set of roles. There are a number of actors, professional and lay—officials of local school districts, the Board of Regents, the Governor, the Legislature, the public, and the state and federal agencies. The crucial question is, what roles can each perform most effectively and how should they interact in order to effect planned change. My analysis and opinion rest particularly upon experience in the New York State Department of Education in the last three years. Our success in New York City in the past year, in particular, seems to indicate that the type of model I have been discussing can successfully produce considerable desired change. For the remainder of my time I shall briefly describe one specific application of this model.

Elementary and secondary education evaluation program

The recent report on elementary and secondary education evaluation, referred to earlier in this paper, addressed itself to three basic questions* which had been asked of the education department, and to two state of the art problems, the capability of existing testing methodologies and the availability of disaggregated information for decision-making.

Figure 3 outlines the program we have developed over the past few years to answer question #1 within the constraints of the state of the art problems. The report recognized that norm-referenced tests were not appropriate for answering question #1 and suggested that research and development work presently underway be expanded to develop a reading effectiveness instrument which would measure adult competencies, progress towards them, and growth between the beginning and the end of a school year. The instrument should also permit analytical studies of the appropriateness of instructional materials according to the reading comprehension of students with different reading abilities. An experimental version of the reading effectiveness measure was used with 24,000 children in New York City during the past year; its results will be available in fall 1974. Preliminary data indicate that students probably are able to read better than was the general belief based on a criterion-referenced test.

*Listed on page 24.

As Figure 3 indicates the instructional-criterion-referenced tests must also be able to determine continuously, throughout the school year, the specific skill levels required and the extent to which they are being achieved.

Figure 3   PROJECTED PROGRAM

Question # 1:   To what extent are students mastering basic skills?

- Reading Effectiveness Measure
- Measuring Adult Competencies
- Measuring progress toward adult competencies
- Measuring growth between beginning and end of school year
- Possible analytic studies

- Instructional Criterion-referenced Tests (Instructional Evaluation System — I.E.S.)
- Basic Competency Examinations

In the report, in answer to question # 2 the instructional evaluation system (also called the Instructional Support System - ISS) Currently being implemented in New York City is described.

This is what we hoped to accomplish within one year:

- Bring about a uniform teacher-generated math curriculum for grades 1 through 6 in all the elementary schools of District 18.
- Bring uniformity to program elements (objectives, activities, test items) and performance standards used in these classrooms.
- Give their teachers more time to spend on providing math instruction to the students by providing computer support for scoring tests and keeping records.
- Improve reporting to the school board, education supervisors, parents, teachers, and students.
- Make the MAT a program evaluation instrument targeted on the math curriculum actually used in the district.

In New York State we do not pretend to have all the answers on how to cope with the complex politics of bringing about this type of planned change, but we believe that some of the efforts described here are in the right direction.

Ernesto Schiefelbein*

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL PLANNING: THE CHILEAN CASE

Too often those who plan changes in the operation of an educational system seem to ignore its high complexity and its multiple links with the rest of society. Each sector of society may attempt to influence the operation of the educational system and its relationships with other agencies. Some groups may wish to redistribute education (as a proxy either for the redistribution of knowledge or the redistribution of degrees), but politicians may look for increased "opportunities" for members of their constituencies and union leaders may press for training programs associated with higher salaries.

This is why the questions raised by the planner, once the diagnosis has been finished, cannot be answered in technological terms alone. Any change in the system is likely to do violence to the position of one or more groups, leading to opposition to the proposed change. The implementation of planned educational change, therefore, is a political decision. In a democratic country resources should be allocated according to a subjective welfare function. But the proposed changes must be related to probable future results in ballots and the possibilities of staying in power.

The dangers of planned change were recorded as early as 1513 when Machiavelli wrote, "There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order". Machiavelli sent this message to princes who had immense power. Today, of course, the educational planner seldom has any power, and he works for (and with) politicians and administrators whose grasp of power may be very short-lived indeed.

The political environment of developing countries, however, seems to be quite different from developed countries. Sharp differences exist between the developing society which usually presses for political rule by a tiny financial-managerial-family elite, and the developed society which enjoys political democracy, a relatively free press and broad-scale popular participation in the political process. In developed countries most of the formal political influence is concentrated on law enactment, assigning tasks or providing guarantees or privileges to certain groups. Informal influences work through the use of patronage to disburse public funds, especially interfering in the tenders for contracts for buildings and civic works and for the issuing of licenses and civic employment opportunities.

In developing countries ideology plays an important role in the political process. An economist would say that people supporting an ideology place a high weight on the promise of future economic returns in relation to the time invested in group activities, given

that many needs and ambitions are not being met. The level of disorganization forces political leaders to look for support and loyalty rather than efficiency.

The legislature and the executive frequently clash because some laws are not feasible and cannot be implemented as enacted—therefore the administrative officers have to complement the laws or modify their meaning. For example, most developing countries have compulsory education laws although funds are available only to provide service for half the population of school age. Politicians try to control the administrators by enacting detailed laws—laws which even include the managerial procedures—but the lack of relevant information makes such laws even more difficult to implement and hence less likely to be enforced. Thus a vicious circle is created. For example, we now find that many Latin American countries even set their curriculum and syllabus through laws.

It is not possible here to describe in detail the political background affecting the relationship of the planner and the politician in the Chilean situation. But I shall devote most of my time to Chilean illustrations of the points I wish to make. I shall be referring to the years 1964-70, when Chile was under the regime of President Frei. During this time I served as Head of the Educational Planning Office in the Ministry of Education. During that period, Chile was politically a very open and competitive democratic society, a condition it had enjoyed for several decades. There existed a very vigorous and really free press, in which almost all shades of political opinion were represented. About 15% of the population was illiterate; 85% of the 7 to 12 year old population was enrolled in the educational system. Research had documented that children from the lower half of the society experienced a different educational "track" from that used by those from the upper half. In rural areas educational opportunities were limited to three or four grades of school. Children were promoted by grade, and almost half of those who enrolled in first grade were made to repeat it. In secondary schools the teachers were hired by the hour and many worked in two schools (and in a few cases more than two). In summary, this was a widely extended educational system that badly needed reform, to be reshaped so that it might offer a better service to a society which was one of the more developed nations of the Third World.

In 1964 there was an election which was won by a new political party (the Christian Democrat) which had coined the slogan: Revolution in Freedom. The new government took as its prime purpose the improvement of social conditions. It represented a substantial departure from past administrations. In particular, there was a commitment by political leaders to generate change in education. However, a pragmatic approach to educational problems was implemented rather than a revolutionary position. By pragmatic I mean a policy which takes the relationship of means and ends as being relatively unclear and changing, and assumes that current goals are provisional and will likely change as the society develops a better understanding of what it wants from the educational system.

The planning exercise which was undertaken resulted (among other things) in doubling the primary enrolment in five years, and trebling secondary school and university enrolments in the same period. By 1970, 20% of the population was attending the educational system. About 95% of the seven to twelve year olds were in school; half the primary school students were receiving free breakfasts and a quarter free lunch also. The "tracks" which up to 1964 had separated children of different social classes were integrated into one national system.

Chile is a small country of 10 million people, with a low density of population. Educational decisions in Chile, as in most Latin American countries, are centrally made in the Ministry of Education. Thousands of schools and millions of students are controlled from the capital city. The Ministry formulates and administers policies and programs. It directly runs the public educational system and exercises considerable control over private schools. Some 25% of the students are in the private sector. There are no local school boards; a direct relationship exists between each public school and the ministry. Thus, the bureaucracy plays a key role in the generation of power for change and adds another whole set of interrelationships in the variables the planner must try to affect.

As in many countries, in Chile ministers of education usually have a short tenure* The minister, therefore, is more respondent to constituencies outside the ministry than within, since he must anticipate his move to the next position. Accordingly, he is most interested in creating an impact, in having some short term successes for which he can claim achievement. He is likely to favour proposals which provide some immediate political or educational payoff. The short-term nature of the minister's tenure makes it doubtful whether the educational planner should rely solely on that relationship to build up a solid basis of power in the ministry. On the other hand he cannot ignore the minister. And if the planner is too successful in building up an independent basis of power and commitment, he is likely to encounter considerable ministerial mistrust. Chile might be characterized as a country in the middle of the road toward becoming a developed country. And, therefore, more nuances must be considered when discussing actual political problems faced in the planning process during the period 1964-70. To oversimplify the picture would be to distort it. However, these few comments are sufficient general introduction.

Now let me review a few actual cases.

Changing the curriculum of primary and secondary schools

The high rates of repetition, rote learning and lack of creativity, the emphasis on teaching rather than on learning—all these persuaded us that the curriculum ought to be changed as one means of changing teacher attitudes.

Simultaneously with the creation, in 1965, of committees to study buildings and enrolments (as well as nutrition, scholarships, teacher training, finances and human resources), the planning office set up a curriculum committee. By mid-1965 it had identified two tasks: first, a policy decision had to be made on which subjects would be taught and how much time would be spent on each; secondly, teaching materials and procedures appropriate for the teaching of each of these subjects had to be prepared or described.

About the same amount of money was available to attain the different sets of objectives. There would be minor changes in the number of students and types of building, and major changes in textbooks and materials. The final objectives were not challenged. However, the minister and political officers were somewhat reluctant to implement this change in the curriculum. They expected opposition from several groups: the teachers' union, the educational printing industry, parents and regional groups. Moreover, historically the issue had been resolved by law.

*The 1964-70 period in Chile was an exception to the rule; there were only two ministers during these years.

However, the planners were convinced that it would be possible to legitimize an "experimental" curriculum by means of the approval of the National Council of Education,* thus skipping Congress approval. A work group (which included teachers, parents, civil servants, university scholars, and industry representatives) was set up and, eventually, a consensus was achieved. Public opinion was informed of the agreement through the mass media and by means of slogans—such as "learning to learn", and "learning by doing". Considerable social acceptance was generated, and by the time the political echelon was ready to endorse the proposed change, the detailed project for its implementation had already been worked out.

The only real opposition came from the French language teachers. All the alternative curriculum proposals reduced the number of foreign languages from two to one. And generally French was eliminated in favour of English. These teachers launched a press campaign and the French ambassador "visited" the minister. The upshot was that the time for teaching French was once more included in the plan, in spite of the planning technicians' and curriculum designers' advice.

Increasing the teachers' salaries

As the planning work advanced it became obvious that teachers' support for the implementation of the new curriculum and the new structure of the school system was essential, and one way of fostering this would be to improve their incentives through their reward system. Teachers' salaries had remained constant (in real terms, that is, taking into account the rate of inflation) for the past ten years. A proposal was presented to the Ministry of Finance for increasing them by 7% per year over five years. Accompanying the brief was a comparison of relative levels of training and wages of other occupations, showing the low status of the teachers. The hourly rate was good, but they worked only 75% of the usual schedule. Treasury approval was obtained and the ministry started bargaining with the teachers' union. The ministry expected that in the bargaining the problem of the "taxi" teacher (hired by the hour) would be eliminated; they were prepared to pay more but would expect a longer teaching schedule. Special conditions for teachers living in isolated areas were also included in the discussions. Many educators looked upon the proposal as a significant advance in the search for higher quality education in Chile.

However, as soon as negotiations were underway the union realized that it was in a strong bargaining position. It would not discuss increases beyong the usual 36 hours per week load (for a 9 month year), and it asked for substantial raises to compensate for past neglect. The political parties supported the teachers (teachers represent 6% of the total votes in the country). The risk of strikes prompted parents' support as well. Finally the government had to agree to a substantial raise in salaries with no changes in working conditions. The additional financial burden reduced the funds available for the other reforms. There was, therefore, a limitation of the scope of such projects as the new textbooks, improved teacher training and the provision of food and scholarships. Thus, some parts of the program, aimed at reducing inequality over time, had to be postponed.

*A representative, consultative council within the ministry.

Promoting university planning

The university·has great impact on the operation of primary and secondary schools; this is especially true in Latin America. Therefore the educational planners in Chile considered it important to include university reform in their work. However, the office received a message from the top that the university sector should be left alone. It was a high level political decision not to open an additional political battle front (planning, as a menace to the universities' autonomy, might well be used as an opportunity for the students to engage in street demonstrations). It has been a tradition in Latin America that the opposition is housed in the university (and a future could be foreseen when the members of the party in power would themselves be forced to move into the university).

University demands for financing their annual expansion were handled through grants to specific schools and faculties. But it soon became clear that more information was desirable in order that the allocation process might be improved. The planning office started a crash program to gather information and prepare a position paper about the university sector. The universities' financial officers and planners were invited to assess the accuracy of the report in an informal discussion. All eight universities agreed to send representatives and at the meeting substantial agreement was reached about the main problems affecting the universities. (Solutions were not discussed.)

The students found other issues to fight over and demonstrated, anyway, for political reasons. So the veto to work on planning for the reform of the universities was no longer valid. Financial constraints forced the minister to ask the planning office to handle the allocation of resources for new projects (to the universities as well as the rest of the system). The office was ready for action based on its previous studies and the seminar which had been held. As a result a substantial amount of coordination was achieved between the universities and the rest of the system through informal agreements. The work of the universities' planning offices was reinforced and their physical facilities were used more intensively.

At the same time the ministry's planners tried to reduce the inequality of the university system. In the seminar it had been admitted that university applications came mainly from students of the middle and upper classes. Half of the applicants had been paying high fees in private secondary schools; university study was free. A law was drafted which would require such students to pay fees for their studies and devote the resultant revenue to scholarships for disadvantaged students. As had been expected, criticism of the proposed law arose from all the political spectrum—although based on different premises. There was some lukewarm support from a few newspapers. The law did not even reach Congress; the ministry planners were defeated. However, in the long run this may prove to have been a temporary setback, because an increasing proportion of the public are now aware that the slogan of a "free university" is a mechanism for transferring benefits to a small privileged group. This argument is more often heard in discussions nowadays. More research has accumulated about the issue, and recently the present government asked the universities to establish fees. Thus the future planner may benefit from the apparent failures of his predecessors.

Allocating school construction

Traditionally the decision to build a school came in response to a request from a politician. Naturally the politicians (in the government) with the greatest power were heard first. The

principal shortage of school facilities, therefore, was in the countryside. And the middle and upper class children attending academic secondary schools in middle class districts were better represented politically (and hence better served) than poor primary school children in low-income neighbourhoods. Ministers seemed to be quite successful in resisting requests for schools from small-time politicians; only the big boys got their schools built.

In this situation the planners early realized that they could not dispute the minister's or the politicians' need to approve certain petitions. There was no objective data to counteract the forces of the political "argument". There was not even information which might indicate whether a given kind and size of school should be built for a given location.

So demographic and enrolment information were gathered; a census of schools was carried out to build an index of potential demand for places in relation to available school capacity. With this tool the minister was able to argue with politicians in specific terms, showing them that other communities with worse conditions must be given top priority (unless there had been an actual presidential commitment). After a few attempts congressmen and politicians substantially reduced their requests. They started producing their own figures and challenging the planners' data. They succeeded in a few cases, but what had occurred was the transformation of the allocation process into a channel for the planners to update their figures. The whole decision-making system was improved. Later the index was re-examined to develop a weighting for certain types of community. By this means the direct pressures were turned into indirect pressures in order to obtain a better objective measure.

The development of this "technical" procedure, legitimized by its "scientific" quality, reinforced the planner's authority at the expense of the politician's. So that it was the planner, in effect, who gained power over the choice of location for future schools. The planners could use this new "authority" to "bargain" with legislators. The importance of the relationship of the planners with the legislature should not be underestimated. Even in countries with a strong executive, the legislature still serves as an important mechanism for the distribution of political favours. Legislators typically are leaders in their respective political parties, and they have significant influence outside the government.

Adult literacy campaign

The population census of 1960 registered 15% as illiterates. In 1964 members of the new government suggested the need to launch an adult literacy campaign. The planning office studied the available figures and discovered that, as in most countries, literacy was closely related with changes in the schooling level, in spite of several attempts made to increase literacy in the past. It was calculated that, by the end of the sixties, the expansion in schooling would reduce the illiteracy rate to 5% in the younger age cohorts and 10% in the population as a whole. Thus, illiteracy did not seem to be a pressing problem, and it would diminish as a by-product of other educational policies. In addition, international experience reported that literacy campaigns were usually ineffective.

In spite of the planners' evidence (which was presented to the political high ranks) a campaign was launched, speeches were printed, and the newspapers were informed about the new attempt to eradicate illiteracy. No substantial change in the anticipated literacy figures was detected in the 1970 census. It is important to mention that in 1970 the new

government attempted another new campaign. Planners must learn the important lesson
that some ideas and goals are so persuasive that the evidence of past failures does not dis-
courage the new set of decision-makers. They must recognize when it is necessary to bow
to the inevitable.

What can we learn from these few examples taken from the experience of Chile? We
must not push our conclusions too far; there are too few cases to justify general conclu-
sions. The cases describe projects which were developed in a situation that was neither a
revolutionary situation nor a stagnant society. The political climate favoured attention
being paid to better ways to reach old targets. In Chile in 1964, means and ends were
analyzed to develop a strategy for change, so that, by making changes in some of the func-
tional aspects of the educational system, attention could be focused on the goals of educa-
tion and a climate could be created favourable to significant changes in the curriculum and
structure of the system.

These cases suggest that, in certain situations, the planners may produce conditions
which will ensure that political acceptance of change becomes more likely. They also
underline the need to develop tactics which will enable them to generate the power neces-
sary to energize a stagnant bureaucracy. At the risk of going far beyond what the cases
might suggest (planners must always go far beyond the available objective data), I should
like to summarize a few personal lessons learned from my 1964-1970 planning experiences
inter alia:

● Progress creates decision stress; the accelerative thrust of technological change is forcing
  executives and politicians to quicken the tempo of decision-making. Political leaders
  are overloaded with information. Many people are asking them to solve their specific
  problems. Many channels are open for pressure groups to have access to politicians,
  thus transforming a number of routine decisions into "non-programmed" decisions
  which are higher in psychic cost. The school construction case is an example of this
  type of pressure. The planner then becomes invaluable to politicians; he will be
  accepted by them as a help in dealing with a demanding array of new problems for
  which routine handling is no longer a valid answer.

● Executives cannot tolerate too many simultaneous battlefronts (an example is the
  university case), nor too many options. Discussion of only a *few* choices seems to
  offer more help to the decision-maker in understanding the problem and the available
  alternatives. But there are a large number of options open. And their increase also
  increases the amount of information that should be processed to cope with them.
  Thus, when changing the curriculum, it was only possible to discuss three alternatives.
  The optimum number may differ from person to person. The planner must be able
  to detect evidence which reveals the personal optimum of the individual with whom
  he is dealing. He must screen the alternatives without oversimplifying the choices.
  He walks a delicate tightrope.

● Choices must be submitted to a set of demanding tests. Educational systems are
  large and complex and they are intimately linked with the major groups of society.
  Whether the planners are proposing a new educational structure or a new technology,
  they must attempt to determine how the change will alter the delicate balance upon
  which the executive and the system itself depend for survival. If the results of the
  set of tests are not completely satisfactory, if the planners do not feel they can
  reasonably forecast the effects of the change, they should reduce the proposed
  changes. Small changes are less likely to encounter resistance than large ones. By

neglecting to consider this point carefully the bargaining on the teachers' salaries was lost.

● Personal relationships between the politician and the planner must be good. In some instances planning seems to limit the freedom of action of politicians. Their acceptance of planning will depend on demonstrating that the planners' advice will actually increase the probability of achieving their personal and organizational objectives. Planners must present the analysis (cost-benefit) of their recommendations in terms of variables important to politicians. In the literacy campaign case the technical arguments were neglected because the politicians were reacting to a very different set of objectives from those of the planners.

● Current obstacles to change once were innovations themselves. The programs now most fiercely defended often are those which were established only after a bitter struggle against an earlier tradition. The universities, for example, were defending an autonomy they had gained only after fierce struggle. The acceptance that organizations are changeable avoids the search for the perfect organization—an odyssey that consumes valuable resources and, when it ends in failure, results in apathy. In developing countries authoritarian organizations often emerge from the efforts of utopians to squeeze imperfect individuals into *their* (developed) model of the perfect system.

● Strategies for change should consider the role of mass media. Public opinion plays an important role in shaping educational decisions. It is difficult to predict how news media will react to proposed changes, but timely reports and news releases may improve their fair coverage. In the case of the ·curriculum reform the newspapers supported the change and aided its eventual implementation, while in the teachers' salaries case they joined the opposition.

● Information seems to be the planner's best weapon. Executives are aware that someone should process the information they need but don't have the time to study. The capacity of the planner to gather, tabulate and interpret data represents for other actors (in developing countries at least) a "scientific" way of solving administrative problems. Thus, the myth that the planner provides objective answers is generated and it legitimizes his intervention. The school construction case is an example of this point.

● Discussion of *objectives* requires a high degree of political consensus. It is easier for politicians to assess the effects of changes in *means*. The means-end relationship in education is not yet well enough understood to predict accurately the way the system should be designed to reach the defined goals. What the system actually produces is more a function of inputs, processes and structure, than dependent upon goals that have been established for education. In the case of the curriculum change, the definition of a whole new set of operational objectives did not require a single change in the goals traditionally assigned to education.

It is suggested that these principles would be useful in a wide variety of situations in Latin American countries. However, organizational design and the implementation of change are not learned by reading about them, or by listening to the descriptions of even the best of lecturers. The problem for all planners is that much of what must be done to produce change successfully· requires original solutions to problems that cannot be anticipated in the lecture hall. This paper has merely presented a few examples to sensitize you to the kinds of problems an educational planner might well face in developing countries. If a political problem can be recognized for what it is, there is always the possibility that the planner can help create the conditions for an adequate solution—that he will not persist in thinking he has merely a technical problem until he arrives face to face finally with failure.

William M. Rideout Jr.* and David N. Wilson**

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL PLANNING: THE CASE OF ZAIRE

Introduction

In presenting this case study of educational planning at the national level we are primarily concerned with demonstrating the interaction of the political and the planning processes. The choice of Zaire for discussion of the *politics* of planning is quite appropriate; there are few other jurisdictions where the nation's attempts to plan its educational service are, and have been, so influenced by politics.

Zaire is the country which was formerly known as the Congo (more appropriately, the *République Démocratique du Congo*) and in the colonial period was called the Belgian Congo. During the period of transition from a Belgian colony to an independent nation, and in the succeeding years with their chaos of inter-ethnic strife, secession and rebellion and, then, reconstruction under a military regime, a number of educational policies were formulated, implemented and discarded. We shall examine the effect of these shifting policies upon the planning and development of the educational system of Zaire.

Philip Coombs has pointed out that "educational planning deals with the future, drawing enlightenment from the past".[1] Certainly part of the problem Zaire has experienced in its educational planning efforts has been the inheritance of colonial models and practices. It seems to have acquired, vicariously prior to independence and directly through Belgian advisors afterwards, Belgian educational planning attitudes which might be characterized as being empirical and practical.[2] Each major component of the colonial structure— religious, business and governmental—was concerned to satisfy its own educational needs. Planning generally was opportunistic and guided by short-term considerations, although each institution was guided by its own long-term objectives, e.g., harvesting souls, increasing profits, and protecting Belgium's interests and investments. In such a context there was available (or potentially available) a continuous flow of outside personnel and funding, especially from religious institutions and from business, to augment the government's contribution to education. These additional inputs ensured that the government need not plan, or set priorities, to overcome financial constraints—a way could always be found to increase educational funds. The educational field was a central arena of competition among the major elements in the colonial structure for influence over the Africans. Many of these pre-independence conditions, attitudes, practices and procedures continued after 1960. There was lack of governmental control, the continued presence of major business and missionary entities (in many cases with the same actors in influential roles), and the continued availability of outside funds for the support of education.

To set the stage for this case study we shall sketch the Democratic Republic of Zaire in geographic, economic, demographic, historical and educational terms. Zaire is the third largest nation in Africa, with a total land area of 906,000 square miles and an estimated

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population of 23,300,000 of whom five million live in urban areas. The estimated annual rate of population growth is between 2.5% and 2.9%; the population density is 20 per square mile.

Zaire's Gross Domestic Product for 1970 was calculated at 900 million Zaires, about U.S. $1.8 billion. It had grown in real terms at an annual rate of 5.2% between 1965 and 1970 (i.e., after allowing for price increases). The rate of economic growth for part of that period was much higher—8.6% in 1968, 9.3% in 1969 and 11% in 1970—but it dropped to about 5% in 1971. The annual growth rate projected in 1970 for the planning period 1971-80 was 6%. All major economic sectors were expected to share in this growth: agriculture at 6.3%, industry at 7% and mining at 6.6%. The annual per capita income was expected to grow from approximately $100 in 1970 to $117 in 1975 and $158 in 1980.[3]

The sectoral composition of the GDP in 1969 was as follows:[4]

	%
Primary Sector	
commercialized agriculture	10.5
mineral extraction	11.0
Secondary Sector	
metallurgy	18.2
manufacturing industries (large-scale)	4.6
construction & public works (large-scale)	2.8
energy	1.0
Tertiary Sector	
transport and communications	6.0
banking and insurance	2.2
commerce (large-scale)	12.3
administrative services and defence	13.8
other services	8.8
Subsistence Agriculture	8.4

In general the capital-intensive projects embarked upon by the government have not generated sufficient employment to significantly change the nature of the economy. Between 70% and 80% of the Zaire population are engaged in subsistence agriculture, and agricultural production has yet to attain its 1959 figures (the last full year before independence). However, production has been improving markedly since the termination of civil strife in 1966.[5]

The precise size of the wage-paid labour force in Zaire cannot be given because of the poor quality and scarcity of statistics. In any case, in developing nations, distinctions between unemployment and underemployment are rarely made and, when made, are notoriously lacking in standardized criteria. As of 1967, approximately 13% of the Zaire population of working age were salaried or employed for wages, almost three quarters of them in estate agriculture and related processing industries. In 1968, the sectoral composition of the wage-paid labour force in large-scale enterprises was:[6]

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agriculture	363,700
extractive industries	56,700
manufacturing industries	35,000
chemical and metal construction industries	16,000
construction	15,000
transport and communications	60,100
commerce, banking, administration and other services	29,500

Another 332,400 persons were described as employed in modern-type employment in small-scale enterprises, which leaves some 233,500 employed in small-scale agricultural enterprises. (These are itinerant workers known as *travailleurs libres*.) As noted earlier, about 70%-80% of the population participates in subsistence agriculture. If it is assumed that 40% of this population are of working age, then the subsistence agricultural labour force may be roughly estimated at 7,360,000.

According to Anatole Romaniuk, the demographic data for Zaire during the 1950s was extraordinarily good by African standards. However, the civil upheaval and dramatic deterioration of public health, economic and urban conditions during the 1960s, has markedly altered this situation. The 1955-57 Demographic Inquiry reported the age structure and distribution of the population as follows:[7]

Age	Percentage of Total	Percentage in Urban Areas
0 - 4	16.90	20.62
5 - 9	13.25	12.49
10 - 14	11.55	7.65
15 - 19	10.20	7.28
20 - 24	8.80	11.27
25 - 29	7.60	12.91
30 - 34	6.55	10.10
35 - 44	10.25	10.67
45 - 54	7.35	5.14
55 +	7.55	1.88

Kinshasa, known before independence as Leopoldville, is an urban agglomeration of approximately one and one-half millions. It has grown from about 100,100 in 1945 at a rate of 11.8% per annum, which means that it doubled numerically every nine years. A 1969 study noted that the average age of its inhabitants was 17 years 10 months, and the breakdown of the population by age groupings was as follows:[8]

Age	Percentage of Total
0 - 4	21.2
5 - 9	18.1
10 - 14	13.1
15 - 19	9.6
20 - 24	8.0
25 - 29	7.6
30 - 34	6.5
35 - 39	5.8
40 - 49	6.6
50 - 59	3.1
60+	0.4

A comparison of the 1955-57 data on the structure of the urban population with the 1969 data for Kinshasa suggests that the rapid urbanization which took place after the attainment of independence in 1960 may be on the decline. Approximately 52.4% of the population of Kinshasa were under age 15, whereas a decade earlier there had been only 40.8%; 62.0% were between 20 and 40, while a decade ago there had been only 45%; 10.1% were between 40 and 50, and 3.5% were over 50.

In order to trace policies which have had an impact upon present-day Zaire and its educational system, we must briefly examine its colonial history. A varied and continually changing array of political structures existed before the advent of the Europeans. Some of these kingdoms and chieftainships in Bas Zaire had early contact with the Portuguese, and one kingdom even converted to Christianity during the 1500s. Internecine warfare, with assistance from the Portuguese, Dutch and others, continued until the 1880s, when the interested European powers began to make specific territorial claims. The travels of David Livingstone and Henry Morton Stanley brought the area to the attention of King Leopold of the Belgians.

Belgium itself had only been consolidated as a state in 1831, and the European occupation of Africa provided Leopold with the opportunity to create the Congo Independent (or free) State as a sovereign nation, during the negotiations for the Treaty of Berlin which partitioned Africa in 1885. According to William Rideout:

> Since it was legally a separate kingdom, Leopold had direct access to neither
> Belgian government personnel nor funds in support of Congo operations.
> His own fortune was limited and he was, therefore, forced to derive the maxi-
> mum benefit possible from the power and influence he could command as King
> of Belgium and as King-Sovereign of the Congo. By planning and ruthless
> exploitation of position, prestige and people, Leopold ruled the Congo for
> twenty-three years. Confronted after 1900 by mounting international criticism
> of his African administration, he gave the CIS to Belgium as a colony in November,
> 1908, just thirteen months prior to his death. His regime, however, had already
> established patterns which were not to be changed by the succeeding colonial
> government.

Following the creation in 1909 of *Congo Belge* many of the policies which Leopold had chosen on grounds of expediency remained to influence strongly the development of the educational system which Zaire inherited in 1960. The two most prominent elements upon which Leopold relied are still strong determinants of policy, although their influence is declining. They are the Catholic Church and the Belgian financial-industrial complex.

The travels of David Livingstone had inspired missionary activity in a number of areas including the Congo. These led to educational activities. The development of Zaire's formal educational system can be traced to the entry of Protestant missionaries in 1878. Rideout has described their early activities as follows:

> Although the missionaries came seeking souls while Leopold's agents sought
> wealth and dominion, life in the Congo for Europeans was impossible without
> the assistance of the Congolese. In order to establish stations in which they
> might survive the jungle, the Europeans needed increasingly well-trained and
> educated Congolese—from labourers and masons to carpenters and mechanics.

Thus, although the colonial government assumed virtually no operational responsibility for the education of Africans, it did assume some fiscal responsibility by granting subsidies to

the missions. Prior to World War II, educational development was almost entirely domi-
nated by Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries, and there was distinct official pre-
ference for the Catholic system. This had been embodied in a 1906 concordat between
King Leopold and the Vatican. Colonial subsidies were made available to Protestant-
affiliated schools only in 1948. The structure of this educational system persisted until
the educational reforms following World War II. Unlike the British and French philosophy
of colonization, which was one of indirect rule through the native elite (and which, there-
fore, required that the elite be cultivated through exposure to modern western education),
the Belgian colonial regime was characterized by direct rule. Acting as if their colonial
presence would be a permanent state and their nationals would provide all the Congo's
leaders, Belgium educated very small numbers of clerical and technical cadres to staff only
the lower echelons of public and private bureaucracies. There was deliberate neglect of
the development of African secondary and post-secondary education, with the result that
nearly all the school enrollment was to be found in the first few years of the primary
schools.

Zairois were prepared for leadership roles only for the churches. Until the 1950s, the
petits and *grands* seminaries were the sole avenues to secondary and the equivalent of
post-secondary education. The first African priest had been consecrated in 1917, and by
1960 Zaire had the most heavily Africanized clergy in tropical Africa. It had 500 Zairois
priests, one-third of the total in Africa at that time. One educational effect of this was
that the dropouts from the seminaries were a major source of primary school teachers of
the Catholic schools.

Only a handful of Zairois had university qualifications and these they obtained abroad.
At the time of independence it was alleged that the nation had only 30 university graduates.
This was essentially true, but it failed to take into account the large number of seminary
graduates who possessed equivalent qualifications.

The pre-independence system

Until World War II, the policy of the colonial government was to favour national mission
schools which followed the official program. Only they were granted subsidies; these were
on a twenty-year basis. Protestant missions were not eligible for grants because they were
not Belgian-managed, i.e., they were not "national" missions. (There were a few excep-
tions to this policy—of which the schools of the English Mill Hill (Catholic) Fathers were
one.) The "official" curriculum was adapted to African conditions. The *écoles primaires
du premier dégré*, designated as rural schools, provided two years of primary education
with emphasis on vocational and agricultural studies. Instruction at these schools was in
the vernacular language of the area. *Écoles primaires du second dégré* offered the third,
fourth and fifth years of primary education, usually at the mission stations or in urban
centres. The *écoles spéciales pour la formation de l'élite* accepted the outstanding graduates
of the urban primary schools and prepared them to be primary school teachers or clerks.
There was a completely separate school system for Belgian children. It had been created
in 1912 but not until 1953 did these schools begin to admit a few gifted African students.
The graduates of these primary schools entered secondary schools (Atheneums) which
followed the *régime metropolitain*, i.e., the Belgian curriculum which prepares Belgian
students for post-secondary studies at home. Most of this structure was the product of the
educational reforms of 1929. Although further reform was proposed in 1937-38, little
additional development took place until after the Second World War.

William M. Rideout Jr., and David N. Wilson

After the war the twenty-year national mission school subsidization agreements were terminated and all mission schools became eligible for grants if they met government standards. Since the *école subsidé* system provided the only recognized diplomas, Protestant missions accepted the subsidies for their schools although they favoured the separation of church and state. In 1948, another reform improved the primary system and introduced a standardized 6-year program of secondary education with both modern and classical study streams. For the first time a genuine distinction was made in the education of Africans between the mass-based, primary education and the education of an African elite. The policy had actually been initiated in 1946, with the establishment of separate lay schools for Africans and Belgians. Both would include various secondary school streams, but the European schools were more classical than the African. By 1953 highly selected African students, able to meet severe social as well as academic standards, were permitted to enter the metropolitan program schools with the Belgian students, a policy change which was considered a major achievement by the Africans who were fighting for equality. According to Rideout,

> ...in effect, the establishment of equality between Congolese and colonials at the secondary level was coterminous with the development of colonial universities. Both occurring simultaneously, placed a strain on the educational system which, to avoid collapse, demanded extensive resources in terms of financing and foreign teachers. Subsequent social, political and economic events compounded secondary and university problems during the 1950s, but the colonial givernment which had created this situation, did little to solve it prior to independence.

The year 1954 marks a watershed in the evolution of educational policy during Zaire's colonial period. In that year, Belgium's Roman Catholic-dominated government was replaced by a Liberal-Socialist coalition which was decidedly anti-clerical, and the following years were marked by an intense competition between the government, the church and the king for educational and political advantage, with the *évolués* (a middle-class, nascent elite, the products of the few post-primary schools) playing off one group against another in order to agitate for greater equality and eventual independence.

A commission on educational policy, appointed by the new government, recommended that in keeping with changes made in the Belgian educational system subsidies to mission schools should be reduced, and a system of lay schools be established. These contentious conditions in the metropolitan political scene altered the emphasis, but not the direction, of the 1950 Ten-Year Congo Development Plan which had emphasised the development of African manpower to satisfy the expanding local industrial development. The threat of a strike by the Catholic missions, which would have closed their schools, led to a compromise. Subsidies would continue to the schools of the Catholic missionary orders (which served approximately 70% of the pupils) while the government expanded the system of lay ("official") schools. One important political outcome of the strife between church, state and big business was that the *évolués* recognized its existence and took advantage of it to push their nationalist aspirations.

One of the most significant educational manifestations of the cleavage was at the post-secondary level. The first university in Zaire, Lovanium, was opened near Kinshasa in 1954, under the sponsorship of the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium. The reaction of the Liberal-Socialist government to what was a virtual Catholic monopoly of higher education in the colony was the establishment in 1956 of a second university, the Official

University of the Congo (UOC) at Lubumbashi (then called Elisabethville). This was followed in 1963 by the opening of the *Université Libre du Congo* at Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville) under the sponsorship of the Council of Protestant Churches in the Congo. Thus there was inaugurated in Africa under colonial conditions the denominational-replication of post-secondary education which was a feature of Belgian education.

The impact of independence

Belgian colonial policies were overtaken by political events which led to the premature granting of independence in 1960—the king forced the government to make a commitment to immediate independence, with only eighteen months notice. At independence the Zairois inherited an educational system which consisted of the base of the pyramid with virtually no middle section or peak. It was truncated at the primary level. In 1959 primary enrollment had represented almost 65% of the population aged 6 to 11, but high attrition and repetition rates distorted the picture of the length of participation time and the actual amount of education being received. More than 70% of the primary schools provided only two years of education. Some 43% of the total enrollment at the primary level was in the first year, and pupils in the first two years represented 64% of the entire primary enrollment. There were only 45,000 pupils in the sixth year, i.e., less than 3% of the total enrollment and less than 9% of the cohort which had entered primary school six years earlier. The pattern at the secondary school level was similar: in 1959 the enrollment of 29,000 represented less than 1% of the relevant age group; 41% of these students were enrolled in the first year of the *cycle d'orientation;* and the overwhelming majority were registered in this two-year preparatory cycle, rather than one of the four-year program options which followed the preparatory cycle. The numbers enrolled in the final three years of university preparatory courses were so small that there was little likelihood of being able to provide the high-level manpower needed for the first decade of independence. Moreover, among the total secondary school enrollment there were only 1,000 girls.

Since independence Zaire has suffered a series of national dislocations which are unparalleled in Africa. These have affected the whole society and its economy and, of course, the impact on their educational system has been severe. An immediate exodus of Belgians followed the 1960 crisis, although many of the religious personnel remained or subsequently returned. There was an immediate emergency in the secondary schools, particularly in the lay or "official" schools. Katanga Province (now called Shaba) seceded. In its southern section schools continued to function, but in its northern part, during the Baluba rebellion and the subsequent severe repression, educational facilities were ravaged. In 1960-61 South Kasai also seceded and much of Kasai Province was disrupted by localized ethnic conflict. From November 1960 until August 1961, and again from October 1961 until January 1962, Orientale (now called Haut Zaire) and much of Kivu Province were under the control of the Gizenga regime*. Katanga was reintegrated in January 1963, but a year later rebellion broke out in Bandundu, and the Idiofu and Gungu territories were out of the control of the national government for more than a year. In summer 1964 in the eastern part of the country rebel forces conquered most of Kivu, much of north

*This was the group which considered itself the legitimate government following the assassination of the first prime minister of the country, Patrice Lumumba.

Katanga and all of Orientale. During these disturbances teachers were a particular target. Rebel vengeance was directed at anyone having more than a three year primary education, the more highly educated Africans being identified with the "official" government. The recapture of Kisangani in November 1964 marked the beginning of the end of the rebellion, but a climate of insecurity lingered in Maniema, south of Kivu and the Kisangani area through most of 1965. And the forces of the government were almost as disruptive as those of the secessionists. In 1966 there was a mutiny of the Katanga Gendarmes, who had been mobilized for the campaign against the rebels in Isiro and Kisangani. And the activities of mercenaries and the gendarmes prolonged the civil strife in Maniema and Bukavu. In 1967 a series of disputes between Zaire and Belgium led to the suspension of Belgian technical assistance to education and the withdrawal of some 1,200 Belgian secondary school teachers. Some of these teachers eventually returned but many experienced teachers and principals were lost. The mere listing of this series of crises cannot begin to suggest the extent of the disruption which took place in the educational system while efforts were being made to plan its reorientation and development.

Planned reforms

As early as 1961-62 major reforms were being attempted in both the primary and secondary systems. At the primary level, a unified national program was developed which provided for using French as the medium of instruction from the first year of school. This was a radical departure from colonial policy, which had advocated primary instruction in the vernacular languages (Lingala, Kikongo, Tshiluba, Kingwana and Kiswahili). This proved difficult to implement; most primary school teachers' French was inadequate for instructional requirements, and in defiance of the official policy they reverted to their previous practice.

At the secondary level, a general *cycle d'orientation* of two years was developed which would be followed by an array of four-year short (vocational) and long (humanities) programs. With UNESCO support the entire curriculum was revised to adapt subject matter to the needs and environment of Zaire. Rideout describes this effort as follows:

> Popular demand for more academic programs at the secondary level was answered by a variety of expedient measures—schools changed their programs simply by changing designations; classes were enlarged; unqualified teachers were assigned to teach at more advanced grades; increasing numbers of students were sent into the cities to live with tribal kinsmen in order to gain access to secondary schools; etc. Academic standards began to slip at all levels of the primary and secondary systems while, for political reasons, enrollments had to expand.

Because of the previous development of the primary sector and the high expectations and educational aspirations inherited from the pre-independence agitation of the nationalists, the secondary sector became the bottleneck in the desired expansion of the system. Priority was given to its rapid expansion, so that increased flows of students might gain access to higher education.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC), with its UNESCO contingent, assisted with this planning for a more adequate and appropriate secondary school service. In June 1961 the *Service des Études et Planification de l'Education* (later renamed the *Bureau des Études et Planification*, BEPE) was set up within the Ministry of Education with substantial UNESCO assistance. Its seven advisors were assigned to the five sections

of BEPE: Planning, Statistics, School Books and Programs, the Centre for Professional Orientation and the Documentation Centre. Later there was added to the planning infrastructure (also with substantial UNESCO assistance) a facilities planning group—the *Centre National des Constructions Scolaires.* This assistance marks the advent of another political element in the national educational planning effort of Zaire, that of the international agencies. However, their initial support could not overcome all difficulties; the few UN personnel could not effectively assist with staffing the expanding secondary school system, nor could they promise the long-term financial and manpower commitment which the reforms required. When UNOC was disbanded in 1964 it was virtually bankrupt, and the UN had to reduce its continuing programs to a level which might be justified as "normal". It was inevitable that dependence rest upon the missionary systems with their African and European personnel. Only they could really help to keep the educational structure functioning and, insofar as possible, expanding. Specifically, only from Belgium was it possible to hire the number of qualified French-speaking expatriate teachers that Zaire's growing secondary schools and universities needed. In the final analysis, it was those who already had established long-term commitments to the country, and who were still acceptable to the Zairois, who implemented the educational reforms.

UNOC began as an emergency operation in response to a critical need. As it stabilized into an on-going activity not enough consideration was given to what functions it and its specialized agencies really could undertake, and what they did not have the capability of, or should not attempt to, perform. An immediate problem, one particularly felt by non-francophone nations attempting to respond to Zaire's requests, was the need to find French-speaking technicains to fill the staff positions of Belgians who had fled the country. They were unintentionally assisted by the return of many skilled Belgians, but it must be recognized that the United Nations did manage to locate and employ the needed number of technicains to avert the breakdown of vital services. The presumption grew that it could overcome the language problem inherent in recruiting personnel for Zaire, whereas bilateral aid from non-francophone nations simply could not. It is difficult to understand, therefore, the UN failure to recruit a sufficient number of French-speaking teachers. The Government of Zaire requested some 1,500 for the academic year 1960-61; only 80 were obtained. The requested number was later reduced, but this happened because the continuing teacher shortage drove Zairois officials to by-pass the UN and carry on their own recruiting, largely through familiar Belgian channels. Obviously, it had proved easier for the UN to recruit a diversified range of skilled technicians in many fields than to recruit extensively for one profession. It was not possible for the UN to overcome the language problem in the recruitment of professional educators. Probably only the national directive of a francophone state could have provided qualified personnel quickly. Lacking sovereign jurisdiction the UN could not provide sufficient inducements for success.

An important lesson to be learned from the UNOC experience in Zaire is that international organizations can be just as constrained by practical realities and political limitations as national and bi-national organizations which are attempting to plan for educational change. And the appropriate division of roles and tasks is a tricky matter, one which must be done with tact and judgement applied to the specific situation. "Cookbook" recipes about which groups should perform which tasks simply are inadequate. Multi-national organizations which at times may play a dominant role in a nation's educational development will run many of the same risks as bi-national, national or regional agencies, and will

be equally resented. UN personnel did not actually become *persona non grata* in Zaire but a number of them did have to leave the country on very short notice. Multi-national assistance, while free of some of the odious neo-colonial characteristics associated with bi-national assistance, has some unique and undesirable ones of its own. As its advantages and disadvantages became apparent to the government of Zaire, their earlier assumption that multi-national assistance was preferable changed somewhat.

It must also be recognized that the United Nations and its agencies cannot easily initiate or maintain a preponderant position in one member country over a long period of time. By its very nature it is expected to treat the needs of member states equally and impartially. Given its present level of resources, and there is little promise that they will substantially increase, it is extremely difficult for multi-national agencies of the UN to do more than maintain a constructive presence in the developing world. Their extraordinary commitment to Zaire between mid-1960 and mid-1964 was probably continued as long as possible without arousing the disaffection of other member nations needing assistance. Educational development in developing countries such as Zaire must, of necessity, be of long duration. This means that extensive foreign assistance in education, assistance which is sectoral and programmatic rather than simply project oriented, cannot really be provided by them; it requires major bi-national assistance to supplement the multi-national efforts. Moreover, the bi-national assistance must be identified as such. If such funds are incorporated into the budgets of the United Nations' work they will also be subject to the demands for parity by all the other needy member states. Unless new ground rules are developed for the allocation of UN educational aid resources, it is unlikely that ever again the extraordinary commitment of personnel and funds made to Zaire will be made to a single state. Since 1964 the UN has reverted to its policy of being one of the donors rather than *the* most influential donor in Zaire.

Governmental structure and planning

The *Loi Fondamentale*, which served in 1960 as a temporary constitution for the new nation, set up a federation. The six colonial provinces were retained and considerable powers were delegated to their elected assemblies. In 1964, following the rebellions, another temporary constitution was promulgated, but the series of crises and disturbances which continued led by 1967 to the creation of a unitary state. However the impact upon education of the abortive 1964 constitution was significant, because 21 mini-provinces were substituted for the original six, suggesting that each new provincial capital would have its own post-primary and, in some cases, post-secondary education infrastructure. While this democratization process nominally made secondary education more available throughout the nation, it further contributed to the rapidly falling educational standards. It also completed the collapse of the government's 1961 policy to limit the growth of secondary enrollment for the years 1961-1967 to a reasonable number, given the lack of space, materials and qualified teachers. The estimated number who could be served was 30,000. By 1967 there were over 60,000. The political risk involved in trying to limit the educational growth of provincial authorities was simply too great for the weak central government. However countervailing forces were also developing. In March 1965 General Mobutu took power by a military coup. Five months later his regime began to centralize the country once more, and in April 1966 the number of provinces was reduced from 21 to 12. Some months later their number was cut to eight, plus the federal district of

Kinshasa. Concurrently other constitutional and political developments occurred which affected education. On May 5, 1966 a new Africanization policy was announced with the promulgation of a "de-colonization" decree replacing the European names of major cities with indigenous ones. In the following May the Africanization policy was further elaborated in a major speech which set forth the program of Mobutu's Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR); "national authenticity" was to be their main goal.

The 1967 constitution reserved to the provinces responsibility for technical education, teacher education and the appointment of school inspectors, but ensured that the central government possessed the greater power over educational matters. Since most of the provinces had not the financial resources to meet their educational needs, the financing of education was a central government responsibility.

However, much of this constitutional and administrative organizational structure existed only on paper. The government's effective control of education was limited to the components directly under its administration, and at no time did these exceed 5% of all educational establishments. It was the Catholic Church which was responsible for (and controlled) nearly 70%, the Protestant Church 20%, and the Kimbanguist Church* and private schools the remaining 5%.

Prior to independence, virtually the only planning model to which the Zairois had been exposed had been the list of developmental targets in the Belgians' ten year plan of the 1950s. However, Zairois had played little part in developing or deciding upon these schemes. The plan itself was seriously affected by the post-Korean war recession and, after 1956, by the Zairois' growing political agitation which exacerbated economic conditions and contributed to the flight of capital which began in 1958.

Given no active role in planning, little administrative exposure to it, and little evidence that it was desirable or effective, it is surprising that all governments which assumed power in Kinshasa between 1960 and 1966 included planning portfolios in their cabinets. Following President Mobutu's return to power in November 1965, a High Commissariat of Planning for National Reconstruction was established. It disappeared after less than a year of ineffective existence, but two years later the planning portfolio was reinstated with the Ordinance of March 5, 1969. Again it failed to survive. From November 1965 to September 1970 there were eight cabinets, two of which had Ministers of Planning and Coordination—Kititwa (November 1965 to September 1966) and Tshisekedi (March 1969 to August 1969). Finally a planning office was established in the Presidency, but it had barely begun its work when its core of French technical staff were given 24 hours to cross to Brazzaville because of their "diplomatic indiscretions". In view of these experiences it would be understandable if Zaire showed little incentive to embark once more upon a national educational planning effort. However, there seems to be increasing recognition by members of the growing bureaucracy that planning for the system of education has not been given a fair try; that it is a misnomer even to classify these former practices, procedures and processes as educational planning. Certainly, as the term is used internationally, their efforts can hardly qualify as planning.

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*The Kimbanguists (The Church of Jesus Christ on Earth by the Prophet Simon Kimbangu) are an indigenous religious sect. This church became a member of the World Council of Churches in 1970.

However, the independent government did consistently seek to meet the popular demand for education, in spite of an ineffective governmental structure. It did this by simply adhering to a policy of "more of everything". The primary educational base was already so broad compared with the upper sectors that the two (and then three) universities were underutilized. Particular developmental emphasis, therefore, was placed upon the grossly inadequate secondary education sector. Even though the economy was greatly disrupted during the period 1960-67 the funds committed to education exceeded 25% of the ordinary budget. Such an expansionist policy in reality was an attempt to fashion an African educational system after the elitist model which had been established for the Europeans in Zaire. Often there was nothing more than a change in title, when a school which had previously been a four-year African post-secondary vocational institution became a six-year secondary school with a European-type general education curriculum leading to university admission. It is not surprising that quantity was achieved at some cost in quality.

The lack of direct governmental involvement in the management of the educational system, which was a feature of the colonial period, persists for a variety of reasons. Aside from the provision of statistical services (the generation of policy guidelines and the centralization of payroll procedures through the *Bureau Central de Traitments*) it is the *Bureau d'Enseignement Catholique* (BEC), the *Bureau d'Enseignement Protestant* (BEP), the *Bureau d'Enseignement Kimbanguiste* and the *Bureau de l'Enseignement Libre* which exercise responsibility for education. According to Crawford Young:

> ...the Ministry (of Education) began operation without a clearly established ascendancy over its educational domain. The sudden departure of some senior Belgian cadres, and the general disorganization and confusion of summer 1960, left the Ministry with little choice but to grasp at whatever straws might serve to keep as much as possible of the educational system intact and afloat.

The disruptions of the early independence years obliged the central government to actually restrict its activity rather than try to extend it and gain ascendancy over the diverse elements of the educational system. In sharp contrast to other independent African nations, therefore, missionary control of education in Zaire has increased rather than declined, so that most of the functions elsewhere performed by national ministries of education continue to be performed by missionary organizations. The BEC has really become a second ministry of education controlling the qualifications of staff, the development of curriculum, finance and salaries, communications, planning and administration.

Crawford Young identifies three stages in the development of education in Zaire since independence. The first, from 1960 to 1962, was dominated by the need to survive. The second, from 1962 to 1965, was a period of "disorderly expansion", characterized by the 21 provincial governments' establishment of official Atheneums. In some cases these represent the only concrete signs of governmental achievement, and the schools were created whether or not there were means for their support. In the areas affected by rebellion the expansion stage was short lived. The third stage, from the accession of President Mobutu to power in 1965 to the present, is marked by attempts to centralize. Young notes, however, that "centralization of power was not...matched by an administrative capacity to achieve full control over the burgeoning educational system, which was taking a growing share of the national budget".

The consolidation and expansion of BEC since independence had its roots in the educational expansion of the 1950s when BEC served as the vehicle for planning and coordination.

Young reports that it possessed:

> ...a very competent staff...mainly composed of religious personnel. Unlike
> their lay counterparts in the former colonial bureaucracy, Church personnel
> did not take part in the panic exodus of July 1960—or if so, only very briefly.
> By 1961, leadership of BEC had been given to a Zairois, Father R.P. Ekwa,
> whose ability, tact, and charm served he and BEC well through innumerable
> vicissitudes. However, most of the cadres were expatriates. The objectives
> of the Church are clear enough to all actors, and to many non-controversial;
> Catholicism has an enormous investment in the evangelization of Zaire,
> probably more than in any other country of comparable size. The preserva-
> tion of the mission school system is the pillar of evangelism. And the solidity
> of the pillar rests upon the indispensability of BEC and the mission school
> system.
>
> From the moment of independence, BEC quietly became a second Ministry
> of Education, producing much of the statistical and planning material which
> the Ministry was called upon to deliver. It has cultivated close and cordial
> working relationships with its counterparts in the Ministry across the street.
> It has helped unobtrusively, not seeking to highlight the significance of its
> contribution. Quiet, discreet, reliable, efficient—a friend in need, when need
> was constant. Thus armed, BEC has survived well; the inevitable eventual
> nationalization of all school networks will occur much later in Zaire than in
> most other African states.

Prior to independence the Protestant mission work was almost exclusively at the primary
level. The various missions had long maintained a liaison office in the capital which acted
as the spokesmen *vis à vis* the colonial government. Since independence BEP has become
more clearly a national agency for Protestant education although it does not attempt to
match BEC in size or role. And the Protestant sector has de-emphasized primary educa-
tion in favour of developing a modest network of secondary schools. Expatriate mission-
aries now are almost exclusively involved in secondary school teaching and administration,
and the primary teaching is undertaken by Zairois Protestant teachers. The Protestants
also embarked on post-secondary education with the creation of the university at Kisangani
in 1963. In contrast to BEC, BEP does not see itself as a quasi Ministry of Education; it
has long operated in anticipation of eventual takeover by the government.

Post-independence progress in primary and secondary education

In spite of its internal dissension and other problems Zaire has managed to expand its
enrollment impressively since independence. The number of primary school pupils rose
from 1,635,800 in 1959-60 to 2,666,034 in 1969-70 and the number of secondary school
pupils from 42,630 to 222,196. Tables 1 and 2 show the actual and projected enrollment
for the grades of these sectors for the years 1962-63 to 1974-75. And Table 3 shows the
actual and percentage distribution of the enrollment among the various systems in the
most recent years for which statistics are available.

Recent development of Zaire secondary and post-secondary educational system has
been almost exclusively in urban areas. The staffing requirements of secondary schools
and the provision of supporting educational materials have militated in favour of schools
in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi and other cities of the Shaba Copperbelt and towns in Bas Zaire,
rather than elsewhere in the country. Except for the Catholic and Protestant missionary

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TABLE 1

ACTUAL AND PROJECTED PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN ZAÏRE

Legend: [WASTAGE] [% STRUCTURE] [PROMOTION] [CRUDE TRANSITION] [REPETITION]

Year	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	Total
1962-63	666,593 [37.2%]	380,993 [21.2%]	275,030 [15.1%]	208,510 [11.5%]	162,166 [8.8%]	111,675 [6.2%]	1,804,967 [100.0%]
1963-64	714,225 [35.8%]	415,086 [20.8%]	311,164 [15.6%]	236,759 [11.9%]	184,914 [9.3%]	133,082 [6.6%]	1,995,230 [100.0%]
1964-65	715,600 [34.3%]	429,700 [20.6%]	317,300 [15.8%]	236,300 [12.0%]	188,310 [9.8%]	139,000 [7.5%]	2,026,210 [100%]
1965-66	715,915 [34.7%]	437,605 [21.2%]	323,753 [15.7%]	239,949 [11.6%]	192,951 [9.3%]	154,474 [7.5%]	2,064,647 [100.0%]
1966-67	766,726 [35.0%]	465,833 [21.2%]	345,450 [15.8%]	250,689 [11.4%]	200,298 [9.1%]	164,204 [7.5%]	2,193,200 [100.0%]
1967-68	769,881 [32.9%]	508,362 [21.2%]	390,327 [16.7%]	276,239 [11.8%]	216,888 [9.3%]	177,198 [7.6%]	2,338,895 [100%]
1968-69	748,300	457,800	385,300	296,800	233,300	174,800	2,286,100
1969-70	763,200	466,900	363,900	303,400	249,000	186,000	2,332,400
1970-71	778,400	476,200	371,200	286,700	254,600	207,400	2,374,500
1971-72	793,900	485,700	378,600	292,500	240,500	212,100	2,403,300
1972-73	809,700	495,300	386,100	298,300	245,400	200,300	2,435,100
1973-74	825,800	505,200	393,800	304,200	250,300	204,200	2,483,700
1974-75	842,300	515,300	401,600	310,300	255,200	208,400	2,533,100

WASTAGE (1962-63 row): 19%, 17%, 7%, 9%, 9%
REPETITION: (38%), (28%), (31%), (26%), (26%), (20%)

PROMOTION / CRUDE TRANSITION:
- 1963-64: 43%/62%, 55%/82%, 62%/86%, 65%/89%, 65%/82%, 80%/
- 1964-65: 60%, 76%, 76%, 80%, 75%
- 1965-66: 61%, 75%, 76%, 82%, 82%
- 1966-67: 65%, 79%, 77%, 83%, 85%
- 1967-68: 66%, 84%, 80%, 87%, 88%

(Rows 1962-63 through 1966-67: ACTUAL; rows 1967-68 through 1974-75: PROJECTED)

TABLE 2

ACTUAL AND PROJECTED SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN ZAIRE

Year	I		II		III		IV		V		VI	Total
ACTUAL												
1961-62	25,376	78%	11,279	86%	7,214	78%	4,096	39%	771	96%	418	49,152
1962-63	30,861	79%	19,819	85%	9,700	86%	5,636	50%	1,595	95%	739	68,350
1963-64	38,215	60%	24,453	67%	16,940	61%	8,315	37%	2,841	63%	1,509	92,273
1964-65	34,630	83%	22,844	85%	16,281	74%	10,271	62%	3,087	78%	1,778	88,891
1965-66	49,978	69%	28,876	77%	19,397	70%	12,017	66%	6,334	62%	2,456	119,078
1966-67	57,965	71%	34,905	78%	22,235	77%	13,556	78%	7,942	69%	3,965	138,270
PROJECTED												
1967-68	62,406		39,885		26,725		17,120		10,390		5,511	162,237
1968-69	76,900		44,800		30,500		19,500		11,600		6,800	190,100
1969-70	88,100		51,500		34,500		22,300		13,300		7,700	217,400
1970-71	101,700		59,200		39,700		25,200		15,200		8,800	249,800
1971-72	116,900		68,100		45,600		29,000		17,100		10,000	286,700
1972-73	134,500		78,300		52,500		33,300		19,700		11,300	329,600
1973-74	154,600		90,100		60,200		38,300		22,600		13,000	378,800
1974-75	177,800		103,500		69,400		44,000		26,000		15,000	435,700

Source: See Table 1.

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TABLE 3   DISTRIBUTION OF ENROLLMENT IN ZAIRE BY SYSTEMS

PRIMARY

Network	Number	Percentage
Official	361,614	12
Official Congregationalist	15,058	1
Catholic	1,869,007	63
Protestant	573,923	19
Kimbanguist and other Local Churches	150,437	5
Total	2,970,039	100

Note: 1. Estimated enrollment in non-subsidized schools was 130,000
         2. Figures are for 1970-71,

SECONDARY

Network	Number	Percentage
Official	78,028	38
Official Congregationalist	7,808	4
Catholic	78,373	38
Protestant	26,918	13
Kimbanguist and other Local Churches	13,640	7
Total	204,767	100

Note: 1. Enrollment in non-subsidized secondary schools was 26,603.
         2. Figures are for 1969-70.

Sources: For the primary school statistics Bureau du Président de la République du
           Zaire, *Zaire*. Kinshasa: 1972, p. 412.
           For the secondary school statistics Ministère de l'Education Nationale,
           Annuaire Statistique de l'Education. Kinshasa: Direction Générale de la
           Planification, Fascicule STA 23, 1969-70, pp. 122-125.

cadres, the expatriate teachers—French, Belgian and "technical assistance" (predominantly Haitian)—prefer assignment to Kinshasa, Lubumbashi or other centres to the rigours of bush schools. In 1967-68, there were 6,722 secondary teachers, of whom 3,951 were Zairois, mostly teaching in the *cycle d'orientation*, 1,351 religious personnel and 1,420 secular expatriate teachers.

A *Service Civique Obligatoire* was promulgated in 1966 in response to the critical shortage of secondary school teachers. This was the policy reaction to the Belgian government's refusal to permit the technicians and teachers of the *Assistance Technique Belge* to return to their positions following their exodus during the initial part of the period of tension. Under this program, students at universities and professional schools in Zaire and abroad, who had completed their *licence* (equivalent to the B.A.) after January 1, 1966, and those who were obliged to repeat a year of study after having completed their first two years,had to serve as government employees for two years. In 1966-67 this regulation made 323 secondary school teachers available for service. The program continues with some modification.[9] One unexpected and unintentional benefit of the civic service requirement is that it might serve to reverse the rural-urban migration of teachers which is of long standing. The 1969 Education/Manpower Survey Team, on which the authors served, reported that the reintegration of teachers into the rural areas of the interior of Zaire was desirable. Some of the *miliciens* (the civic service teachers) may remain to work in secondary schools of the interior when they have graduated (i.e., completed the *diplôme de régent*, which qualifies them to teach in the four-year long cycle of the secondary school.

The qualifications of the members of the secondary school teacher force during the period 1963-64 to 1967-68, which are shown in Table 4, demonstrate that there were few Zairois teachers with the desired qualification. Due to large numbers of highly qualified expatriate teachers, only 2.7% of the total secondary school teacher force might be termed "unqualified", but without them the picture would have been very different.

In 1967-68 there were 748 degree-holding *(licence)* expatriate teachers and 198 Zairois; and 1,056 expatriates and 664 Zairois with *régents*. As Rideout explains:

> What the figures do not show are the conditions under which these teachers
> have been working or how well they have performed. An example of the most
> common teacher complaints would include: salary payments in arrears from
> 4 to 6 months; inadequate school buildings (e.g., no lights, no toilets, no drink-
> ing water, etc.); inadequate school furniture; insufficient books and materials;
> inadequate faculty housing and an excess of pupils. School construction outside
> of the Bas Congo and Kinshasa has not even come close to keeping up with the
> establishment and enrollment in the schools. Certainly in the north-eastern
> part of the country the insurrections have compounded this because so many
> schools were destroyed and almost all were plundered. A secondary school in
> Oriental Province is a very different institution from one in Kinshasa. The
> inspection system, which broke down at independence, has been partially
> rebuilt. It is still, however, not in a position to oversee adequately that even a
> minimum level of acceptable performance is maintained. Furthermore, it is
> difficult to impose rigid standards on unqualified teachers, and it is
> impossible to discipline them with any conviction when it is known that a
> teacher dismissed cannot be replaced.

In contrast to the highly qualified secondary school teacher force, 70% of the primary school teachers might be said to be "unqualified". In 1967-68, there were 61,408 − 439 of

TABLE 4   PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL
            TEACHERS BY QUALIFICATION

Qualification	1963-64	1964-65	1965-66	1966-67	1967-68
Zarois:					
Licenciés	0.8	3.1	1.7	5.4	5.0
Régents	3.2	5.3	6.8	10.9	17.0
Instituteurs	32.2	43.7	47.6	54.7	64.0
Inst. Adjoints	50.5	40.6	32.9	23.2	11.0
Non-qualified	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.1	0.5
Undetermined	12.3	7.3	11.0	3.7	2.5
Number	1,046	1,404	2,226	2,809	3,951
Expatriate:					
Licenciés	26.6	26.9	23.6	27.1	27.0
Régents	34.8	35.1	38.1	41.6	38.0
Instituteurs	25.3	26.0	22.2	21.4	25.0
Inst. Adjoints	1.3	1.9	2.6	2.2	2.0
Non-qualified	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.1	0.6
Undetermined	12.0	10.1	13.5	7.6	7.4
Number	3,731	3,302	3,726	3,801	2,771
Total:					
Licenciés	20.6	19.9	15.4	17.7	14.0
Régents	27.4	26.4	26.4	28.1	26.0
Instituteurs	27.2	31.2	31.7	36.1	48.0
Inst. Adjoints	12.8	13.2	14.0	11.4	7.0
Non-qualified	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.0	1.0
Undetermined	12.0	9.3	12.5	5.7	4.0
Number	4,777	4,706	5,952	6,610	6,722

Source: F. El-Boustani and P. Mambe, *L'Enseignement au Congo: Analyse de la Situation Actuelle et Prevision des Effectifs Jusqu'en 1975.* Kinshasa: IRES, 1969, pp. 64 and 67.

them expatriates and 60,969 nationals; 265 of the expatriates were directors of schools; 144 of the Zairois were school inspectors, 3,572 were school directors and 57,253 were teachers. These teachers' qualifications were as follows: 14,378 held 4-year diplomas from the *humanités pédagogiques* (long cycle of the secondary school); 16,084 had two to three years of post-primary education; 26,791 were designated as unqualified. The desired qualification for primary school teachers is from five to seven years of education beyond the primary level. The student might devote the fifth year of secondary schooling solely to teacher training and receive the *brevet d'instituteur*. After six years of secondary school, however, if he then takes a year of teacher training he receives the *diplôme d'instituteur*. Both these types of graduates are qualified to teach in primary schools. But because of the expansion of the *cycles d'orientations* and the shortage of teachers they generally find themselves teaching in the lower grades of the secondary schools.

The desired qualification for the teachers of the lower grades of the secondary school is some form of the *régent*. Training for it is given in middle level teacher training institutes which are known as *écoles moyennes pédagogiques*. The middle school course (ENM) consists of either three years of study beyond a preparatory year (for secondary school graduates who have already taught school) or five years of study (for those with no teaching experience). Usually a *brevet de régent* is awarded at the end of the second year (or fourth year, depending upon the student's background), and a *diplôme de régent* after the final year of practice teaching, upon successful presentation of the thesis.

In 1969-70, 13 new ENMs were in operation, with a total enrollment of 1,807.[10]

The training of teachers for the upper grades of the secondary school (*licenciés scientifiques* and *littéraires*) is given at the *école normale supérieure* of the *Institut Pédagogique National* in Kinshasa. A second ENS is planned by BEC for Bukavu in north-east Zaire. It is estimated that some 1,537 of these secondary school teachers are needed; in 1970 there were some 85 nationals with this qualification. The 1969-70, the third year of operation, total enrollment of the ENS was only 65 although its planned capacity when fully developed was to be 540. Admission to the ENS is open to the following: graduates of the ENMs, persons having completed two years of university education, and university graduates desiring a professional teaching qualification. The latter obtain the degree of *agrégé* (M.A. equivalent) by superimposing one year at the ENS upon their four-year university *licence*.

The data and descriptions of the quantity and quality of the Zaire teacher force indicate its most pressing educational problem. Because of the shortage of personnel, nationals are employed at one level higher in the system than their teaching qualification warrants (according to the desired standards which are Zaire policy). And according to the authors' 1970 projections, Zaire will be dependent upon expatriate secondary school teachers for several decades to come. However, such a condition is no more politically acceptable in Zaire than in other independent African states. But this condition is unavoidable unless Zaire adopts other teacher standards using untrained secondary school teachers or ones of considerably less training.

Post-independence financing of education

According to the *Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales* (IRES) between 1959 and 1969 the proportion of the national budget devoted to education doubled (from 15.5%

to 31%). Zaire ranked unusually high in educational expenditure—fourth among 32 sub-Saharan African nations in the proportion of total governmental expenditure. Nevertheless, the benefits accruing were marginal, particularly since there was considerable wastage and repetition evident in the flow of students through the system.

The Zairois budgetary organization differs somewhat from that practiced in other African nations. There is a recurrent budget known as the "ordinary" budget and, since 1967, an "extraordinary" (or capital investment) budget which does not have specific tax or revenue receipts but is allocated a specific percentage of the ordinary budget receipts. Investment activities which are financed by bilateral and multi-lateral foreign aid are not included in the extraordinary budget, which makes it difficult to gain an accurate picture of the entire budget. To further confuse matters, commitments authorized under the extraordinary budget are made on a three-year basis, rather than the one-year basis of other commitments.

During the past few years, the budget of the Ministry of Education has grown at an annual average of 4.5%. In 1969 4.3% of the GDP was allocated to education. In 1970 25.2% of the ordinary state budget was allocated, and this represented 76% of the funds available for education. The remaining 24% was derived from the extraordinary (capital) budget.

Salaries of teaching and administrative personnel account for more than 70% of the total ordinary budget. A breakdown of expenditure by educational sectors shows that in 1970 50% was used for primary, 30% for secondary and 20% for higher education. Personnel expenses accounted for almost 90% of the expenditure at the primary level and 80% at the secondary level.

From the end of 1965 to August 31, 1970, the total budget allocated to educational construction amounted to nearly 4,240,000 Zaires, 67.3% of which was for secondary school construction, 27.9% for higher education facilities, 2.4% for elementary schools and 2.4% for teacher training institutions. The percentage distribution indicates the policy emphasis—albeit part of the expenditure reflects the desire to establish political control throughout the interior of Zaire. There can be no doubt, however, that the expansion of secondary education was of prime concern.[11]

Post-independence progress in higher education

The three universities of Zaire have problems in common: their programs are dysfunctional; they have high wastage and repetition rates; and their enrollment patterns are biased. All of these render them unable to produce the high-level manpower which the nation needs for its development. Examination of the data on university enrollment and the number of diplomas awarded reveals their extremely high attrition rates, probably the highest in Africa. The universities have been particularly deficient in the scientific, technical and agricultural fields; most of their graduates are concentrated in the social sciences (which account for nearly 60% of the degrees awarded). The failure rates during the first two years (first and second *candidature*) are extremely high, although students who survive into their third year (first *licence*) have a reasonable chance of survival. For example, in 1968-69 at Lovanium, 2,266 of the 2,988 students enrolled were in the "pre-university" or the first two years of degree study.

In order to meet Zaire's needs for high-level manpower in the sciences, agriculture and technology, UNESCO and the UNDP helped to create a number of specialized institutes: the *Institut National des Bâtiments et Travaux Publiques* for training engineers; the *Institut d'Aviation Civile* for training air traffic controllers, airport commanders and related technicians; the *Institut National des Mines* for training engineers and geologists; the *École National d'Administration* which awards a *licence* in administrative science, economics, law and finance; and institutes in architecture, commerce, agriculture, meteorology, posts and telecommunications, and the graphic arts.[12]

In effect, the establishment of these post-secondary institutes replicates the functional differentiation of higher education in Belgium. This will be particularly true if they develop the tradition of accepting the dropouts from the universities, as recommended by the authors' Education/Manpower Survey Team in 1969. In that case they will parallel the role of similar institutes in Belgium.

The involvement of UNESCO and the IBRD/IDA (World Bank) in the formulation of Zaire's higher education policy began in 1970. Largely upon the recommendation of the 1969 Education/Manpower Survey Team the Office of the President and the Ministry of Education applied to the IDA for an education projects loan[13] for widespread capital and technical assistance to be used for secondary vocational education, teacher training, professional training and educational planning. In this case the policy initiative came from the Office of the President rather than the Ministry of Education. This was not unique. In cases of external affairs either that Ministry or the Office of the President usually is involved. What was unique in this instance was that both the impetus for external involvement and the enthusiastic development of the loan request came from the Office of the President rather than from the ministry. This was more a reflection of the ineptitude of the ministry than the assertiveness of the presidency.

As political and military power became concentrated in Mobutu's hands, a running battle developed between the president and the university students. In January 1968 he accused students of Lovanium University of distributing subversive materials and organizing demonstrations against the vice-president of the United States, Hubert Humphrey, during his official visit. Some students were arrested, others were warned that if they continued to interfere in politics the president would personally intervene against them. In February it became clear that this was no idle threat—the Executive Committee of the General Union of Congolese Students (UGEC) was dissolved, allegedly for plotting the president's assassination.

The students took the challenge by engaging in open criticism of Mobutu's decision to declare a three day period of national mourning upon the death of his mother on May 18, 1971. Then on June 4th they staged a protest march through Kinshasa to demand higher student scholarships. Troops were called out; a melee ensued; and before order was restored several students had been killed and many wounded. The president immediately closed Lovanium University, and within three days conscripted all university students (including pregnant women) into the army. Although dire consequences of this action were predicted; in fact there were no further student strikes or demonstrations.

While the students were being inducted into the army, the MPR's Political Bureau set up a Commission for the Reform of Higher Education which met on June 6, 1971 to begin discussing the reform of Zaire's post-secondary system. Actually what was emerging was

the end of the old "more of everything" policy. A congress at N'Sele, held from July 27 to 31, brought together professors from all the higher education institutions to offer advice on the reforms being discussed. It probably was no accident that at that time most of the foreign academicians in the system were on vacation in Europe and were not, therefore, able to influence the deliberations directly. On August 6, "at the request of the Ministry of National Education, and after deliberations on the matter by the Political Bureau and Council of Ministers" the president signed Ordinance Law No. 71/075 which in 56 articles created the National University of Zaire (l'Université Nationale du Zaire UNAZA).

Shortly thereafter another commission was appointed which worked through the remainder of August and September to decide upon the new program of courses, and in October 1971, these programs were phased into the curricula, beginning with the first year students at each of UNAZA's institutions.

Thus with the academic year 1971-72 there began the most sweeping educational reorganization since independence. Furthermore, it was an entirely Zairois undertaking. All the subsidized post-secondary institutions were nationalized and placed under the direction of the UNAZA Rectorate in Kinshasa. UNAZA was divided into two major components, one which included the three university campuses and another which included the higher institutes. The latter were divided into two categories higher institutes of pedagogy and higher institutes of technology. The three universities became three campuses of the national university, each headed by a vice-rector and renamed after the cities in which they were located: Lovanium University (formerly Catholic) is now the Kinshasa Campus; The Official University of Zaire is now the Lubumbashi Campus; and the Free University of Zaire (formerly Protestant) is now the Kisangani Campus. Six of the eight higher institutes of technology and two of the eleven higher institutes of pedagogy are located in Kinshasa. In total approximately 41% of the students of the post-secondary system are enrolled in the capital. The remainder are dispersed throughout the country. Considerable expansion has taken place since 1971, as may be seen from Table 5, which shows enrollment for the years from 1960-61 to 1973-74.

One of the most intriguing elements of the reorganization has been the "rationalization" of faculties among the former universities. According to Rideout,

> While Ordinance Law No. 71/075 did not specify that Faculties (or disciplines) would be redistributed (or that Faculties would be consolidated to avoid duplication) among the three campuses, this trend was indicated when the National School of Administration (ENA) was abolished and transferred to the Faculty of Social, Political and Administrative Sciences at Lubumbashi, except for the small economics component which went to the Kinshasa Campus. By the beginning of the academic year 1971/72, the plan for redistributing the Faculties had been determined, and planes were chartered to move professors and students to their new Faculty sites (Table III*).

The 1971-72 academic year opened late, but it was still an incredible feat that the campuses were able to begin operation so soon.

*Herein numbered Table 5.

During the first year of the reform additional changes were made: the National School of Mines at Bukavu was transferred to the Lubumbashi Campus; the Faculty of Veterinary Sciences was placed at Lubumbashi instead of being located with the Faculty of Agriculture at Kisangani; and the Institute of Industrial Psychology was moved from Lubumbashi to the Faculty of Psychology and Pedagogy at Kisangani. Nevertheless, by the end of the first year of the reform relatively few modifications had been made in the inter-campus distribution of the various Faculties.

TABLE 5 ENROLLMENT IN THE UNIVERSITIES AND HIGHER INSTITUTES OF ZAIRE, 1960-61 TO 1973-74

Years	Universities		Institutes		Total
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	
1960-61	567	74.3	196	25.7	763
1961-62	868	69.3	385	30.7	1253
1962-63	1198	59.8	806	40.2	2004
1963-64	1542	64.6	845	35.4	2387
1964-65	1734	55.3	1402	44.7	3136
1965-66	2148	55.1	1751	44.9	3899
1966-67	3038	63.7	1726	36.3	4764
1967-68	3476	59.6	2351	40.4	5827
1968-69	5846	67.0	2882	33.0	8728
1969-70	6153	60.2	4059	39.8	10218
1970-71	7565	62.5	4546	37.5	12111
1971-72	10448	66.8	5186	33.2	15634
1972-73	11143	69.4	4911	30.6	16054
1973-74*	12350	65.6	6478	34.4	18828

*Predicted enrollment

Source: For the years 1960-61 to 1972-73, *Annuaires statistiques,* Ministère de l'Education Nationale 4ème Direction des Services Pédagogiques et Division de la Planification de l'Education; UNAZA, Rectorat, Statistiques des étudiants 1972-1973. Estimated enrollment for 1973-1974.

In many ways the most important modification made since the original assignments of faculties to campuses was the decision to abolish the Faculties of Protestant Theology at Kisangani and of Catholic Theology at Kinshasa and replace them with a non-denominational Faculty of Theology at Kinshasa for Protestants, Catholics and Kimbanguists. This further promotes the policy of making the universiteis respond to national needs and represent national institutions. By removing direct missionary participation their power

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TABLE 6   REDISTRIBUTION OF FACULTIES AMONG THE THREE CAMPUSES
OF THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF ZAIRE, 1973-74

FACULTY	PRE-REFORM	UNAZA SYSTEM
Law	Kinshasa/Lubumbashi[1]	Kinshasa only
Education and Psychology	All Three Universities	Kisangani only
Philosophy and Letters	All Three Universities	Lubumbashi only
Social Sciences		
Economics and Commerce	All Three Universities	Kinshasa only
Pol./Adm. Sciences, and		
Sociology/Anthropology	All Three Universities	Lubumbashi only
Engineering	Kinshasa/Lubumbashi	Kinshasa (Electrical/Mechanical) Lubumbashi (Mining/Metallurgy)
Theology	Kinshasa (Catholic) Kisangani (Protestant)	Kinshasa (Catholic, Protestant, Kimbanguist)
Medicine	All Three Universities	Kinshasa
Agriculture	All Three Universities	Kisangani (Yangambi)*
Veterinary Science	Kinshasa/Lubumbashi	Lubumbashi
Sciences		
Physics/Mathematics & Chemistry	All Three Universities	Kinshasa/Lubumbashi**
Biological Sciences	All Three Universities	Kisangani*

*To be accomplished usually by annual increments.
**Industrial Chemistry to be at Lubumbashi, with the remainder at Kinshasa.

[1]Only Lubumbashi and Kinshasa had separate and fully functioning Faculties of Law. Kisangani did, however, have a Department of Law and Political Science within the Faculty of Humanities. While law per se might have developed as a separate entity, it had not done so by 1971.

to influence, and the students' identification with, their special group and special campus will be lessened. By attending a common institution the fact that they are all Zairois will become paramount with the students over the fact that they owe religious allegiance to different sects.

The deliberate nationalization of the post-secondary system was seen as long overdue. As the editor of *Zaire*, a popular weekly news magazine explained,

> The troubles which have broken out on the campuses were the result in large part of the malaise which has pervaded them for some time. Inspired by foreign principles, the university finds itself a foreign body in the national community. Young students profoundly resent that subtle form of 'neo-colonialism'. Another [foreign] subtlety was [the effort] to make the former universities neutral zones where the authority of the government meant nothing.[14]

The foreign presence on the campuses continued after Mobutu's return to power. The number of Zairois teachers increased between 1967-68 to 1971-72 from 3,951 to 7,287, but the contingent of foreign faculty had also increased, though at a lesser rate (2,771 to 4,537, 84.4% vs. 63.7% growth). Moreover the influence of the foreign faculty continued because they were highly qualified—71.3% of those holding *licence* or doctorate degrees were foreigners.[15] After 14 years of independence, Zaire continues to be heavily dependent upon foreign university faculty.

However, the government's concern is not with the foreign professors *per se*. It is that the universities themselves have been foreign institutions and they give little indication of becoming Zairois. Objectionable foreing influences include such transplanted European notions as "academic freedom" which is seen as a claim to some special "neutral condition" which creates a threat to the "authority of the government". There is obviously no natural law which states that the relationship of universities and government, which arose from European needs and is appropriate to their traditions, should be identical in Zaire.

One other serious disquiet is that the university has almost no relationship with, and little meaning for, the mass of the people. It is an institution entirely alien to their experience. As the Vice-Rector of Kinshasa, Dr. Koli put it, "The university should be closer to the masses. The university ought to feel as if it emanated from the people who created it, and it should place itself at their service".[16] If a university makes no visible attempt to adapt, integrate, and make itself relevant to the nation in which it is located, if its products do not relate to local professional and intellectual life, then it is hardly surprising that those who financially support it become impatient and charge it with being "neo-colonial". Even more, the university as an articulate and trained body of experts should be making the most important contribution to helping a new nation define itself, proclaim its native heritage and unique qualities and show these to the world. It must not be simply a receiving filter repeating and transmitting to the new nation the influence of world scholarship, which is in any case so influential and pervasive that it will filter into university and intellectual cricles anyway.

In summary, since the adoption of the new policy which tries to identify higher education with the nation the structure of the universities has been completely changed, the institutions have been nationalized, the students have either been co-opted into a supportive role or have been neutralized, the faculty and administration have cooperated with the new organization (though often with substantial misgivings), and to a considerable

degree the churches have been moved out, except for their proper role of operating religious institutions for the training of their own priests and pastors.

If these changes needed other justification than the needs of national identity they might be acclaimed on grounds of cost effectiveness. It is difficult to obtain hard data of the savings involved and it is, perhaps, too early to expect the savings to be manifest. It was claimed that the reorganization would result in significant savings. But in 1972 former Minister of Education, Mafema, acknowledged that, initially, expenditure on higher education had, in fact, substantially increased.[17] However, if the government follows its intention of carefully evaluating the reorganization to control costs and rationalize expenditure in the various faculties, it should be able to make savings. At least now the structure of the system makes it possible to document expenditure accurately and compare the accounts across programs and institutions.

Interestingly, the reorganization indicates recognition of a distinct change in the role of education. Until 1966 the overriding national concern was to preserve the nation's existence. The school was often the only, or the most significant, evidence of the national government's presence and it was imperative that this presence be positive. Schools had to illustrate government's willingness to respond to popular needs—such as the demand for education. Quantity was obviously more important politically than quality. At least in the short-term admission numbers were crucial. No government was in power long enough to worry about the possible long-term repercussions of such action. However, after 1966, a stable government had to face the long-term implications of a policy of constant growth, and the effect on the educational budget of exponential increase for a system whose service was seen by many as irrelevant and of low-quality.

Since the government controlled the entire country it could demonstrate its presence through a pervasive one-party political apparatus, the army, the police, and the bureaucracy. The school ceased to be the unique or most significant representative of government and public service. Placed in this more balanced perspective it ceased to be the "sacred cow" which must be maintained without criticism. In fact, the educational system probably had become even less important than it had been prior to independence, when, as a major institution of the colonial structure, with the bulk of its operation controlled by the national Catholic mission, it had a direct and powerful influence upon government (in return for which it obtained a privileged position).

In the interview reported above Dr. Mafema defined the new policy as "...adapting to the real needs of the country, of integrating the...school into the milieu". It is now felt that education must not take a disproportionate share of the national budget; it must serve national social policy, its students and graduates must justify the public funds which have been invested in them as investments in human resource development. In short, education must be regarded as a public service provided in the context of the needs of the nation and for the national good.

Future directions

If this new policy of making higher education sensitive to serving the needs of the nation is appropriate, will it be extended to the primary and secondary education? In responding to this question in 1972, Dr. Mafema pointed out that an educational system is a single entity and government must indeed consider extending these new principles to other levels

of schooling. He added, however,

> One ought not have a reform without preparation, with insufficient thought
> and reflection....Therefore, let us prepare the primary and secondary reform
> with prudence in order to adapt it to the new structure that we have just
> given to higher education. But in this pre-university domain the problems
> are much more complex given the structure itself and the number of students
> concerned.

Sheer numbers in the two lower levels of the system, as compared to those in higher educa-
tion, make the extension of the policy a much more complex and difficult task. In effect
the reorganization would have to address itself to three needs—nationalization of schools
which still show undue foreign influence and attributes, secularization of systems which
are fragmented between a number of religious denominations, and rationalization of the
service which is not evenly distributed geographically over the country (see Table 7).

TABLE 7   PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ENROLLMENT AND
POPULATION IN ZAIRE BY PROVINCE, 1968-69

Province	Percentage of Total Elementary & Secondary Pupils	Percentage of National Population
Kinshasa	20.50	6.10
Bandundu	11.00	12.00
Bas Zaire	14.50	6.95
Equateur	5.20	11.25
Haut Zaire (Orientale)	7.90	15.50
Kasai-Occidental	8.40	11.25
Kasai-Oriental	14.60	8.65
Kivu	7.60	15.55
Shaba (Katanga)	10.30	12.75
	100.00	100.00

Source: Ministère de l'Education Nationale, *Annuaire Statistique* de l'éducation, 1968-69.
Kinshasa: Imprimerie St. Paul, September, 1971.

A further complicating factor which relates both to nationalization of the system and
to the more limited goal of trying to ensure a proper geographical distribution of schools
is the national shortage of competent administrative personnel. Apart from the small
official network, the educational systems as we have described them are administered by
various religious organizations. The missions provide both an administrative and pedagogi-

cal service and the importance of this service cannot be exaggerated given the continuing nation-wide shortage of skills. Their importance was forcefully put when Jean-Claude Willame was discussing Zaire's economic policies. He asserted that "The threat of nationalization has never been effective, for it has been obvious from the very start that the [country] lacks the kind of administrative apparatus that would allow her to institute a planned economy".[18] The problems inherent in displacing the trained mission personnel would appear to be at least as great as replacing the personnel who run the foreign commercial and industrial enterprises. The directors of the religious educational systems, moreover, are noteworthy for their initiative and dynamism—so much so that, in recent years, government has been trying to restrain rather than encourage their activities.

Another difficulty in carrying the reform of higher education into the primary and secondary school levels is that the religious systems not only provide the bulk of the service, their's are also, generally, the best schools. Given the deterioration in the quality of education since 1960, to which we have already referred, the government must pay serious attention to trying to stem the erosion and reverse the trend. Many factors account for the fact that only 20 students complete higher education in Zaire out of every 1,000 who enter primary school. It is clearly related to the quality of education but solutions to the problem of wastage are not a simple matter.[19]

It is clear that government policy will continue to stress the need to make all levels of education responsive to the needs of the nation, and this, inevitably, will have a profound impact on the system. The reorganization of higher education was merely the first move to make education contribute to the development of a new national identity and cohesion.

As Dr. Mafema pointed out, reform policies must be carefully defined to ensure that they really do enable education to play its part in contributing to national welfare. Although the structure of the higher education system has been changed much still remains to be done to transform that sector, and it is perhaps wise not to try to reform all levels of education simultaneously. As the First General Report of the Work of the Congress of National Professors reported,

> The goals, methods and philosophy of education have not been re-thought with regard to the givens and realities of our situation and in relation to our desire for authenticity. For a new society one must have new aptitudes, methods and knowledge.... Education... is in reality foreign education, not at all adapted to our system of values, to our milieu, to our problems, to our culture. Moreover, there is not sufficient connection between the themes of research and teaching and our national sectors of activity, nor between the results of that research and their practical utilization.[20]

To date there has been implementation of the reorganization required by new policy goals, by what might be termed "fiat". However, if real change is to take place the structural reform of higher education must be followed by reforms of process, content and goals. And if the principles of this new policy are to be extended to the primary and secondary systems (with maximum results at least cost) Zaire must develop a process of planning for educational change which will be appropriate for, and adequate to, its national needs. It appears highly likely that as the government of Zaire searches for means to shape its educational system to the needs of the nation it will also fashion an authentic process of educational planning.

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NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL PLANNING IN A FEDERAL STATE:
A SKETCH OF THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

Ten years ago next Monday there was a "confrontation" in Paris at which a Canadian delegation faced the international team of five examiners which had just conducted another in the series of reviews of national policies for education arranged through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. In this case the review was confined to the training of and demand for high-level scientific and technical personnel in Canada, and, as usual, the confrontation took place before representatives of the member states of OECD. I don't know whether the date of the meeting was chosen with an eye to its symbolic significance, but it happened to be July 1, the 97th anniversary of the creation of the Canadian confederation.

The examiners had been critical of Canada's lack of planning and organization. Indeed, they observed that we had no national policy for education. "Better co-ordination is needed at two levels", they said, "not only to relate the programmes of the Provinces to each other and to those of the Federal Government but also to link the programmes in one broad policy sector to the policy aims in another sector when these sectors are inter-dependent".[1] "The latter need", they continued, "is illustrated by the almost watertight separation that seems to exist between economic planning and forecasting, on the one hand, and educational planning and forecasting on the other". "The consequences of the dispersal of responsibility among the Provinces," they concluded, "have been not merely to restrict central authority but to inhibit Federal action and to impede programme-planning by the Provinces themselves".

In response, the Canadian delegation pointed out that there was more cooperation between the two levels of government than the visiting experts had discovered and that, in terms of social priorities in Canada, personal development came before manpower training. The examiners were not impressed, however, arguing that "there is an inescapable relationship between educational development and economic progress" and "that there was a real need for developing an overall educational policy to meet *Canadian* needs".

A more general review of education in Canada is now under way, again arranged through OECD. I want to return to that at the very end of this paper in order to make some comparisons between the two. For this reason, let me note now two interesting features of the earlier review. Arrangements for the team of visiting experts, and for the composition of the Canadian delegation to the subsequent confrontation in Paris, were made for Canada by the federal Department of Labour, and the Canadian delegation to the meeting on July 1, 1964 was made up of three federal officials (of which one was chairman of the delegation), one provincial official, a university president, and an industrialist. Of course, the ratio of francophone to anglophone members was one to two.

This episode in the history of national educational planning epitomizes the problem we face because ours is a federal state. It all began about a century ago, with the proclamation

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of the British North America Act in 1867. The Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations which was known as the Rowell-Sirois Commission summarized the objectives of the confederation by saying: "Federal union was a plan whereby, through mutual concession, cultural and local loyalties could be preserved and reconciled with political strength and solidarity of the whole".[2] Basic to an understanding of the situation is the division of legislative powers provided for in that Act.

One section (91) gives to the federal government the power to make laws for the "peace, order and good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects ... assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces." Thus it was to have the residuary powers. Section 91 goes on to give 29 examples of areas of federal jurisdiction, including trade and commerce, census and statistics, defence, Indians, and penitentiaries. Two sections (92 and 93) give to the provincial governments the power to make laws on subjects which include public and reformatory prisons, hospitals, charitable institutions, property and civil rights within the province, justice in the province, and education. The clause with respect to education reads as follows: "In and for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Education ..." and then there are added exceptions to ensure the preservation of the rights of religious minorities. Another section (95) assigns the field of agriculture conjointly to the federal and provincial governments.

This is the framework within which development has taken place. The federal government's powers are clearest, though not completely clear, with respect to education and training related to economic growth; those of the provinces tend to favour their emphasis on cultural, including individual, development. Such a relatively imprecise summary of the division of responsibilities for education, and hence for educational planning, reflects the fact that legal interpretation of the constitution is an almost continuous process—one which has tended in most cases to favour the provinces. Certainty is a rare commodity in this realm. J.A. Corry, that wise student of government in Canada, put it neatly when he said: "In a working federalism like ours where both centripetal and centrifugal forces have full play, there is certain to be a good deal of dishevelled politics, temporizing, untidy and partial solutions ... I have almost concluded that a tidy mind is a crippling disability in dealing with the problems of the Canadian federation".[3]

Before proceeding on the assumption that we have no constitutional basis for national educational planning, let us toy for a moment with the hypothesis that the BNA Act did indeed provide a framework for planning—one characterized by decentralization. That doesn't stand up, however, when one notes the significant difference between a *de*centralized system and one which is *not* centralized. The former implies a centre with integrating functions and powers; the latter does not. And, essentially, the latter is what we have. So, how have we sought to plan for the nation under these conditions?

The instruments we have used include federal departments and agencies, government commissions of inquiry with national scope, federal-provincial conferences, national voluntary associations, and people talking to people. Our approaches have had to be ingenious; sometimes bold, sometimes devious. We have relied to a great extent on the processes of diffusion and absorption. And we have experienced more than a little frustration.

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Federal Agencies

Because national government commissions of inquiry and federal-provincial conferences lead to programs administered by federal government departments and agencies, it is convenient to treat these three together. An inference on which the following notes on federal activities is based is that every national agent, spending money on education or programs directly related to education, must plan that expenditure and thus contribute to national educational planning. To that I add the general observation that most educational or quasi-educational inquiries and programs initiated by the federal government have been related to particular departmental spheres of interest and responsibility, rather than to overall policy for education and training.

The Department of Agriculture was early on the scene when, in 1912, an Agricultural Aid Act was passed, to be followed the year after by the Agricultural Instruction Act which alloted $10 million over a period of ten years to aid agricultural education in the provinces. This was the first of the major federal aid measures and illustrates the use of conditional grants as means of influencing and encouraging national development in selected areas of education.

Another example is the Department of National Defence which in 1876 established the Royal Military College to train officers for the Army, and in 1879 organized a secondary school cadet corps. In the years that followed, this ministry has planned and established two additional colleges for the training of armed forces officers and also subsidized the training of officers in the universities of the country. It has been responsible, too, for schools for the children of service personnel on Canadian military bases and for adult education programs for serving members of the forces.

Veterans of the armed forces have been the responsibility of the Department of Veterans Affairs. After World War I it made some meagre efforts to help with the re-establishment of the disabled, but for the veterans of World War II it went all out. Elaborate programs of assistance for training were planned in consultation with educational authorities in the provinces and the universities. Many thousands of men and women received training which had been interrupted when they enlisted, or would never have been possible had they not been aided under the post-discharge re-establishment legislation. It will be remembered that the BNA Act gave the federal and provincial governments joint responsibility for agriculture, and the federal government sole responsibility for defence. It was not difficult to justify the training of veterans as being directly related to defence, but it is interesting to note that the word "education" was avoided in the process. The Department of Veterans Affairs had a "superintendent of educational training" (What could be more redundant?) and those of us who used our benefits to study for degrees were engaged in what was euphemistically called "university training".

One could go on with the catalogue of specific fields in which the federal government has departments or agencies planning and operating national programs within their areas of particular responsibility: for example, health and welfare involving tremendous outlays for support of provincial programs to train health services personnel; the education of Indians and Eskimos and all children of the Territories—though this is a field in which it is agreed that the provinces should gradually take over; language training and citizenship education for immigrants, and second-language training for Canadians of whatever origin in order to move toward some of the goals set for the nation by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

Of quite a different order is the planning tool, affecting all types and levels of education and training, which has been provided, quite constitutionally, by the federal government since 1919. I refer to what is now called the Education, Science and Culture Division of Statistics Canada. In consultation with the provincial departments of education, the universities and other agencies engaged in the planning and administration of educational programs, the Division collects, compiles, analyzes and publishes hosts of data concerning pupils, teachers, schools and costs, and variations on these basic categories of education statistics.[4] From time to time projections of these data are attempted but the agency is shy about dealing with such uncertainties. Its good reputation has been built on the reporting of reliable statistics, and its officers think this may not be maintained if their projections prove to be wrong—something which often happens to projections.

The areas of education and training in which the national government's activity and influence has been greatest have been manpower training, postsecondary education, and scientific research.

As early as 1901 representatives of labour and management brought pressure to bear on the Government of Canada to name a Minister of Industrial Education and to appoint a commission to inquire into technical education. In 1910 a Royal Commission on Industrial Training and Technical Education, Canada's first federal royal commission on education, was launched. Its report, submitted in 1913, was said by James Collins Miller to be "the first attempt to formulate an educational programme on a Dominion-wide basis and involving the active participation and leadership of agencies created by the National Government".[5] The First World War intervened and more years passed, but in 1919 a Technical Education Act was passed. It was modelled on the Agricultural Instruction Act of 1913 and, like the latter, provided $10 million over a period of ten years—in this case to help the provinces develop technical and vocational education facilities. Not long after, there was established in the Department of Labour a bureau of technical education headed by a Dominion director whose task was to encourage and facilitate provincial initiatives in this field.

In the years to 1967 a series of acts enabled the federal government to give conditional grants to the provinces for the expansion of technical and vocational training, in order that industry might be served and economic development promoted. The last of these, the Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act of 1960—a matching grant scheme like the earlier ones—was so enticing that some provinces charged the central government with gross interference in their educational planning. It is true that they did not have to apply for the federal aid offered, but if they did they had to match it (50-50 for some classes of expenditures; 25-75, i.e. 25% for the province, 75% for the federal government, for others) and this might well reduce the provincial funds left for other educational programs. If they did not apply, think of the money they would allow to go unused! This was but another example of federal use of the power of the purse. The long series of federal subsidies for technical and vocational education came to an end with the legislation that followed the announcement of a new federal policy in October 1966—to which we will return after sketching the story of federal support of the universities.

World War II ended in 1945 and for the next few years the universities were crowded with veterans. The federal government paid their fees and gave them a living allowance, and helped the universities to the extent of an annual grant of $150 per veteran student enrolled. But as the decade came to a close, enrolment dropped and funds grew scarce.

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A Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (the Massey Commission) had been appointed in 1949, and to it the universities brought their case—arguing that because they served the nation as a whole the federal government should come to their assistance. The Commission reported in 1951, recommending that university grants to be calculated on a per capita population basis and divided within each province on the basis of student enrolment. Maurice Duplessis, the then Prime Minister of the Province of Quebec, protested that this amounted to a breach of the constitution. He allowed the grants to be paid for one year, in the joint names of the governments of Canada and Quebec. Thereafter, he forbade the Quebec universities to accept the grants, threatening that if they did they would receive no support from the provincial treasury. In 1956 the universities of Canada submitted their case for an increase in the grants and Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent announced that the per capita rate would be doubled (from 50¢ to $1.00). On the constitutional question he argued that, though the provinces had the exclusive right to make laws with respect to education, the federal government could give money to anyone or for any purpose it chose. It is interesting to recall in this connection the point of view expressed in 1957 by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the present Prime Minister of Canada. He was writing in *Cité Libre* and this is a translation from the French:

> I have argued that it would be detrimental to our federal system to permit
> either the central or the provincial governments to donate money *received*
> *from their taxpayers* outside the area of their own jurisdiction. The fact
> remains, however, that these governments may have in their possession money
> *that does not come from taxation:* funds from the public domain, from war
> debts, profit from Crown companies, operational earnings from the Bank of
> Canada, and so on. Of course, no theory of federalism can prevent a govern-
> ment from donating these funds as it sees fit.[6]

The federal government was paying university grants out of the consolidated revenue fund, that is, money received from the taxpayers of Canada, and M. Trudeau was arguing that this was wrong. The Massey Commission had made another recommendation on which no action was taken in 1951—that there should be established a Canada Council for the Encouragement of the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences. Is it coincidence that this Council was established in 1957, after M. Trudeau's article appeared, and that it was said that the Council's two endowment funds of $50 million each came from taxes on the estates of two wealthy men—the late Isaac Killam and the late Sir James Dunn? Perfectly satisfactory, according to the argument of the law teacher/journalist who later became Prime Minister of Canada. Eventually a scheme was worked out by which Quebec opted out of the national scheme for the payment of university grants and, in lieu, received the equivalent in tax transfers from the federal government, thus preserving its autonomy in the field of education and getting the money too. This was the pattern when the new federal policy was announced in 1966.

The setting was a federal-provincial conference on the problems of university financing, held in Ottawa, October 24-26. The federal government had just appointed a Special Consultant to the Secretary of State, presumably to advise on federal support of higher education. But the new policy seems to have been formulated, and almost at the last moment, in the Department of Finance. It was announced on October 24 by Prime Minister Lester Pearson—a complete surprise to the provincial ministers and their aides, for it had been arrived at without prior consultation, and a surprise also to most of the federal officials present. In essence, the Prime Minister said that the Government of Canada was going to

get out of the business of making direct grants to universities. Moreover, it was going to phase out its massive program of conditional grants for technical and vocational education. Instead, it would make fiscal transfers, tax points to start with, and later an accounting and payment of balances owing, which would have the effect of reimbursing the provinces for 50% of their expenditures on postsecondary education. An alternative of $15 per capita of the population was offered to those poorer provinces which found the latter formula more advantageous—a rate per capita that would rise each year. In short, the federal government would try to help the provinces become financially able to discharge their own responsibilities with respect to postsecondary education. Would they use the money for education? It had to be a matter of trust, because there was no way in which the federal government could tie firm strings to the funds.

So much for postsecondary education. But, the Prime Minister went on, the federal government believes it "has a constitutional and necessary role in the training and development of our adult labour force for economic growth and full employment".[7] It would, therefore, frame a manpower training program weighted heavily on the retraining of men and women whose skills were no longer marketable, or the training of those who had none. It would purchase training from provincial departments of education, community colleges, private training institutions, or even training within industry. These plans were embodied in the Adult Occupational Training Act of 1967.

How could the provinces turn down such a fiscal transfer scheme. It was designed to free them and fund them; for that they could forgive the unilateral decision. They were hard bargainers, though, when it came to defining what costs were eligible to be counted. The result was that the program has cost the federal government millions and millions of dollars more than it had estimated. The plan which was formalized in the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act of 1967 was to have had a life of five years. As 1972 approached there was agreement only that the Act needed to be modified, but no agreement on how, so it was extended on the understanding that the provinces would not let their expenditures on postsecondary education mount more than 15% per year. In 1973 the provinces rejected a federal proposal for modification of the basis of fiscal transfers (shared costs, really) and the Act has been extended once more—to 1977. In 1967 the Department of the Secretary of State established an Education Support Branch to administer the postsecondary education aspects of the Fiscal Arrangements Act, and it continues to have at least formal responsibility for planning what should come next. One gets the impression, though, that there has been little active planning since the recent rebuff by the provinces.

But action continues elsewhere in federal circles. In 1963 the government appointed an Economic Council of Canada to study, and make recommendations on, government policies which would favour economic growth. The Council is a planning body, but no government department or agency is obliged to give effect to its plans. Inevitably, it has found education and training to be relevant to its studies. In its second annual review it fell into step with what was then current economic thinking, and argued that spending on education was investment.[8] Analysis of our stock of education led the Council to voice concern over the low level and to recommend that we should arrange to have more, especially more postsecondary education, for our people. More recently its cost-benefit studies have reflected the second thoughts economists have had on this score, but that is incidental to the fact that it continues to be involved in highlevel planning for education.

Its eighth annual review entitled *Design for Decision-Making,* is a sort of handbook for government planners.[9] In the chapter on education there is consideration of the policy objectives of education: "... it seems clear that education can contribute to two fundamental objectives of society—namely, economic growth and cultural development [including individual self-realization]. Moreover, because of its importance in distributing throughout society the skills and attitudes which contribute to economic growth and cultural development, education may significantly affect another fundamental objective of our society—namely, equality of opportunity". The Council emphasized "the need for better measures to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the means being used to achieve these objectives" and examined "aspects of the interrelationships between the educational process and the economy—including some partial returns from education, and certain distributional aspects of the financing of postsecondary education". (These interrelationships, you will remember, are among the matters the OECD examiners found to be neglected when they reviewed the Canadian scene ten years ago.)

The Economic Council has become a prestigious body and its reviews are treated seriously throughout the country, in spite of the fact that it has no executive power. As a planning agency, primarily economic but also educational, it is a valuable addition to our small national supply of such instruments.

One bit of evidence that the Council's thinking is shared by the federal government's fiscal planners is to be found in a paper by Douglas G. Hartle, written when he was Deputy Secretary (Planning) of the Treasury Board Secretariat.[10] "Governments," he said, "attempt to reflect social consensus regarding the overall value of education to society by influencing, via financial and other policies, the size and structure of the total educational sector". Later he suggested that the purposes intended to be served by government, i.e. federal government, intervention are:

1) to correct for "market 'imperfections' which prevent the individual from investing sufficiently in higher education to maximize *his own well-being*";
2) in the belief "that higher education produces benefits for society which cannot be appropriated by the individuals who undertake higher education"; and
3) to achieve "equity in treatment of its citizens ... and in the treatment of the federation's component regions".

He demonstrated that the wealthier provinces profit more, per capita, from the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act and observed that, "Recent proposals by the Federal Government to move towards a standard per capita transfer to the provinces for each youth in the 18-24 years age group presumably have been aimed, at least in part, at correcting the differences in provincial postsecondary entitlements which have arisen under the present cost-sharing program". (These are the proposals which, shortly thereafter, were turned down by the provinces.)

Speaking in Toronto about three months ago, the Secretary of State, Hugh Faulkner echoed Prof. Hartle.[11] He advanced the federal rationale for support of research activities and then said: "It seems clear that economic growth, development of labour market skills, interregional equity, and interpersonal equity are other very specific national objectives which may be partly realized through our support of education".

We shall now turn, briefly, to the third area in which the federal government's influence has been of major significance—scientific research. The need for government sponsorship

of research was recognized in 1917 by the establishment of the National Research Council of Canada. At first, indeed for about fifteen years, its role was to encourage and subsidize research and the training of research scientists. Later it acquired its own laboratories but continued to play its original role as well. In 1964 a Science Secretariat was set up in the Privy Council Office. Two years later a Science Council of Canada was established to advise the government on science policy, and now we have a Ministry of State for Science and Technology. Advice has been offered as well by a Senate Special Committee on Science Policy which recently submitted the final volume of its report.

Of relevance to our concern for national educational planning is the fourth report of the Science Council, *Towards a National Science Policy for Canada.* [12] In it six national goals are suggested as a framework for policy:

- national prosperity;
- physical and mental health and high life expectancy;
- a high and rising standard of education, readily available to all;
- personal freedom, justice and security for all in a united Canada;
- increasing availability of leisure and enhancement of the opportunities for personal development; and
- world peace, based on a fair distribution of the world's existing and potential wealth.

The Council points out that science and technology can and should contribute to each of these. It also advocates supply and demand studies of highly qualified manpower. I mention that particularly because it has long been a preoccupation of one federal department or another, indeed sometimes more than one at a time: the Department of Labour, the National Research Council, the Department of Manpower and Immigration, and now the new Ministry of State for Science and Technology.

We have seen how the provinces' constitutional responsibility for education has restrained and restricted federal initiatives with respect to manpower training and postsecondary education. Now even scientific research, of concern to the federal government "in the national interest" and long thought to be beyond the provinces' constitutional reach, has become a matter of expressed provincial interest, and the provinces have recently stated their right to be consulted about federal financial support of research projects in the universities. Their position is that all higher education is within their jurisdiction and also that some subjects on which research may be proposed are subjects reserved by the constitution to the provinces. This was made clear in January 1974 in a document discussing the activities of the Council of Ministers of Education. [13] Indeed this may account for the theme of the March address by the Secretary of State, which was mentioned above.

Interprovincial Bodies

Earlier, when listing the types of national planning instruments we use, I mentioned interprovincial governmental and quasi-governmental bodies. The chief of these are the Canadian Education Association (CEA) and the Council of Ministers [i.e. provincial ministers] of Education, Canada (CMEC). The CEA has been in business since before the turn of the century. Made up primarily of provincial and municipal officials and teacher training personnel, and financed by provincial departments of education and municipal school boards, the Association gathers and relays information about schools, teachers and pupils; publishes reports, a journal and a newsletter; and holds an annual conference. Thus

it provides media for country-wide diffusion of ideas and exchanges of experience. In this respect it acts much like the voluntary associations which are described below.

The provincial ministers of education had always been supportive of the CEA and usually attended at least a part of the Association's annual conference. As a group they were formalized in 1960 as the Standing Committee of Ministers of Education (of the CEA). Then in 1967, shortly after the federal government announced its new policy with respect to the financing of postsecondary education and its plans for adult occupational training, the Council was formed as a body separate from the CEA.[14] Its purposes are to promote interprovincial cooperation in education, to collect and exchange information on matters of mutual interest, and to facilitate effective consultation with the federal government. Since the Council of Ministers came into being the CEA has concerned itself primarily with professional affairs and the Council with matters of policy. Items on the ministers' agenda, usually supported by committee activity, include national school broadcasts (in cooperation with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation); manpower training (formulation of policy with respect to the federally-initiated adult occupational training program, reflecting what Stefan Dupré *et al* diagnose as a clash between provincial educationists and federal economists); the financing of postsecondary education (preparation for discussion with the federal government on the modification of the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act) and, currently, the OECD review of education policies ("policies" not "policy") in Canada. Here, then, is a new and powerful agent for the protection and promotion of the provincial interests in education. It does not pretend to be a planning body, but it certainly influences what plans are made and carried out.

National Voluntary Associations

To the extent that the Canadian Education Association is a voluntary body it is one of the three national associations that play major planning roles for Canada. The other two are the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) and the Canadian Association for Adult Education (CAAE). The latter, formed in 1934, acts as a medium of communication, as an agent for the promotion of adult education, formal and informal, and occasionally as a lobby on behalf of the interests of its individual and institutional members. It had its heyday in the past; it could have another in the near future since the concept of "continuing education" seems to be gaining popularity.

The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada began, under another name, in 1911 and acted as little more than a forum for the discussion of university concerns until the outbreak of World War II in 1939. In its planning for recruitment, for the training of officer personnel and for war research, the federal government consulted what was then called the National Conference of Canadian Universities (NCCU) in a way which was so meaningful that the universities felt the resulting decisions were to a marked extent their own. There was similar consultation and cooperation with respect to the plans for providing university programs for veterans on their discharge after war service. The Conference played another important role in influencing government plans when it persuaded the Massey Commission to recommend federal grants to universities, and then helped in deciding how these should be distributed. Its information services, national studies, annual conferences and occasional submissions to government have enabled it to contribute significantly to the planning of university education for Canada.

It was at the 1955 annual conference of the NCCU that the first national projection of university enrolment was presented—one which was heeded across the country. It was the AUCC that sponsored what might be called a non-royal Commission on Financing Higher Education in Canada—which had the effect of raising people's sense of the order of magnitude of university costs and financial needs. It was the AUCC that arranged for a recently published study of research policy in the universities of Canada. But its role, too, is diminishing. As provincial governments become more involved in financing and coordinating higher education within their borders, the target at which a body like the AUCC should be aiming, formerly the federal government, has become splintered. Where there was one, now there are eleven—the federal government and the ten provincial governments—and the Association has not yet discovered how to accommodate itself to this situation.

In a remarkable display of cooperation, the major national education associations supported an initiative of the Canadian Teachers' Federation which resulted in a Canadian Conference on Education in 1958, designed to draw attention and seek solutions to the problems of education at all levels. It was so successful that a second mammoth conference was held in 1962.

People Talking

My final category of planning instruments is "people talking to people". A new idea in education, sometimes good, sometimes not so good, has a way of finding expression across the country. Often it originates in the United States, for we read American books and journals, we attend American educational conferences, and many of us have taken our advanced degrees in the USA. Sometimes it originates or has its first Canadian adaptation in one of the provinces. Ontario and Alberta probably offer the most-copied models. Quebec has tended, since 1960, to be the most innovative of the provinces, but too few educationists in the rest of the country read and understand French to be fully aware of what is going on there, so its models are seldom copied.

OECD Review

I began with reference to the OECD review of one aspect of education in Canada which took place a decade ago, and promised to compare it with another OECD review which is now in progress. It is significant that the current review was announced not by the federal government but by the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Education. In his press release of March 26, 1974, François Cloutier described the project as "a review of the different systems of education in Canada".[15] Management is the responsibility of a coordinating committee composed of one representative each from the Western Provinces, Ontario, Quebec, and the Atlantic Provinces, and two from the federal government. "In essence", according to M. Cloutier's statement, "the final document will provide a look at the status of education in Canada. The review is also intended to promote internal study and analysis of educational developments and policies in a regional context, and to identify areas for long-range planning which individual ministries or the Council of Ministers of Education may wish to explore in the interests of provincial and/or interprovincial planning and cooperation". The confrontation is planned for 1975, and one may infer that the Canadian delegation will not, this time, be composed primarily of federal officials or led by a federal deputy minister.

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Conclusion

What we have in Canada are systems of education, not *a* system; no federal ministry, no national office of education; plans, but no integration of plans and no overall plan. By way of summary, I should like to quote again from the address made by J.A. Corry to the Association of Universities and Colleges two days after the 1966 announcement of the new federal policy for the support of postsecondary education. "The federal government is still engaged, nearly ten years after it lost the initiative, in a long retreat from the pre-eminence it had in the later years of the depression, and during the war and reconstruction." Looking at what he called first principles, Prof. Corry argued strongly the case for federal participation in educational planning and financing, drawing pointedly on the "peace, order and good government" clause of the BNA Act, and concluded, "The federal government has constitutional ways open to it to secure the educational objectives that are vital to the nation as a nation.... The only problems that arise in using them are political".

I wonder; not everyone would agree. But it seems clear that the national interest is different from, if not greater than, the sum of provincial interests, so we must continue in our efforts to serve it. My vision is of true intergovernmental collaboration in the definition of objectives for Canada which can be achieved through education and training, followed by negotiated agreement on how the constitutional powers and the resources of the partners in confederation can be exploited to achieve these objectives. If this is to come to pass it will require a spirit of mutual concern rather than of hostility, and multilateral rather than unilateral planning. To use a phrase which had political currency a few years ago, we must strive for cooperative federalism.

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THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL PLANNING UNDER THE U.S. FEDERAL SYSTEM

Introduction

To speak of educational planning and politics might appear to be both incongruous and confusing. Planning is systematic, organized, rational and forecasts future outcomes. Politics appears to be a disorganized, unpredictable activity with a limited look to the future only as it relates to the continued control of power bases. Yet, educational planning cannot be conducted in a realistic manner outside of the context of political activity. As a tool of management, planning must be responsive to, and aware of, the political arena in which major decisions are made. This is especially true in the development of viable plans at the federal level in the United States. Even the decision to engage in planning and evaluation activities is politically motivated. Much has been written about the politics of planning as if it were an academic study of principles of government. In this there appears to be a serious oversight. Fundamentally, politics represent a set of response patterns by individuals led less by rational decision-making than by emotional-survival needs.

Before considering the topic of the politics of national planning, there are several notions one should recognize about political behaviour:

- Political behaviour is motivated by a drive for power and ascendency. Oneupmanship is a desirable and rewarding game for the politically motivated individual.
- Though political behaviour may seem to be unpredictable in terms of expectations and outcomes, there is some evidence of predictable behaviour.
- Political behaviour is generally concealed, only obvious to other politicians and those with trained eyes.

The Politics of Priority Setting

When we speak of national planning under a federal system, we mean planning by the U.S. Office of Education. The U.S. Office of Education was founded in 1867 with the following provision:

> There shall be...a bureau called the Office of Education, the purpose and duties of which shall be to collect statistics and facts showing the condition and progress of education in the several States and Territories, and to diffuse such information respecting the organization and management of schools and school systems, and methods of teaching, as shall aid the people of the United States in the establishment and maintenance of efficient school systems, and otherwise promote the cause of education throughout the country.[1]

Throughout the history of the office its mission, role and purpose have been intensely debated. There are two basically contrasting views. Some have felt that it should provide

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national leadership by setting priorities for state educational agencies (SEA) and local educational agencies (LEA) to adopt and implement with the reward of federal aid to education. Others feel that the office should function only as a clearinghouse of information and provide federal funding to support the priorities established by each state. The advocates of strong national leadership have been encouraged by the dramatic increase in federal aid to education during the past ten years, viewing this increase as a mandate to carry out priorities identified by Congress and the Administration. Therefore, heavy focus on better education for the disadvantaged became a major priority of the U.S. Office of Education in the mid-sixties and was demanded of the state educational agencies and local educational agencies. The advocates of a more passive agency role—the collector of highly forgettable facts according to former Commissioner of Education, Frank Keppel—contend that constitutionally it was intended that education in the U.S. be controlled by state and local authorities. They feel that the federal government has no business dictating educational policy. Monies given the federal agency should be distributed to states and local educational agencies without any strings attached, with the minimum of red tape and inconvenience. They believe that federal intervention in American education is unconstitutional and dangerous.

Further complicating the picture are two other contentions which seem to cancel one another. The first states that without some national plan we can never achieve the dream of quality universal education—because of the wasteful use of available resources. The other states that the hallmark of American education—diversity of programs, approaches and practices—is a positive and desirable outcome, best achieved by relying upon local initiative. Now more than a century after its establishment, the role, mission, and purpose of the U.S. Office of Education remain matters of uncertainty and ambiguity. In such an ambiguous context federal legislation and appropriations are often administered with a sense of uncertainty.

Within this context of ambiguity and uncertainty the federal government, including Congress and the U.S. Office, have moved aggressively to play a leadership role for American education. Such recent federal legislation as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act give the impression that certain educational policies are to be observed nationwide, and that federal funds will be supplied to those agencies which support these policies. The nationwide policies are enacted by Congress and expressed in laws pursuant to the U.S. Constitution. They become binding on each state and are to be incorporated into, or encompassed by, the policies of each state government.

Though there were stirrings of interest in identifying national educational priorities by the Commissioner of Education before the appointment of Commissioner James Allen, it was not until fairly recently (I would say 1970) that the U.S. Office delineated a list of such priorities. I participated in that event when I served in Dr. Allen's administration. His officials urged that he accept the leadership in national planning first by listing the educational priorities for the next three to five year period. He postponed making a decision on this issue. After an unfortunate set of circumstances, which left the commissioner feeling abandoned and rejected by principals in the executive branch, he took action to recover his status. Without any planning, an historic announcement was made of a new major priority for American education. It took the form of the Right to Read Project. This was followed by a list of eight U.S. Office priorities for the expenditure of federal education funds. The priorities were drawn from congressional interests, statements by

national professional organizations such as the Big Six, the Administration, and those within the inner circle of the commissioner's office.

Successive congressional actions and commissioner's pronouncements have indulged in this type of priority setting for American education. For example, in 1971 former Commissioner Sidney Marland drastically revised the list of priorities identified by his predecessor and stipulated *his* priorities in education. Two of these, educational renewal and career education, became the major focus of his administration. But both priorities were hastily developed and poorly defined. Education renewal resulted in a fiasco and was abandoned after an unfortunate waste of manpower and financial resources. Career education still remains, but there is political pressure for its abandonment. Mr. Marland's priorities were revised in 1973 by his successor, John Ottina, who mixed management process priorities with program priorities; the former were related to agency objectives, the latter to national education issues. It appears that the setting of national priorities by the Commissioner of Education has become a fashion to reflect his personal interests and leadership style and make a mark on the Washington scene. To the dismay of officials, each commissioner (with a turnover of a commissioner each two or three years) revises his predecessor's set of priorities, excluding those which do not fit his bag of political tricks. This only results in further confusing the role and mission of the agency.

It may fairly be said that the U.S. Office of Education's priority setting has served two purposes: to assist the public relations program to enhance the public image of a new commissioner as a forward-looking, systematic and organized leader of American education; and to provide guidance to program managers at the federal, state and local educational levels, in terms of the current foci of effort and support. Although they have not evolved from the grass roots but were identified by the commissioner (with some advice from the non-federal educational and political community) it has been assumed that the stated priorities represent the foci of the U.S. Office and also reflect the interest of educational leaders in the nation. The very act of priority setting added support to a long range planning program within the agency which had been almost ignored. The public announcement of priorities gave impetus for the clear delineation of program and evaluation plans. Such plans would have been evidence that the agency was sincere in its focus on a given set of priorities. But, as in the case of the priorities, the politics of planning and budgetting added to the difficulties in trying to define a set of national plans.

The Politics of Planning and Budgetting

Given a set of priorities which reflect various interests of the Congress, the constituents, and the commissioner, what were the resources available to support their realization? At present, the U.S. Office of Education administers roughly $7 billion each year, has a workforce of 2,800 and works through their talents and skills, through legislative mandates which have the force of law, through working relationships with major educational organizations and key decision-makers in federal, state and local governments. The U.S. Office's funds represent 7% of the support for American education. Their 2,800 employees are miniscule when one considers that there are more than one hundred federal funding programs, involving every level and area of education. These programs affect some 19,000 local school districts, 50 state educational agencies, 3,500 colleges and universities (including branches), 3,600 post-secondary vocational schools, almost 22,000 lending institutions, and countless other agencies and organizations. The nation-wide system it is attempting

to influence services 60 million students and employs 3 million teachers in some 110,000 elementary and secondary schools. It might be argued that a staff of 2,800 is none too large a group to perform the agency's share of the management task; the administration feels that their number is too high.

If the U.S. Office of Education intended to assume aggressively the role of the leader of the nation's educational system, it would have to cope with the question of the degree of diversity of American education at all levels. To put it simply, the organization and management of education in the United States does not lend itself to a "systems" approach. The confusion and disagreement about the role and mission of the federal agency has already been mentioned. The confusion is heightened by the traditional claim that only the states and the local communities (combined) should run this public service. The federal government may make small financial contributions to these authorities, to use as they decide in partial support of the educational programs they have established. There can be (there should be) no such thing as a U.S. "priority" or "goal" in education. And the degree of differentiation, divergence and inconsistency from community to community, state to state, and region to region within the country should not be a matter for concern. The argument runs as follows:

> The U.S. Office of Education is an executive agency of the federal government, created by Congress, and managed as part of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, under the general direction of the President as chief executive of the federal government. Each state education agency is similarly authorized, managed and directed, but its authorization stems from action of the state legislature and the direction flows from the state's governor. The U.S. Office of Education and the state educational agencies serve different masters; organizationally they are distinctly separate entities. As parts of separate organizational structures, neither is subordinate to the other, neither receives direction from the other. Each deals with the other as a peer. And this distinction is multiplied a thousandfold when one is comparing the organization and management of the federal agency for education and the local school system.

This diversity of authority, organization, management and purpose has been the most significant stumbling block to the orderly planning of services and the rational allocation of resources for education. To date none of the primary actors in the nation's educational system has created a successful approach to the problem. At best we have the following picture:

- The federal government develop their program and budgetting plans taking into account the needs and wishes of the other components of the nation's sytem, but reserving the right to ignore them if that is needed to serve the Administration or Congress.
- The state educational agencies and local educational agencies develop their plans according to specifications established by the state educational agencies. These plans generally are aware of, and try to take advantage of, federal priorities—but not exclusively and generally they do not follow the format of the federal planning documents. Translation from one plan to the other is difficult and, in some instances, impossible. And the sum of all the individual plans is not one "whole".
- The institutions in the private sector function very much like the local educational agencies except that they may not follow any recognized guideline for planning. For example, individual universities often develop their plans as if they were the only institution in the country.

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The dream of developing a national plan which would incorporate the efforts of all the educational agencies operating in the United States to meet some specific national objectives during a given period of time may never materialize. If only there were some mechanism for dispelling the fears of a federal takeover of education, for rationalizing within agreed limits the great diversity in U.S. education, and for developing a set of viable and realistic plans, then a collaborative planning system might emerge.

Before leaving this topic, something should be said about the politics of planning and budgetting in the U.S. Office of Education itself. Program planning was considered an exercise in futility until 1973. Before that year, the office staff would go to great pains to develop a five-year plan according to the specifications laid down by a number of decision-makers which included the agency's Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, the Department's Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, and the Office of Management and Budget (formerly the Bureau of the Budget). After being assured that the program plans would dictate budget allocations, each year when the final fiscal year budget was reported there would be a mad scramble by the office managers at all levels to allocate the funds. For a host of reasons (some appropriate and some invalid) the decisions were not based on the prescription of the program plans. The plans, then, would be shelved as mere exercise documents with no value for the real world of federal decision-making. Interestingly enough, the most powerful decision-maker to emerge during the budget allocation period, which might last as long as three weeks, was the Director of the Office of the Budget of the U.S. Office of Education. Many of his judgments were prompted by straight political considerations (What will senator X say? White House memorandum of such and such a date restricted programs in this area). Moreover, the Budget Director had his own set of priorities, which might well be influenced by political considerations. For three weeks, therefore, he became federal potentate dispensing funds largely according to highly subjective judgment. And generally his recommendations became reality. The managers of the U.S. Office of Education became disillusioned with the program planners who offered a rational approach to decision-making but who were unable to follow through. In 1970, it was recommended that the planning and budgetting offices of the Office of Education be consolidated under one director so that program planning and budgetting would function as one synchronized activity. It was not until 1973 that the office consolidated thesefunctions, so that now there is a Deputy Commissioner for Planning and Budgetting. When that occurred the Director of Budgetting (the three week federal potentate referred to above) retired. Now the system is beginning to work, budgetting decisions are pegged to program plans, and the allocation of funds and program choices are made more rationally.

The Politics of Evaluation

Now let us consider evaluation and the political forces related to determining program impact and effectiveness. Melvin Tumin in his paper, "Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Education", said,

> Evaluation is a many-edged sword. It must unavoidably threaten and damage some of the actors in the scene, just as unavoidably it will improve the power position of others. The negative as well as positive functions of evaluation must be seen and understood by the evaluator. He dare not assume blandly that it is always better to know more than to know less. Or to know everything sooner rather than later. There are many positive functions of deliberate ignorance and systematic delay of information in these complex systems.[2]

Tumin gives the following example: Two, three, or four years after the publication of an evaluation report, when some legislation about pre-school education has found its way into congressional debate, someone will have to take a selected finding or two, with minimal statistical significance (such as that of the Coleman report regarding the role of integration of classrooms in the production of equality between Black and White), and make of that absolutely minimal finding a justification for a major political program. The experiences which we had in the U.S. Office with several major evaluation efforts for Title I and Head Start reinforce this point. Evaluation can be a political tool since it concerns decision-making in the political arena. And it can be either a destructive or a constructive tool! Because of the early evaluations of Title I and Head Start, their programs came under severe attack and their budgets were threatened. Members of Congress (whose staffs are becoming increasingly sophisticated about these matters), decision-makers in the Office of Management and Budget and in other federal offices are using these data not only to judge the program under question but to make judgments about their "analogous" programs. We know the weakness of these studies—the Coleman study, and the Westinghouse Study of Head Start—and the questionable conclusions drawn from weak and scattered data. But are the weaknesses known to the decision-makers? They are eager for information; they will ignore the *caveats* about the data in order to make a decision which has the hallmarks of rationality.

As an example of the weakness of major evaluative studies of social action programs, let us consider the Westinghouse assessment of Head Start. The review of the Head Start study by Walter Williams and John Evans, entitled "The Politics of Evaluation: The Case of Head Start" is misleading; the major fallacy is that the wrong questions were asked.[3] The term Head Start was a misnomer for pre-school intervention in health, socialization and, to some extent, education. To focus on achievement in cognitive areas when there is serious doubt that direct intervention by the rest of American education does any good, is sloppy evaluation. To overlook the development of the affective components, such as "hope" and its long term impact on future generations, of those affected by Head Start is overlooking one of its most important features. To dismiss this, as Williams and Evans did, and persist in asking incongruous questions about school achievement, reveals either their poor analysis of the problem or their *political behaviour.* (It is somewhat analogous to engaging in an evaluation of whether the Office of Education has raised the achievement level in the cognitive domain throughout education in the U.S.)

It is disconcerting to learn that sincere but unsophisticated managers will draw upon evaluative information of this calibre. It is even more disquieting to have it used by a politician because it reinforces his liking for, or disapproval of, some national effort. The major difficulty is that social action type programs in education are geared to bringing about political and social change. Evaluators generally approach these programs as if they were standard efforts to produce educational change. Title I-ESEA is a good example of this. To use achievement test scores as a criterion of the success of Title I is spurious. Its long range purposes are much more complex. In the minds of the Congressmen who passed the bill were the following: hopes of a solution to rising political problems of city schools which were manifest in the early 60s; the desire to provide federal financial assistance for public education; and the need for larger cities to realize relief from some of the pressure on their revenues. Therefore, the political implications of its evaluation are obvious and awesome.

During the past four years, because of the hue and cry for accountability in the expenditure of public funds, evaluation has had a high priority at the federal, state and local levels. There have been strong pressures for the Office of Education to address its evaluation efforts to the use of the federal dollar. Though this has some merit, it is more important for it to support reliable and valid evaluations, appraisals, or assessments of substantive aspects of education, educational enterprises, and educational needs and operations. But if the action is at the state and local levels, how does a federal agency, suspected of big-brotherism and potential control, implement an evaluation effort? The answer is partly facetious and partly serious: gingerly. Enlisting the cooperation of the state educational agencies and local educational agencies is difficult when they are besieged with masses of requests and paperwork. Furthermore there have been so many abortive attempts by the U.S. Office to evaluate federal-state-local educational program investments that relationships become strained when requests for cooperation are made. The state and local agencies demand that before major efforts are mounted, they take part in the planning so that the task can be accomplished in the most cost-effective manner. Also, the current state of the art and the professional capability of all agencies (including the federal) mitigate against outstanding success in a national program evaluation. We need new and germane evaluation strategies to assess national efforts in education. David Cohen of the Harvard Center for Educational Policy Research suggests that evaluating broad social action programs requires broad systems of social measurement.[4] Although staff capability has been a major thrust in advancing the cause of effective evaluation, a number of states and local educational agencies still cannot adequately mount a broad program evaluation. At the federal level the outcome of program evaluations in the past five years has been very disappointing. We can readily obtain program impact data to determine the number of students benefitting from student loans, or how efficiently our formula grant cheques are being distributed. But to determine whether or not the grant cheques support programs which attain the objectives of the legislation (such as quality education for the disadvantaged) requires a study of the comparability of educational programming and experimental study of student cognitive and affective behaviour. Such efforts take time. Unfortunately politicians and other high pressured decision-makers are impatient; they cannot wait for results. If there is no information after one or two years, the assumption is that the program should be under suspicion.

Coping with the Monster

There are several poignant illustrations of the political problems in developing and implementing a national plan under the U.S. federal system. We shall mention two in which we were personally involved. The first example relates to the development of a major new thrust in the education of handicapped children. In 1967 as Director of Program Planning and Evaluation for the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped in the U.S. Office, it seemed to me that the intended mission of the bureau and the office were not clear. After considerable study and discussion, we suggested that the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped should be working toward the goal of quality educational services to all handicapped children in the U.S., and that there should be a comprehensive program plan to meet the objective by 1980. Such a set of plans would serve several purposes. It would function as a trial balloon to see if this type of planning is feasible in the U.S. It would begin the process of orderly planning for the diverse programs of the office. And they would provide direction to a groundswell movement which was emerging, to meet the

educational needs of the handicapped—a long desired objective of workers in special edu-
cation. After considerable effort plans were formulated which attempted to take into
account the many constraints imposed by limitations in budget, available manpower,
available facilities, political support, etc. In order to meet the objectives by 1980, it was
estimated that a total ten year federal budget of $21 billion was necessary. This would be
additional to the contributions made by state and local educational agencies. **Beginning** in
1970 at $1 billion, the federal contribution would increase each year until 1976 when it
would level off at roughly $2.5 billion. In addition, the Office of Education would assume
the responsibility of implementing the plan under the activity label of experimentation
and development. When the draft plan was presented to the Bureau Chief, the response
was outright rejection. First, the idea was unprecedented in the Department of Health
Education and Welfare. Secondly, the plan was too ambitious. Thirdly, the federal share
was too expensive. Fourthly, the nation was not ready for such an effort. And fifthly,
Administration policy was not ready to move in this direction. The office could not, and
should not attempt to, assume leadership and direction for implementation of the plan.
This would arouse fears of federal control. The plan was then taken to a special meeting
of the representatives of all major professional organizations in the field of special educa-
tion. However, the group would not assume leadership in spearheading the implementa-
tion of the plan. The effort was tabled.

Eventually that plan became the foundation of a more modest one directed by Dr. Edwin
Martin, a new Associate Commissioner for the Education of the Handicapped. He has built
skilfully and gradually with noticeable political aplomb so that today the office is on the
threshold of implementing a comprehensive plan to meet the objective of quality educa-
tional services to all the handicapped by 1980—as originally proposed. In 1968, the total
federal budget for the education of the handicapped had been $109 million. Six years
later it is $240 million, with the prospect of an additional $630 million in state aid for the
handicapped—a total of about $870 million, not far from the original estimate of $1 billion.
The current plan of the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped is more detailed than
the original, but for all practical purposes it is the 1968 plan which is at last being imple-
mented.

There are several observations to draw from this experience; obvious ones but neverthe-
less true. First, timing is one of the most important variables in the acceptance of a
major planning effort. Second, a politically adroit manager is as important in the imple-
mentation of a plan as a sophisticated planner. And third, if the cause is right, never
hesitate.

The second example involves the politics of planning for the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act. One of the gems of the Johnson Administration was this act, designed to
equalize educational opportunity for the disadvantaged. It provided funding for a host of
educational programs and activities, all for the improvement of the education of children
and youth who were socially, economically or in any other way among the "have-not"
groups of society. The legislation gives the impression that our legislators really believed
that more dollars would lead in some automatic way to increases in the academic achieve-
ment of these pupils. This simplistic view was presented to Congress during the testimony
in support of the original legislation. To the researcher and scholar in education, this
notion was nonsense. But to the legislator, faced with other political pressures from the
urban areas, the minorities and the representatives of the "poor", this message was "just

what the doctor ordered". No one questioned the efficacy of the reported relationships between more federal dollars and excellance of schooling. There was a groundswell of demand that something must be done. The vote of federal dollars is not an uncommon response of U.S. legislators faced with major social problems. We must beware of being overly cynical in judging this response. There are, no doubt, some social programs where a recognition of the need for funds is a step half way to a desired solution. But not with those which are education-linked, where a higher achievement level of learning is the main goal to be sought. Three years after the passage of the act, when the first evaluation reports proved to be quite disappointing, the U.S. Office of Education was severely criticized by Congress for making poor educational investments. It was pointed out that it was the Congress which had enacted the legislation, not the office. The office was required to administer a law whose stated purpose, though noble in intent, was unattainable by the means provided.

The legislation called for periodic evaluative reports of the programs which were funded, but did not designate the form of the reports. At the beginning it would have been possible to design and implement an integrated system of reporting and accountability —one that might have satisfied Congress *and* provide critical information for the planners and managers of schools working at various levels. Some effort was begun to build such a system. But meanwhile, more and more reports of an increasingly diverse nature were being required of the states and local districts which were providing the new programs. Most of these served limited purposes and could not be compared one with another. Some educators found themselves spending almost as much time and effort reporting and evaluating as creating the programs. Concurrently there were pressures for the development of what has come to be known as a comprehensive planning, management, and budgetting system. Local and state education officers were growing impatient with completing the seemingly endless, redundant, time-consuming forms. Federal bureaus were collecting fewer and fewer properly completed forms from the overburdened educational agencies. Since reporting was by category of legislation, educators attempted, generally without success, to ensure cross-program impacts on particular target groups. Comparisons of cost-effectiveness were hampered by the multiplicity of terms and definitions used in the description of programs.

In August 1968, the Council of Chief State School Officers (senior personnel from the state departments of education) sought an agreement with the office that would involve both groups in jointly defining the data requirements for planning, management, and evaluation functions. A joint federal/state task force on evaluation was established which held its first meeting in January 1969 at Belmont House, near Elkridge, Maryland. Thereafter it became known as the Belmont Group and their proposals as the Belmont System. The goals of the Belmont Group were explicit.

● To reduce the proliferation of reports and separate data collection activities associated with the administration and evaluation of federally funded programs.
● To establish a common data base, and a system of management and evaluation reports which would enable local and state officials and the Commissioner of Education to meet legally required progress and evaluation reports for elementary and secondary education.
● To develop a long-range and systematic approach by which improvement could be made in the evaluation and management of programs in elementary and secondary education.

Despite continual infighting with the U.S. Office of Education the Belmont effort seemed to be having remarkable success. When changes of leadership occurred in the office, the Belmont group had to battle not only the administrators but also other Office of Education program managers who looked upon Belmont as an octopus, engulfing the reporting requirements of one program after another. Eventually Belmont was abandoned. The original operating group (the Belmont group) was reduced in size and in responsibility. Now a shadow of its former self, it has the ominous acronymn CEASE.

The lesson of this example is obvious. No major project with long term implications and needing long term commitment can be successful unless the inside, as well as outside, decision-makers are involved in it from the beginning. The Belmont effort miscalculated the power of the internal managers of the U.S. Office of Education.

Conclusion

This paper has been a sketch, a brief outline of some of the factors related to the politics of planning at the federal level in the United States. With anecdotes and examples I have briefly alluded to the role of Congress and other offices of the executive branch which have had, and must have, a decided impact on the planning process at the federal level. The examples are quoted from the experience of an official of the U.S. Office of Education, which would be the appropriate administrative planning agency at the federal level. The paper began with a few reflections on the nature of political behaviour. Having worked at the federal level for some time I fully recognize that politics pervade our lives. Nevertheless, I also recognize that it is a wasteful and unproductive way in which to conduct a public service such as education. Fully cognizant of the complexities of man as a thinking and feeling individual, I still hope that someday we shall be able to govern ourselves with candour, honesty and sincerity. We publicly support and espouse these qualities and the making of rational decisions on the use of our resources, yet we blithely dismiss them when we are faced with the explanation that a specific decision was made because of politics. And we seem to accept, with resignation, that planning activities recognized to be excellent in themselves can be nullified because they do not adequately take into account the "politics of planning".

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Edward H. Humphreys*

THE PLANNER IN THE VORTEX OF A DEVELOPING STORM

The Developing Storm

Anderson and Bowman have defined planning as "the process of preparing a set of decisions for action in the future".[1] For our purposes, we wish to limit the set of decisions to those related to the operation of a local system of education. Hence we will limit our discussion to the educational planning function at the local level, rather than the national or provincial (state) level of operation. It is not that most planning activities are different at different levels; but since planning takes place in a different arena, the rules of the game, by necessity, differ. Much of what I claim or describe is true for many western countries; it is particularly so for Canadian and U.S. educational systems. The details vary but the essentials are the same. However, I speak for the most part of Ontario conditions and from experience with Ontario boards.

While national governments have the right to raise revenue to meet their demands, few local boards are able to do so without the approval of a higher level of government. Because of this dependence, local boards of education are subjected to pressures from above that are not exerted upon national or provincial governments. That is not to say that the financial constraint is the only one pressing upon the local government of schools, but it is one, and it reveals itself in program decisions, building design, employment practices, and many other areas. In Ontario at present it seems to be taking its toll of local autonomy.

Most national and provincial governments are forced to pay some attention to the national economy and to the needs for trained labour. They frequently plan tertiary education to develop a labour force that is compatible with national economic needs. On the other hand, governments in local school districts are only concerned with the economy in a micro sense, and if they are concerned about labour at all, it is usually with finding jobs locally for the graduates of their schools. The development of specialized labour is not their primary concern, though some of their schools may have programs to train skilled tradesmen. Generally, highly qualified manpower is trained at the tertiary level of education, which is generally the responsibility of national or provincial governments. Even apprenticeship programs come under the jurisdiction of a department of labour rather than a department of education. This relieves elementary and secondary school planners from being much concerned with long-term planning for manpower needs (other than teaching manpower for their systems). Most children enter primary school and complete high school with a minimum of job-related skills.

A third fundamental difference of the work of planners at the local and other levels is the distance between the planner and the public. National planners are protected from the public by large bureaucratic administrations; the local school planner lives next door to the subjects of his planning, with the result that he is subjected to more direct attempts

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to influence his decisions and he obtains much faster and more personal feedback on his plans. His information and advice has an immediate effect upon the childrens' schools so any problems that result from it are immediately evident. There is little tolerance of the planner's errors of prediction when Johnny has no seat, no books, or no teacher or conversely when a classroom has few students, schools have empty unused classrooms, schools must be sold or closed, teachers are redundant and budgets will not balance.

There are many other differences we must take into account, but those cited above provide ample justification for viewing the local educational planner as different from the national or provincial planner. The differences make it wise to approach planning at the local level in ways that do not grow naturally out of the traditions of national planning. The arguments put forward by Blaug[2] about the processes of planning seem somewhat foreign to the world of the local planner.

Even the issues which local planners must face differ from those of the national planner. In a province with compulsory attendance laws, the question of whether to provide spaces for school-age children is redundant—it is the question of the number of places one should provide that is critical. Moreover, although the accuracy of the five- and ten-year projection is important, the accuracy of the figures for the following September is absolutely vital. It is ironic that common projection techniques are able to produce high accuracy for large numerical bases, such as the total school enrollment of a nation or a province, where an absolute estimate error of a thousand pupils causes little disruption, but they cannot produce the same accuracy for small groups, where an error of 30 in a single school creates havoc. Where the entry age of children has been imposed on the local board by the senior government, the decision as to the number of places required depends upon the size of the school-age population rather than upon any local policy. The major question then becomes not how many places to build but where to build them, and that primarily depends upon the *distribution* of the school-age population, although it can be affected by Board policy on the busing of children and on the location of special programs.

Until recently educational program decisions in Ontario were imposed by the provincial government and this was a common situation in many western countries. Major capital decisions that were taken by the local school board concerned building the facilities to accommodate the various program offerings. But even these decisions were constrained by provincial regulations and norms governing the quantity and quality of space to be provided. In Ontario recent changes in educational control structure have altered this pattern, throwing greater responsibility on the local board. With the amalgamation of many small boards into county units (in 1969) a change also occurred in relationships between the personnel of senior governments and of local boards. There are now only 128 large regional boards. This has changed significantly the equation of competency in this province.

Not only has the arena of the local school board planner differed from his national or provincial counterpart, the methods and attitudes of the players with whom he interacts have changed considerably during the last two decades.

The power game

The traditional pattern of decision-making in boards of education has been outlined by Kimbrough in *Political Power and Educational Decision-Making*.[3] He refers to such models as "Formal Institution-Association Concept" and "Informal Structure of Power Elites".

The first assumes that:

> (a) ...the predominant power in public policy is the institution of government. The persons elected or appointed to official positions in the formal decision-making structure hold the most actual power, as it is provided by the constitution and political practice, over the direction of basic educational policy, (b) the greatest unofficial influence upon educational policy-making is the plurality of competing formal interest groups and associations through which the special interests of the people are most effectively and forcefully expressed, (c) basic educational policy is determined by the interaction between the official power-holders and the representatives of competing formal interest groups and associations, (d) basic educational policy decisions are established in the formal meetings of the legislative groups, boards, and agencies which are legally clothed with authority to adopt binding policies.

The second that:

> ...the power to get major projects initiated or to decide what basic policies should be adopted resides in an informal power structure. Policy decision-making is a hidden process. The big men involved talk about what should be done in informal crowds at country clubs and private estates. This is not a group which has an elected president or constitution. Their meetings are not attended by the public, covered by the press, or recorded by an elected secretary. There is not the familiar reading and approval of the minutes of the previous meeting. There is not a call to order by a presiding officer or a procedure based upon "Robert's Rules of Order". After much informal discussion, those in the top level make the decision. The new hospital must be built. Perhaps a month later the school administrator reads the newspaper caption: *Mayor Proposes New Hospital.*

Kimbrough demonstrated that in reality the second process was the more common. Nevertheless, it appears that the game is being played by somewhat different rules today, and with somewhat different players. Because informal power groups have significantly changed in both their composition and modes of action, the planner needs new strategies. He must change his mode of operation discarding many of the concepts employed by traditional local school board administrators along with many inherited from national planners. Militancy is with us. We had best recognize the fact.

Who are the players in this education game? By what rules do they play? Bruno[4] suggests that four groups make up the present players in education—teachers, students, society and administrators. While these four groups have been present as long as schools have been organized, they appear now to be playing by a significantly different game plan. And it must be recognized that these groups are not homogeneous; each is composed of a number of competing elements. In his discussion of the power process Stearns graphically described these competing influences in 1965.[5] Today, pulls and pushes on any educational decision are present, but the power of the elements exerting the force has been fundamentally altered. Bruno's four groups remain the contending players, but over the past decade they have not remained static—neither in relative power nor in composition. Bruno's assessment of the developing trend is useful as a basis in our consideration of these four players.

Player 1 — teachers

The teacher of the 1950s was presented with apparently unlimited advancement potential.

The low birthrates of the '30s and early '40s produced relatively few university graduates between 1950 and 1965, while the high birthrates of the late '40s and early '50s brought many students and extraordinary growth to the education system. The result was gratifyingly rapid upward mobility—particularly for males. The satisfying rewards of compliance brought about a close identification of teachers with school district policy. By the late '60s, when the postwar babies were graduating from college and ready to take up jobs in industry and education, this had changed. At the same time, use of the pill exacerbated the expected decline in birth rates which led to decline in enrollment—experienced first by elementary schools which had been a particularly promising field for male teachers. The conservative backlash to freedom in the schools resulted in restricted financing. Few new administrative posts were available, the aspiring young teacher was dismayed to see his chances for advancement vanish and even his job put in jeopardy.

Militancy blossomed as cutbacks resulted in larger class sizes, fewer services, and heavier workloads. The profession, with an ever-growing proportion of males competing for available senior posts, and with new members raised on concepts of self-actualization, rebelled against the compliance so characteristic of the decade before. These developments took place earlier in the U.S. than in Ontario but they were essentially the same. In 1961 the American Federation of Teachers, on the basis of teacher disenchantment with the more passive National Education Association, became the bargaining agent for teachers in New York City. By 1965 teachers struck widely across the province of Quebec. In 1972 they joined with the trade union movement of Quebec to stage major work stoppages in the public service sector, shutting down schools to protest the actions of the provincial government in reclassification of their jobs. The changed attitudes of teachers was profound. Evidence of this was seen in British Columbia. In 1972 the B.C. Teachers' Federation put money and muscle into a partisan political effort to defeat the incumbent provincial government. In December 1973 the previously apolitical Ontario teachers—over 100,000 strong—staged a one-day strike against Bill 274-5, a measure which was designed to limit their bargaining process. Today no one questions that teachers have decided to play the game by different rules.

Player 2 – students

Students have also demonstrated change in characteristic behaviour over the last two decades. The apparently quiet, obedient, and passive (particularly university, but even secondary) student, fired by materialistic goals, faithfully completing his assignments, jumping efficiently through the academic hoops, standing in line for the high-status job of the future, unquestioningly accepting the advice and plans of his parents and teachers—this student has disappeared. Deferring present gratification for future gain is no longer part of the accepted strategy of today's student, as it was in the '50s and early '60s. His goals must be an intrinsic part of any activity in which he participates and he is impatient for results. He has little faith that the conventional wisdom of his parents and teachers is adequate to the problems of his time.

Of 1,000 schools studied by the N.A.S.S.P. in 1967, over 59% had experienced organized activism.[6] To caution those who assume that the worst is over and that students will go back to sleep now that they have had their fling, Alexander and Farrell report that the incidence of student protests in Ontario schools and the numbers involved increased each year between 1969 and 1973—growing by about 900% in the four-year period.[7] Students

apparently have changed. As Bruno states, "The radical shift in student attitudes, percep-
tions and expectations concerning the schools does not seem to be a temporary phenome-
non; in fact, these attitudes might even become more radical or at least more widespread
in the future".[8] The students, seem to have decided to play by different rules.

Player 3— society

The third player in the game, society, has not remained somnolent as the other players
metamorphosed. Compliance to decisions by government was commonplace during the
postwar period as aspiring individuals sought the golden grail of material comfort and
status. Property rights reigned supreme, and most adhered to the cult of efficiency as
individual personal rights were set aside to accommodate growth of the economy. The
leadership provided to the community by influential (generally business and professional)
men frequently was followed without question. Bigger was better, as those 'on the make'
sought their fortune in the new bureaucracies of business and government. In the name
of progress, the individual was expected to stand aside as new and bigger schools, hospitals,
and highways were built to accommodate the needs of the system.

   Then it began to change, as challenges to monolithic 'public will' were successful in the
courts; the Brown *vs.* Board of Education of Topeka (1954) decision on integrated school-
ing was one of the first successful challenges.[9]   Much later, the Indian, Aleut, and Inuit
compensation for aboriginal lands in Alaska (1971) proved a costly lesson to oil companies
and government alike and boosted the morale of the challengers of bureaucracies.[10]   Even
more recently the stunning victory, though apparently short lived, of the James Bay
Indians over the Hydro Quebec flooding of their hunting grounds has demonstrated the
continued thrust of the citizens' rights movement.

   Not only were challenges in favour of individual and collective rights apparent in the
national and provincial courts, they also became apparent at the city and community level
as old-line city councillors were replaced by ones more responsive to the demands of
citizen groups of all sorts. In the Toronto area alone, in recent years anti-pollutionists
were able to stop the construction of the Scarborough and Spadina expressways, environ-
mentalists have preserved from developers the Rattray marsh as a wildlife sanctuary, and
community activists have rehabilitated the neighbourhood of Don Vale rather than permit
demolition of its homes prior to the redevelopment of the area. Success of grassroots
activism at the expense of government, industry, developers, and majority groups has be-
come apparent wherever business or government has come into contact with an aroused
citizenry. No longer are citizens at the national, regional, or community level prepared to
sit still while their real or fancied rights are infringed. Here again we see that the players
have rewritten the rules of the game.

Player 4— administrators

Administrators have lived difficult lives in recent years. The world in which they work has
changed remarkably. Their authority and expertise have been rudely challenged. The
official who was unprepared to analyse the needs of the situation, unwilling to consult,
report and delegate authority, unable to look ahead, has found himself in continual conflict.
As the security of the '50s turned into the disruption of the '60s, the administrator's need
for analytical capability, flexibility, tact and ingenuity has become more apparent. The
delicate position of the senior administrator of an educational system cannot be over-

emphasized. It is he who must try to mediate the conflicting goals and conflicting aspirations of the other players in the game. Not only is he subjected to pressures from teachers, students, and public but he must operate within the constraints of the senior level of government, who view his problems from a quite different perspective.

To make matters even more delicate, it is the administrator's responsibility to ensure that the schools function—that teachers are present in well-equipped classrooms, that buses convey students to the classrooms safely and at the appointed time, that students learn and conduct themselves in ways that parents believe match their own best behaviour. Needless to say, the changes that have taken place in the last two decades have had a profound effect on the functioning of the chief education officer. And because the changes affect him, they affect the planner who must assist him to prepare for the decisions he must make.

The educational administrators' problems stem from conflict between the other players in the educational game. What are some of these differences? What are the issues with which we must deal as planners, and how are they rendered difficult by the players' changed modes of operation? To examine these questions let us look at a few examples of current conflicts.

The Planner in the Vortex

One way to grapple with the issues that affect planners is to examine a number of activities with which planners at the local level traditionally have been associated. These include (1) site location and school boundaries, (2) facilities design, (3) facilities use, (4) staff development and allocation, (5) program specification, and (6) financial planning. Although there are other areas in which planning is involved, a brief examination of these will provide ample evidence of the quandary the planners face.

Site location and school boundaries

There once was a time when board administrations decided where schools would be located and what their catchment areas would be. Their decisions were based upon the best knowledge their professional planners could provide. We must grant that a decision was probably swayed as a result of discreet inquiries from influential people in the region, but, generally speaking, it was expected that good planning principles would be the most important element in the decision. Once the decision was taken by the duly elected trustees on the advice from their officials, few adjustments were made; the site was purchased, the school built, or the boundaries established. Times have changed.

Many planners now wonder how they can function effectively for the rules are changing day by day. Major school redevelopment plans often are turned back by activist community workers who insist that schools should not be built by expropriating and demolishing low-income housing. The location of a proposed new school is changed as old residents demonstrate, demanding and getting assurance that their interests will not be subordinated to those of a large subdivision developer. The total population planned for a development area (and the need for school sites) is dramatically reduced when a confederation of ratepayers' organizations mobilizes the surrounding community in a successful three-year fight in council, the school board, and finally the courts. A redesign of school boundaries to free space for the reorganization of accommodation is rejected after parents' protest through delegations, demonstrations, and picketing that their children will be

forced to traverse busy streets. Bus transportation, removed on the basis of reasonable walking distance, is reinstated after parents' protest by picketing and then by removing their children from school.

These examples of parent and community activism illustrate the degree to which planning decisions are affected by the influence of previously quiescent groups. Moreover, they are somewhat unsettling to the planner, for successful protests have been mounted about numbers of schools and location of sites, matters which are not technically difficult to settle and which it should be possible to place with some objectivity and detachment. After all, the houses and the children are either there or not: the school is either needed or not. This type of decision does not appear to be a political one. But apparently, it is no longer entirely technical.

Design of facilities

If the planner is not able to choose a school site based upon technical considerations, perhaps it is his role to plan the construction of the building once the site has been chosen. It should be possible to examine school needs and construct accommodation appropriate to them. But who defines the needs? When programs were prescribed by central authorities it was clear: if shops were designated as necessary, they would be built and they would be used. But the credit system appears to have removed this certainty; it is the students' choice of courses which determines from year to year what courses will be taught. Will the newly redundant auto shop be appropriate for a newly needed art room? And will, two years from now, the art room itself become redundant, displaced by the needs of a course in marketing, or consumer economics, or classical civilization, or theatre arts? Will the old Latin classroom be appropriate as the new Family Life classroom, with day care facilities attached? Will the space demanded by the community for junior kindergartens be congruent with the space now available because of falling enrollment?

Is it even possible to design space to meet past, present, and future requirements? Will the community-designed school of today meet the needs of tomorrow's community? And if we build-in needed community facilities, will we be able to recover the costs from the Ministry of Education or must we then play tic-tac-toe with the Ministry of Social and Community Services as well? Who is it that the planner must meet with to decide on the design of the facility? If he is able to identify the groups that now will influence decisions on programs, will that be sufficient to enable him to define an appropriate set of functional specifications? Will the same groups that hold power now still hold power once the school is built? If they do, will they still see the same needs, or will they have changed their minds by that time? The building of a school should be relatively simple—once the planner has an acceptable statement of function. Drawing up functional specifications used not to be too difficult for a well-trained educational planner—but times have changed.

Facilities use

It may be that one of the problems related to capital investment is the use to which the facility or equipment will be put. Schools have been the subject of considerable criticism because some of their facilities have appeared to be idle many hours in the day, month or year. Where population shifts have occurred, redundant classrooms have remained empty or been used for storage or as extra resource rooms, libraries, reading rooms and lunch rooms. The public is demanding more efficient use of capital resources, and the schools

are attempting to meet the challenge—but not without problems. Members of the community use school facilities for recreation programs and wonder why it cannot provide storage space. They criticize the playing fields as inferior to their needs and complain because they cannot be used during the day. Joint use of buses has been urged in order to eliminate redundant runs; but because the buses went to different schools, some children rode around for excessive periods of time. Parents are not prepared to have their children delivered like packages by efficient but apparently circuitous routes. Route planning became a political problem when parents objected to little seven-year-old girls riding the buses with eighteen-year-old men.

It would seem to be logical planning to reduce space redundancy as much as possible. It would also appear to be good planning not to build new space where redundant space already exists. Communities, however, develop around schools, and the exchange of facilities with the municipality or the local community college, while good planning, has frequently proved unacceptable to a community which thereby loses its favourite school.

Joint use of facilities is another of these 'rationalizing' concepts that appears feasible to all except those who are expected to employ it. In Ontario, where a Roman Catholic parochial but publicly supported school system operates alongside a non-denominational public school system, the reallocation of space between the two boards is easier said than done. Unless the public (particularly the parents) accept the idea, it is impossible to accomplish. Such a public acceptance was clearly lacking in a recent attempt to exchange schools in the city of Mississauga. Public meetings about the exchange drew overflow crowds; epithets were hurled freely by public and separate school supporters contesting the decision. The planners found themselves in the middle of a near battle between two sectarian groups, each protecting what it believed to be its own interests. Proposals for exchange and sharing of facilities in Metropolitan Toronto have met similar obstacles.

Staff determination and allocation

Planning for that area of the educational system that accounts for between 70% and 80% of the current budget is rather crucial. A small error in short-term projection of enrollment can result in grave difficulties when a number of students who are expected in September do not turn up, or when many more than were expected appear. Estimating the long-term changes in birth rates has been a difficult problem, but it can be done with some degree of reliability. Estimating the school population one year hence, however, requires much greater accuracy.

Should the planner act conservatively to staff schools with fewer teachers than are likely to be needed? Or should he load schools with fewer students per class than policy warrants? In the first instance economies are made, but teachers protest heavy workloads, and considerable reorganization of the schools will be needed if student numbers increase unexpectedly. In the second, teachers are happy but taxpayers protest the added cost of small classes; and the cost is even greater if the projection was high so that the resultant classes are even smaller than the size intended. A further problem confounds solution to the first; as there occurs redundancy of secondary school teachers resulting from students' choice of subjects—choice that is frequently influenced by personality as much as by content—these teachers add to the number displaced by virtue of shrinking enrollment. And when these secondary school teachers also hold the elementary teacher qualification and try to transfer to the elementary sector they exacerbate a supply/demand inbalance of teachers for the lower schools which is of even longer standing.

The allocation of staff to schools and the resulting community protest received continent-wide publicity in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville* experiment in community control. Militant members of UFT conflicted with militant community activists to disrupt the schools over the question of who would control the allocation of teachers to positions in the schools.[11]

Though less drastic, student protests have also erupted over changes in the length of school year imposed by the Ontario Ministry of Education. That recent strikes of teachers have not been solely related to salary problems demonstrates that there is little in the area of staff determination that is not subject to dispute. The planner finds that most of the policy guidelines he is trying to work within are subject to major community dispute, and there is a real possibility that policies will be reversed after planning has been under way for some time.

Program specifications

When program decisions were made centrally schools provided essentially identical offerings. At present many provinces and states permit local boards the freedom to offer the courses and programs they wish. With such autonomy, the planner should have a significant role in helping the administration and the board determine what will be offered. However, this autonomy is often more apparent than real. For example, in Ontario the recent mediation judgement on the French-language school controversy in Cornwall[12] set aside that board's planning decisions of previous years. As a result there was overcrowding in the high school involved and the retention of a shift system. Similarly, the controversy in Sturgeon Falls[13] over the language of instruction to be used was resolved politically, not primarily with reference to the numbers and distribution of the English-speaking and French-speaking children. There is little doubt that this type of political approach to such program decisions will continue, with the public protests, student strikes, and staff involvement that characterized these two disputes.

Though less actively expressed, demands abound currently in Ontario for programs in school to meet the needs of various ethnic and religious communities. In recent meetings held to consider the social policy needs of Indian and Métis communities a complaint which was frequently made was the lack of programs that would help preserve non-dominant cultures. While this has long been an issue among supporters of the Indian and Métis communities across Canada, its expression has never been as widespread as at present. It has not been what might be termed a common problem. It is now. The imposition of dominant cultural values and language in various Canadian cities has run into conflict with French, Italian, Jewish, Indian and English ethnic communities recently. Public acceptance of imposed solutions, even when they are well planned, is difficult to secure.

We would not wish to imply that only non-dominant groups employ activist tactics to attain the programs they desire or to prevent those they object to. We should not forget the controversies which raged over the introduction of junior/senior schools, over the elimination of religious education in the public schools of Ontario, and over the introduction of courses of sex education. And these were matters of dispute in many communities

*In New York City.

in North America. The removal of children from open-concept schools and demands for open boundaries were also being recorded in this province not too long ago. On the other side, implementation of a desired program frequently is demanded prematurely by a local activist group; the public has been unwilling to wait until suitable staff, equipment, and facilities are available. This has caused hasty planning and implementation which has resulted in much unnecessary criticism of the innovation. These examples illustrate the variety and depth of the public struggle to ensure that particular interests are sustained. The planner often finds himself embroiled in a dispute he would have preferred to avoid and which seems to bear little direct relationship to the technical work he was hired to do.

Financial allocations

Not all of the demands of interest groups cost money, but most do. It is the responsibility of the planner to assess what the costs of programs and facilities, are likely to be under the policy guidelines of the board as to conditions of work, use of space and curriculum requirements. If there were no need to limit funds, all groups could be provided with the education they wish their children to have. But limits do exist, budgets must be struck, and public funds must be collected. In Ontario, as in many jurisdictions in North America, elementary and secondary education are jointly financed by local taxes and provincial grants. The provincial share is based on equalized local assessment (i.e., an estimate of the community's ability to pay) and varies from one board to another. Since there has been considerable difference in the per pupil expenditure of Boards (and it would be possible for richer districts to simply accept the provincial grant, tax themselves and increase the already existing disparities) each year the Ontario Ministry of Education imposes per capita ceilings on total expenditure. Many of those who are responsible for providing educational services regard these limits as simply unrealistic. Protests are generally made by urban boards and those where growth is still occurring. Nor is the ceiling control device entirely followed. Special formula changes have been developed to satisfy the needs of Metropolitan Toronto, and there have been several teacher salary settlements made where it was recognized that some accommodation of the total expenditure ceiling would be required. By and large, however, it is true to say that a limitation on local expenditure has been carried out. But the limitations on expenditure do not appear to be a deterrent to the public when they present their demands for services. The reply that the board cannot 'afford' the service is not an acceptable one. Nor are they a deterrent to inflationary increases in costs. So the planner is caught between escalating demands for services from below and limits to control expenditure imposed from above. He cannot say to the community, "If you wish the service you must pay the price". Now he must point out, "You cannot have that service without losing this service", or "You cannot have either service".

Moreover, the planner cannot always be sure that any statement of priority of program is accurate, or that its accuracy will remain stable. The limits are adjusted by the provincial government from year to year, but they are also adjusted to meet political pressures. Since adjustments often occur after dates for budget submissions have come and gone, the financial planners are left with a serious dilemma. Do we limit program because we lack fiscal space? Do we count on an increase in the spending limit? Or do we arrange a redefi-

nition of expenditures from ordinary to extraordinary* funds? How can we plan adequately with the boundary conditions continually changing?

Planning for capital expenditures is also more risky for the progressive administration than the cautious and traditional-minded. Prudent financing would suggest that expenditure should be levelled so as to avoid overtaxing of capital needs in any one period, with facilities and equipment being acquired in keeping with some planned development. But changes in the money supply, mortgage rates, and cost of housing all affect the need for building schools. Planned new building, replacement construction, and acquisition of new and replacement equipment would proceed better if senior levels of government (or votes for bond approvals) did not distort rational programming by providing large amounts of capital one year and little the next. Long-range capital budgetting is necessary to deal rationally with capital allocation, but can only be effective where competent local planners, close to the scene, are able to timetable projects. The planning of such capital expenditures is seriously affected when political pressures and public protests determine starting and completion dates for major projects. It seems illogical to wait for housing starts to decide to build a school that will require many more months of construction than will the houses.

Planners must be able to employ their skills in such a manner as to provide the services required by their role. What are the capabilities of local education planners? And do they approach their tasks in such a way as to ensure that their technical skills will be employed to the benefit of the public? Are there answers to the problems of school board planners who find they are living in a world in flux, where the ground rules under which they have been trained no longer seem to apply? Where should educational planners search for the guidance needed to ensure that their activities prove to be appropriate to the needs of their communities?

The Functioning Planner

Countervailing interest groups

It is important to recognize that there are a variety of publics to which school planners must pay attention. Because such variety exists, planning can no longer be solely a technical activity as has frequently been the case in the past. The planner must, of course, be competent in the range of quantitative techniques which are traditionally part of his tool kit, but he must now also be competent in the techniques of investigating public attitudes and opinions, and astute in dealing with groups which use political rather than technical processes to accomplish their objectives.

It has been in the political sphere that many good educational activities well-planned in the traditional way have run into difficulty. The planner, therefore, must be able to discover and assess the strength of the countervailing forces that will influence any planning activity. He must recognize the variety of interests which must be taken into account in any particular program he is investigating, even though many of them will not be expressed by articulate spokesmen. To neglect any interest group in arriving at a solution to the problem under study is likely to spawn legitimate criticism at the stage when plans are difficult to amend. Awareness of possible critics is an essential skill of the planner.

Variety in solutions

To be able to recommend actions that will answer to the interests of diverse groups, it may

*These are not included under the ceilings.

be necessary to have more than one appropriate solution to a problem. What is justifiable in a rural area may not be justifiable in a city. What is sound for a Portuguese community may not be sound for an Anglo-Saxon community. What is necessary in a transitional housing area may not be needed in a stable upper-middle-class area. If we, as planners, are to meet the needs of the children from diverse communities, we probably have to be biased in favour of pluralistic-type solutions. Sekaquaptewa, in discussing the community as a producer of education for cultural pluralism, indicated that a need exists,

> ...to restructure America's educational practices based on multi-cultural elements in an effort to resolve some of its social ills. Although this trend to pluralism may be the result of injustices incurred by ethnic minorities because of current educational practices, it is apparent that American educators have realized that education for cultural pluralism can benefit people of all cultures in the community.[14]

Pluralistic solutions may be our best way of meeting the needs of diverse communities. Variety in school organization, staffing, and design, community involvement, program offerings and financial support could all permit and encourage the public educational system to cope more successfully with a changing public. It is critical to the effective functioning of public education that such diverse solutions to problems be encouraged to take place *within* the public system—that alternatives are not forced *outside* the system because of the inability or unwillingness of public educators to accommodate diversity. As planners, we should try to accommodate diversity by asking the question "Why not?" instead of "Why?" Diversity should spawn new thinking and provide opportunities that do not at present exist within the public sector of education.

Direction sought

Many will say that the thrust to multiple solutions is a further indication that today's society is unprepared to follow any type of positive leadership—that the public wishes to wander aimlessly, each going his own way, without reference to societal needs, and with no real policy. On the contrary, our society seeks leadership but rejects authority. We have many examples of the public's willingness to follow those who promise leadership, whether advocating 'visions of the north' or 'unity in diversity'. Perhaps because there has been a lack of delivery on promises, the public now is demanding more honest exposure of the basis for leadership. Proposals no longer can rest on the argument that, "The proposers are authorities and they know what is best for you". Given appropriate processes, the public is anxious to support well-conceived plans.

What are these processes? They rest on rapport between the planner and the various publics—parents and taxpayers, students, teachers, and administrators. The rapport depends upon their perception of the objectivity of the planning activity. Planners must measure up when these publics ask whether *all* the necessary information has been provided in an appropriate form. They will no longer tolerate biased information supported by statements of authority, or no information, just the authority's claims. If the planner is perceived as presenting biased information, or suppressing information in order to support the preconceived positions of authority, his credibility is lost.

He must assiduously avoid any activity that suggests that his interests or those of influential individuals or groups supersede those of the public. In other words, the planner must decide for whom he is working and he must develop his plans accordingly.

Edward H. Humphreys

Who is the planner's client?

One must recognize that, while the public is ultimately the employer of a planner, he reports to (or through) his director of education to the governing board of trustees. The planner must complete the tasks he has been assigned in such a way as to convince his director that he is doing good work. But this should not infringe upon his right to inform the director of the facts (however unpleasant) of a particular planning activity. If withholding information from the public about a controversial item will compromise a future planning activity, he must communicate this clearly to the director as early as it becomes evident. If information developed for a project illustrates that the solution proposed by the director will likely fail, the planner must report this probability without equivocation. If contemplated action will create a major political problem, the director must know, so that he can either get agreement to change the action or plan a strategy to overcome the problem. Once the director has been informed of the consequences of any action, however, it then becomes *his* responsibility—not that of the planner—to decide appropriate action. The planning unit in the local board has a responsibility to act as an honest consultant to the director, rather than as a gatekeeper of delicate information. At the same time it is incumbent on the director to keep his planners informed of the actions he intends to take, the decisions he has made. When that occurs the planning unit should be sufficiently well informed that it can advise him of the likely consequences of his actions—i.e., the exchange of advice takes place prior to the director establishing a position.

Information that is supplied to the public is of particular concern to any planning unit. While it is true that a well-informed public is more difficult to deceive, it is equally true that it is more astute in recognizing appropriate solutions to problems. It is incumbent on the planner, therefore, to ensure that appropriate information be made available to the public so that they will recognize that the problems do indeed exist and that the solutions proposed are efficacious. The planners may need to convince administration that the withholding of information in the long run might well prove to be counterproductive. Just as it is productive in salary negotiations to have unbiased information provided to both parties, so also is it productive to supply contending parties in a boundary dispute with objective information. Each instance of such action will develop better rapport and a greater willingness of the public to accept recommendations supported by information. It is far more difficult for an interest group purposefully to propose unworkable solutions to a problem if valid information has been provided to all parties, by a respected source, well in advance of any discussions or confrontations.

Here we have discussed only interactions that normally take place between the director and the public. In reality only a small proportion of the controversial decisions are made at that level. Most problems occur farther down the line at the level of the superintendent or principal. Usually it is the case that the farther we are from a problem, the more resources we apply to solving it. There is therefore a need to apply resources at the level where problems are most acute.

Planners have traditionally provided information to senior administration while principals are left to rely on their own resources in assessing the effectiveness of a particular proposal. It may now be time to redress this imbalance and supply information to principals as routinely as we expect them to provide information to the system. Since school autonomy permits many principals to develop unique solutions to problems, the adminis-

Figure 1   MODEL OF THE COMMUNICATIONS OF A PLANNING UNIT

PUBLIC

PARENTS

RATEPAYERS

COMMUNITY   GROUPS

TRUSTEES

STUDENTS

DIRECTOR

PLANNING

UNIT

STUDENTS

ADMINISTRATORS

BUSINESS
OFFICERS

SUPERINTENDENTS

SCHOOLS

PRINCIPALS

TEACHERS

TEACHERS

Information and
service provided
to

Data received
from

Data collected
about

trator must be made aware of the implications of a principal's decisions through a channel and in a manner that does not contest the principal's autonomous position.

From the planner's point of view, it is clear that schools would far more willingly provide information to the planning unit if they could expect a return on their investment of time in the form of information classified and prepared according to their needs. With more adequate information many local school difficulties probably could be solved by the principal.

The figure provides a model of the relationship of the planning unit to its various publics. In this model the planning unit would relate to each public—the director, administrative officers, schools, and public—by providing them with suitable information on any major question being examined. In turn, the planning unit would receive data from each of these groups as well as independently collected data about schools and the community. The analysis of these data and the information thereby developed would be disseminated to the various publics as appropriate to their needs. In this way, each level of the system would be able to deal with its problems in an informed and planned way with knowledge of each other's store of information, rather than on the basis of ill-informed crisis decision-making.

It should be possible to reestablish rapport between the various contending players in the education game by developing equity in interaction. In this the planner would play an important part. To accomplish this, however, the members of a planning unit in the local school board must become more politically aware. They must be prepared to provide valid services to all players in the game. They must address themselves to the problem of divergence in the community by providing pluralistic solutions to the myriad problems of school systems.

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PANEL STATEMENT

W.T.J. Busch*

POPULATION IN DECLINE: THE PLANNER AS RATIONALIZER

North York, besides being the largest school board in English speaking Canada, during the last two decades has experienced the most rapid growth. My remarks will deal specifically with North York, its characteristics and our experience. North York in 1952 had something over 14,000 students. Twenty years later this number had increased to over 104,000. This represents an average annual growth of 4,500 students or the equivalent of five new schools each year. North York now has 161 schools with a gross floor area of over 12,000,000 square feet. By 1969, enrollment growth patterns began to change. Up to this point we had been able to forecast enrollments with considerable accuracy. It was a matter of anticipating new developments by talking to real estate agents, developers, planning officials and then making the projections. The proportion of the population attending private and Roman Catholic separate schools was stable, as was the proportional immigration of Roman Catholic families. The economy was stable; serious inflation had not yet set in.

In 1969 the trends began to change. Immigration into Metropolitan Toronto had dropped. There was little vacant residential land left in the area or the borough; the cost of housing began to rise substantially; housing starts had decreased; the effects of the declining birth rate began to be felt; and large numbers of separate school supporters were moving into North York. The proportion of private and separate school enrollments began to increase, and a community college opened which provided an educational alternative for some students of grades 12 and 13.

For these and for a variety of other reasons, North York's enrollment began to decline. It is now expected to continue to decline, by approximately 10% by 1978 and 20% by 1984. Although this contraction is now taking place largely in the primary grades, there are still areas of growth within the borough; new schools are being constructed. Accurately projecting school enrollment in these conditions has become fantastically difficult because of the very large number of factors that influence the trends.

Anyone not familiar with planning for schools might think that a decline in enrollment is good. The hectic adaptation and recruitment associated with rapid expansion is over, and the planners' and administrators' lives can become more tranquil. But there are many problems associated with decline. For example, in Ontario educational budgets are based on enrollments; so, as the numbers decrease, the budget must be cut. However, once the budget decision-making process is over each year, people tend to forget the difficulties of balancing income and expenditure and refuse to accept a reduced standard. The public also has expectations of ever-expanding educational services, rather than contracting ones— based on their recent experience of sustained growth. Although such support services as psychological services, guidance and the like often are not tied to enrollment, they, too, must be cut back proportionately or their funds taken from other services. When this

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happens the other services are cut even more than the proportion of the general retrench-
ment. There is in-house competition for available funds. If the organization must cut
back, where can the saving be effected? In addition to planning, my department is also
responsible for maintenance and caretaking services—this is where the budget trimmers
look first! On the face of it this is not unreasonable; our first priority must be the class-
room. However the in-house competition for funds is bad for morale, and that affects the
whole school system. In a situation such as this program cutbacks cannot be entirely
avoided, e.g., the lay assistants may be dropped. There is a loss of upward mobility of all
kinds of staff—support, teaching, administrative. With limited potential for promotion,
employees become frustrated with the system. And, as the cuts continue year by year,
there eventually emerges the fear of actually being laid off. School programs suffer—there
is no doubt about it. So far in our experience this is less true of the elementary school
than the junior high school, and declining enrollment has not yet hit the senior secondary
school. For example, if the enrollment shrinks and you have a large number of subject
specialists, and if suddenly you have to introduce a core program requiring teachers to
instruct a variety of subjects, the administrative problems become extremely difficult.
The demands on the teachers' flexibility and adaptability become excessive. Perhaps most
significantly there is little money or staff time for the innovation and experimentation
which might have eased the situation.

On the other hand, on the brighter side, there are some advantages to declining enroll-
ments. The most important you may, perhaps, find surprising—it is reduced educational
spending. In Ontario education has been in the limelight because of the large amount of
public funds it has required. As proportionately less money is spent, because enrollments
are down, education taxes will be less of a cross for the public to bear. And with con-
straints on total funds there is the opportunity, the necessity, to select priorities—to really
sit back and have a look at what you are doing that is important. I see a lot of develop-
ments in North York which are positive. The opportunity to cut to a more personal scale
the size of very large schools is good. The opportunity to make building conversions which
provide better plant facilities, especially in older schools, is welcome. We have experienced
a lot of growth and we have built many beautiful new schools, but half of our schools in
North York are old and often are inadequate to support new program needs. Now, in order
to get new space or to use it differently, since our budgets are tight, we have to share.
Opportunities are ripe to bring in other agencies and work out a joint use of space. Shar-
ing is not easy. But when it is effected it can be of great service to the community, and it
makes schools even more vital and important to the public.

In days when it was not difficult to obtain money for education there was little need
for much corporate planning. When money is tight it is indispensable. You *have* to select
your priorities; you *have* to plan. I see a greater need for long-term planning now than
ever before. Prior to 1969, because of relatively stable enrollment trends, the planner
was much better able to rationalize the advice he was giving to administrators. Since 1969,
he has had to examine his role on the bases of radically new circumstances, and these
circumstances suggest that there will be a multiplication of changing conditions in the
future. Clearly, planning for growth is relatively easy compared to planning for decline.
But, in spite of the pressure, the planner is the one person who *must* meet each new situa-
tion head on and adapt to meeting changing goals.

PANEL STATEMENT

A.J. Barone*

THE PLANNER AS MEDIATOR

Wayne Busch metnioned that, in the recent past, the North York Board of Education's main planning activity was designed to "get the kids in out of the rain". The Metropolitan Separate School Board is currently in the same situation. It operates 179 schools; its budget is approximately $79 million. This year approximately one-eighth of its enrollment of 88,000 students is being accommodated in temporary facilities. In September 1974 it will be using 300 portables as well as fifteen relocatable schools (each having a capacity of 296 pupil places). It is this lack of accommodation at a time when separate school enrollment is increasing, coupled with declining enrollment in the public school system and corresponding vacant pupil places, that requires the planner to be a mediator—or negotiator.

Whichever term we use, there are problems requiring solutions. Toronto separate school enrollment increased by approximately 3,000 pupils last year and by a similar amount the preceding year. Enrollments are affected by net transfer between the public and separate school systems, migration within the city, province and country, immigration from abroad, live births and housing developments. With all these variables, enrollment projections tend to become uncertain. However, sufficient accommodation must be available by the beginning of each school year.

The planner tries to solve some of these problems by acting as mediator and we have had some success in arranging the sharing of facilities. In the Borough of North York, St. Francis de Sales Catholic School and Firgrove Public School share the building which is owned by the public board. The public board is constructing an addition to the existing school which will accommodate the projected public school enrollment and the separate board will purchase the existing building. Arrangements have been made to share another public school in North York in the school year 1974-75. In the City of Toronto the public and separate board currently are sharing two schools, and two additional schools will be jointly occupied next year. The policy of the Ontario Ministry of Education is to not permit a school board to build if a neighbouring board has vacant pupil places which might be used. This has forced the sharing situation.

But there are problems involved in sharing; it is not the panacea some people envisage; it has not solved many accommodation problems. In some areas of the city the number of separate school pupils requiring accommodation far exceeds the number of available vacant permanent pupil places, and sharing under such conditions results in overcrowded facilities and a "school" being split up so that it is operating from two or even three different locations.

In Ontario, and specifically Metropolitan Toronto, the planner has been put into the negotiating or mediating position by the Ministry of Education. Its sharing policy is put

*Assistant Superintendent of Planning, Metropolitan Separate School Board, Toronto. (In Ontario there are two systems of schooling which are publicly funded. The Public System, which is non-denominational, administers elementary and secondary schools covering Kindergarten to Grade 13; the Separate System, which is mostly Roman Catholic, administers elementary schools and grade levels equivalent to the "continuation classes" of former days. Separate School Systems are responsible for classes from kindergarten to grade 10, although most of their grade 9 and 10 pupils are actually housed on the premises of private Roman Catholic high schools.)

into effect by use of a form entitled "Co-operative Study of the Need for Additional School Accommodation", and it is the school board planner who has become the prime implementation agent. In Metropolitan Toronto a school board planner works with considerable good will and assistance from the planners of the other educational authorities. Where tact, patience, diplomacy and adaptability are required is not with technical personnel but the political groups involved, the members of each board and the supporters (parents)of each system. Before additional school accommodation is approved for one board, the other school board(s) in the area must report their schools' enrollment, capacity and projections. The form must be signed by the Chief Education Officer of each board concerned, but it is the planners who generally fill it out. And in order to complete it they have to meet and try to come to agreement on factors affecting each proposal. They must not only try to work out some statement which is accurate, equitable and will meet the needs of the situation, but one which will also seem reasonable and acceptable to both sets of authorities.

I shall describe one concrete example of this situation, one which involves the Borough of York in Metropolitan Toronto.* This borough which has a population of approximately 150,000 has undergone considerable change since 1951. Geographically, it is divided into approximately thirty Basic Planning Units (BPU). In 1951 in only one BPU did the Roman Catholic population exceed 30%. By 1961 there were sixteen BPUs which were over 30% Roman Catholic. By 1972 the number had risen to twenty-four, of which nine were more than 40% and eight more than 50% Roman Catholic. Figure 1 shows their location.

FIGURE 1   ROMAN CATHOLIC POPULATION IN THE BOROUGH OF YORK

Source: 1951 and 1961 data, *Census of Canada*; 1972 data Metropolitan Toronto Data Bank.

*A small inner suburban area.

PANEL STATEMENT

Because of immigration from such countries as Italy, within twenty-one years the composition of the borough has substantially changed in terms of needed educational services—i.e., whether the families are clients of the public or the separate schools. Therefore there is a growing demand for separate schools in an old urban area which is completely built up and in which there is no "free" land. These schools can only be obtained by negotiation. In order to obtain funding and approval from the Ministry of Education, the planners and boards must co-operate and demonstrate to the Ministry of Education that the requirements of the "Co-operative Study" form have been met. Moreover, the planner must also demonstrate that there has been co-operative study of possible sites and consultation with borough civic representatives and community and ratepayers groups. Planning for school facilities in the Metropolitan Toronto area is an exercise in diplomacy. However, not a small part of the satisfaction from planning work derives from getting all the parties working together and seeing a project through to completion.

S. Bacsalmasi*

MILITANCY IN STAFF RELATIONS: THE PLANNER AS JUGGLER

I have listened with great interest to the presentation of Professor Humphreys, who—and I am saying this without the slightest trace of envy—in his admirably neutral position, was able to handle his topic not only with excellence but in a very safe way. I, on the other hand, am anxious to discover whether the situation in York County which culminated in the recent teacher strike has earned this place for me today or condemned me to this chair. The title which has been assigned to my brief statement assumes a lot. I speak as the planner of an operating board. My position is a staff one. However, planning is not my only concern. I head a series of supportive services as well as planning activities. The former include responsibility for curriculum planning or development, initiated or directed by a number of curriculum committees. These committees are a sort of educational social club for those who have ideas to exchange and want to get involved. Another task of my division is professional development activities conducted mainly by our Master Teachers. The division is also responsible for the activities of the Research Office, the Testing Office and the Planning Office. This latter, as defined by the York County Board, has specific and restricted duties. It collects such data as are required to indicate the need for new schools, the physical planning of schools, the preparation and annual updating of the five-year capital budget forecasts, the forecast of the supply and demand for teachers, and the projection of enrollment, which is the basis for the other planning work. The definition of teacher work conditions, pupil/teacher ratios and board policy on teacher use has not been our responsibility—although obviously research into these questions would be the responsibility of the Research Office (if requested) and recommendations on some aspects of future conditions and needs would be the responsibility of the Planning Office (if

*Superintendent of Planning and Development, York County Board of Education, Ontario. (York County is immediately north of Metropolitan Toronto.)

requested). However these matters have not, thus far, been our routine responsibility.

Neither I, personally, nor any sector of my division was involved in teacher negotiations. We have never had to 'take sides' in any dispute and nothing that I shall say today should be construed as being connected with the recent dispute. Yet, in a sense, as impartial analysts of data we are at the heart of all controversies, and some things which we do are condemned by teachers or rejected by trustees. Some examples, which come readily to mind are: the professional library, which has been planned for the Administrative Centre and has been declared unnecessary by groups of teachers; the School of the Arts which was planned, against which a stand was taken so that it had to be shelved for three years (now it is expected to be built within three to five years provided enrollment increases);the plan for the expansion of French language instruction was under attack because it did not form part of the priorities of the schools; the routine and continued examination of school buildings and checking of enrollment patterns are seen as representing a threat to existing teaching positions; the very concept of planning the volume of support services and the appointments required for such positions have been attacked as diverting money which might be spent on 'teachers'. One of the most interesting recent examples is the withdrawal from curriculum committees of a number of Heads of Departments and the private establishment of a different Heads' Association. Should all of these acts be put into the same category as the actions of people in one community who, rumour tells us, are selling their homes because the school board has given the school site to the Ontario Housing Corporation to build low-rental houses? In fact the board has not sold any property for this purpose. But if it had a surplus site, and on the recommendation of the Planning Office sold it to a public housing authority, it is the planning officials who would reap opprobrium for their disinterested and objective evaluation of the situation. On one issue the disapproval would come only from within the system, on another only from without.

Professor Humphreys quoted the definition of planning postulated by Anderson and Bowman, that it is the "Process of preparing a set of decisions for action in the future". I would like to add to this a definition used by P.F. Oliphant of the management consultant firm, Price-Waterhouse Associates. In his opinion, "Planning is a device to try to minimize the range of possibilities, to keep a lid on Pandora's box". To carry this limitation to the fullest would be to plan *one alternative only*. In Oliphant's words the purpose is to create "...conditions in which all motivations are directed toward achieving certain objectives". This is, of course, very close to making the decisions themselves. Some people unkindly term it "social engineering". Using these two definitions, the paper which Professor Humphreys has just presented, and many experiences drawn from my work with a board of education, I would like to ask these questions:

● Is there, should we even look for, a clear separation between the planner and the decision-maker, between the planning and decision-making processes? In listening to Professor Humphreys' paper, the question occurred to me frequently, "Are we talking about a planner or a decision-maker?"
When the planner is part of the power game, the impartiality for which he must strive, and which ought to be present in various degrees when different alternatives are being prepared for the decision-makers, is lost. The possibility of maintaining the distinction between planning and decision-making is also lost. I admit that to some people this differentiation is a chimera—unreal, theoretical, a phony. Yet I suggest that it is not the planning part of the process but the decision-making part, which forces the eventual set of decisions into

the 'art of the possible' and makes of the planner a 'juggler'. This is the case even when the planner and the decision-maker are one person.

● Is there any value in a clear separation of the roles, supposing it were possible?

If, as a result, better plans were produced, the answer would be yes and the energy spent to safeguard the impartiality of the planner would be justified. In my opinion it is possible. I consider that militancy (teacher militancy or any other kind), mainly for reasons of self protection, views 'involvement' as involvement in decision-making not in planning. The actual planning of alternatives should not be affected by the fact that plans might be attacked because they are looked upon as decisions. When a planner becomes fearful of the possible opposition of various groups he does become a juggler trying to second-guess their reactions and play them one against the other. When this happens I become concerned about the quality of the plans he produces. This is why I am fearful of Ted Humphreys' suggestion that planners tell the public clearly what they will or will not have. This is the prerogative, the responsibility, of elected decision-makers, and such statements should be left to them. I realize, of course, that there is no 'pure white' planner. There are just too many connections and interests between planners and decision-makers, particularly in small units where they are often one and the same person. This is my reason for saying that in very many local authorities there is no planning at all.

There is another point which must be made. Educational needs exist, are defined, only in terms of the goals and values that society holds and the total amount of resources it will make available to pursue them. For this reason the targets established for social and economic development must be generally known and correctly understood by the community and by those who operate schools—including the teachers. Planners and decision-makers will be operating within the framework established by this goals-resources unity. Militancy, however strong, operating outside the framework will find itself in continual collision with the public.

Planners have no control over the behaviour of staff. They should, however, have control over their own behaviour, and by staying within the framework agreed by society they will be required to do much less juggling. To be specific, in the case of York County, staff militancy was generated to a very large extent out of the overriding fear for jobs, fear of losing or not gaining promotions. The militancy was not aimed at creating increased educational benefits for students or for quality education. No planner should allow himself to be forced into any kind of juggling to nullify such fears. It would be like changing the weather report to make the weather look better. Talk of redundancy in Metro Toronto made many teachers uneasy about the future, and the uncertainty worked overtime in York County. There was a communications gap and lack of trust. The fact that no teacher was actually laid off did not have the same effect as publicly declaring a policy of 'no lay-offs' would have had. In fact it was not the local condition which was the problem but the general trend in Ontario, which everyone recognizes will continue for several years. Under normal conditions, it should be clear to everyone that when you build a school you create jobs, not eliminate them. Yet all teacher inquiries about new schools, such as the proposed School of the Arts, were based on the assumption that job opportunities would decrease. The fact that the Board would be required to prove the need for this school (based on enrollment) before it could be approved, was completely overlooked.

This misunderstanding about the relationship of enrollment, staffing and school build-
ing is common and causes much unnecessary worry for teachers. When the Separate School
Board of York County asked us about a building which was possibly for sale, the reaction
from our teachers centred entirely on the question, "What happens to *my job* if you *sell*
the building?" I have yet to receive a question about the fate of the students. That we
don't sell our students with the building and still have need of their teachers was not
recognized in the prevailing atmosphere of fear. In the case of planned French immersion
classes, many teachers (even the whole staff of some schools) declared themselves opposed
to the classes for fear that present French teachers would be displaced by bilingual teachers
whose mother tongue is French.

In such situations the planner must *not become* a juggler. Any "accommodation" of
the objectively defined requirements of the situation would further blur the distinction
between planners and decision-makers, planning and decision-making. The position papers,
reports and plans are seldom actually read. Only the process of implementation receives
attention. The juggling to enable implementation to proceed is outside the realm of the
planner; this is politics of administration where even plans for implementation can easily
be fouled up. In my opinion the planner ought not to be a juggler, but a very patient, very
humble and forgiving individual who recognizes that much of his planning comes to nought
through ignorance and fear. Hopefully, then the differences between planners and politi-
cians, and planners and decision-makers will become strikingly obvious.

Dr. F. Gerald Ridge*

THE PLANNER AS EXECUTIONER

I don't think the planner can be held to be the real executioner because it is the trustees
who make final decisions. The planner may poise the axe, may even define its parabola
and compute its rate of fall, but the trustees make the decision to bring it down.

Planning is a rational process, defining needs, resources, constraints, and creating
patterns of allocation which meet the needs as well as possible, in light of the constraints
which have been imposed. I think most people involved in education today would agree
that limits on expenditure are a reasonable constraint—in fact an inevitable constraint,
only the form changes. I shall consider some of Dr. Humphreys' statements as they relate
to these constraints:

● "Militancy blossomed as cutbacks resulted in larger class sizes, fewer services and
heavier work loads. The profession...rebelled against the compliance so characteristic of
the decade before."

*Director of Capital Programming and Research, Metropolitan Toronto School Board. (The MTSB is a
unique Board in Ontario in that it does not itself operate schools, other than the schools for the retard-
ed. It has budgetting and fiscal authority over the six area public boards of education in Metropolitan
Toronto—the Boards of the city of Toronto, and the Boroughs of York, East York, North York,
Scarborough, and Etobicoke.)

PANEL STATEMENT

What has been the effect of this teacher militancy coming at a time when the Ontario government has placed ceilings on the per capita educational expenditures of local boards? With limited dollars available, the planner has had to become the executioner; funds normally available for such services as the maintenance and upgrading of facilities have had to be substantially reduced. Trustees are elected for a two-year period. What happens to the buildings in two years is really not their prime worry. What is of significance to them is that classes must be kept operating and teachers have to be in the classes. The only way to balance the budget is to cut some other account than teacher payroll, so that the teacher can be kept in the classroom. So what has happened to our planned maintenance programs? They are in a pretty serious state; they will have to be extended over a longer period of time, and our planners will have to reconcile the difficulties and anomalies which this creates.

● "Not only is he [the planner] subjected to pressures from teachers, students and public but he must operate within the constraints of the senior level of government.... Nowhere is this more evident than in capital budgetting and facilities planning."

No longer does the facilities planner in Ontario go merrily down the road renovating, altering or changing facilities according to some policy statement of administrative priority. Now he must take into account the requirements or demands of students and teachers in the schools and of the public, as soon as they become aware that changes in facilities are being contemplated. All these people want design changes and additional facilities—modifications which generally cannot be provided within the constraints of the Ministry of Education. In Ontario, the constraint we operate under is the Capital Grant Plan. It does not provide funds for swimming pools, meeting rooms, crafts rooms, senior citizen rooms, or auditoria. And our needs are limitless—you name any facility and the residents of an area can develop instantly the need for such a facility.

The job of the facilities planner has become one of trying to reconcile the requirements of students and teachers, the desires of residents and the limits of the Capital Grant Plan. Very few other sources of funds are available to school boards in Ontario for such non-educational but education-related types of facilities as are listed above. In the end, after considerable agonizing, the facilities planner is forced to act as executioner. In the city of Toronto, residents of certain areas have been able to persuade the City Council to provide money for the building of a swimming pool or other facilities as part of an addition to a new school. But this is rare, and this type of funding varies from community to community. There really is little money available from other then education sources for these facilities—and, these days, the response from education is "no way".

From now on facilities planners will have to introduce the social component into their priorities at the beginning of the planning process rather than leaving it to the school trustee in a ward to "sell" the plan as a solution to his constituents after the planning is over. The social component involves: informing all the concerned parties about potential projects when they are first being considered; making changes continually known to the parties; and taking into account the wishes of these parties as the development of the proposal proceeds. All this will change our time lines. The time delays of the past in involving the public, which boards often tried to circumvent or avoid, may now be the only way to go. To start more slowly and build in time for public input and review may today be the fastest way of proceeding in the long run. Certainly the adoption of such a process will help the facilities planner escape having to play the role of executioner.

● "The planning of such capital expenditures is seriously affected when political pressures and public protests determine starting and completion dates for major projects."

Facilities and financial planning can be seriously impaired when public protest results in political pressure. As an example I cite a current replacement project in the 1974 Capital Program of the Metropolitan Toronto School Board. On the basis of an academic and technical obsolescence study, Harbord Collegiate in the City of Toronto was approved for replacement in the 1974 Capital Program. Recently the alumni of Harbord Collegiate held a reunion at the school, and as a result, they are questioning the need for replacement —nostalgia or objective analysis? The project already has been so delayed that the planned starting and completion dates are probably no longer valid. This is a major project, close to $4,000,000 in value. While discussions are being held, the facilities planner can make little progress. The financial planner on the other hand, is concerned with the timing of the project through the necessary approval stages. If certain approvals are not received by certain dates, the funds will no longer be available for the project in 1974 and it has to be re-submitted as part of the 1975 Capital Program, or be delayed even more. The financial planner is also worried about cash flow. So at some point he will recommend the shelving of this project and the transfer of the capital allocation to another one which can proceed and be funded within the required time interval.

● "The planning unit in the local board has a responsibility to act as an honest consultant to the director, rather than as a gatekeeper of delicate information."

In this era of current and capital constraints the planner has to be more than just an honest consultant. The constraints on facilities and financial planning for education are so many and varied, and there are so many actors trying to get into the act,that we must act as honest brokers in what has become a wild poker game. The best we can hope for is to act in such a manner that we gain a reputation for accuracy and honesty, for rationality and objectivity, for producing the most reasonable plan which is most acceptable to most parties. If the actors are free to contribute to the plan formulation and rejection of alterna- tives, and the planner has the chance to advise on alternatives and rejections, he should be able to make a valid contribution.

W.J. Lambie*

THE PLANNER AS MAGICIAN

Planning, as a specialized educational function, implies making decisions about where to proceed, and how, and what the constraints and consequences are likely to be. In most jurisdictions, the right to decide belongs, in theory, to elected trustees or to some kind of legislative body, and the responsibility of the planning official is to point out the options and the consequences. In this model the planner has no responsibility to any policy or pattern of decisions, or for any individual decision, except to tell the truth as best he sees

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it. This is essentially a counselling model which implies the following: that there really are options; that the consequences, especially fiscal, can be anticipated (and eventually evaluated); that the decision-makers need to know (and want to know) the truth; that decisions can be made far enough in advance of the need (very rare in the Province of Ontario, in my experience); and that the decision-makers and planners work within a goal-directed framework. In this model local planning operates under the umbrella of regional or provincial planning, within the context of broader national goals. Planning, then, equals knowing what you wish to do, developing a program to do it and anticipating the context in which you will have to do it.

In the Region of Peel with its growth needs—no longer a steady 10% or more per year but still formidable in some areas—we have a new regional government which is responsible for almost all essential services except education. We have neighbourhoods only 8 years old where high-density rental townhouses have begun to shift over to low-density, high cost, owner-occupied townhouses—thus emptying enough classrooms to equal a junior school. As a result of these and other pressing problems, the planning function (as of January 1974) has been separated from other services and expanded to serve the entire system. As Superintendent my responsibilities include stimulating (and in some cases, co-ordinating) a process by which all our objectives (curriculum, personnel, managerial) are in reasonable harmony over the long term and our resource allocations are planned to serve those objectives effectively and in priority order.

This systems-planning task would be interesting enough if it were part of a total planning process which had isolated some of the obvious provincial, regional, and local needs and provided resources to achieve them over a four- or five-year period. However, this is not the case.

Over the past six months, we have been able to get the Ministry of Education to work more closely with us to begin better, joint planning of school construction, to provide preliminary capital allocations in October rather than late February, to permit the banking of sketch plans for projects which it is agreed are inevitable but for which the year of need is difficult to predict, and to provide some assistance with the longer term forecasting of our revenues. We have also tried to sort out with our own Board some of those basic planning decisions which may help us to define what is "normal" planning policy in changing circumstances: policy statements were especially needed for such things as school sizes, site requirements, curriculum and grade divisions, building-specifications reviews, as well as leadership development, personnel evaluation, and budgetting. In all of this, the development of reasonable agreement about expectations (within general guidelines) is an essential element in coping with conflict or criticism of any specific plan or decision. In my opinion, in this work the planner plays a teaching role, in the most subtle sense.

It has been suggested that the planner in a situation such as ours in Peel is expected to be a magician. Of course real magicians don't need to plan; they live by the practice of illusion. Dr. Humphreys emphasized, in his speech, the need for the planner to operate *out* of the ivory-tower, to articulate plans and options to public gatherings as well as to Board meetings, and to provide not only numbers and time-frames but also informed judgements on political realities. It seems to me that here Dr. Humphreys is developing a statement of ethics for planners (indeed, for educators) who carry heavy professional responsibility but do not, in our system, carry full legal responsibility for their work.

In his paper he emphasized the following: the need for authority, in a climate of questioning, to justify its actions; an apparent hardening of identities, in which teachers, students, parents tend in any educational dispute or cause to identify with their unique groups rather than with each other; that educational administrators will be faced with increasingly stormy conflicts whenever they recommend major decisions or policies; and that in a society which supports a broad spectrum of expectations, values and needs, it is undesirable to rely too heavily on "systems" answers to problems with their apparently neat, cut and dried, solutions.

On the whole I agree with his analysis. But the perspective is not unique to the planner. When I was a principal I was often in the middle of that same storm—balancing the special needs, views and biases of young people, parents, teachers and other authorities, and trying to pull out all the real options. It was my role to help people see that certain choices were wishful thinking. It was necessary to help those who must live with a decision to make it.

You know the old saying: "He who walks in the middle of road, gets hit by cars going both ways". One cannot live in the middle of the road for very long. If the planner is to be effective he needs to make it clear that he is *not* a magician. No research or quantification can compensate for the absence of a philosophic base and a clear policy. Nor can it remove the terror of having to take a calculated risk. In the present anarchic climate, where responsibility and authority are fragmented and only consensus (no matter how transitory, how defined or achieved) has any legitimacy, the planner must seek to help his fellow educators sort out what *must* be done, what *can* (reasonably) be done at level of the school, the neighbourhood, or the region and what resources are necessary to accomplish this—rather than just espouse goals and pronounce upon what evaluation instruments, if any, can reasonably be believed.

There is a certain sense in which no one can really plan for an educational system of 75,000 students, over some 470 square miles in a very temporary and mobile society, with a board elected every two years, in a province where only limits (goals) seem to be planned. In that context, Dr. Humphreys raises serious questions about the integrity of educational planners who feel the pressure to become magicians. But at the same time, in a very real sense, nothing can ever be really planned at the level of the school, the family of schools, or the community unless our large school systems do address themselves to fundamental planning. We must have a set of objectives as benchmarks against which to test all our planning, resource allocations, and failures to implement reforms.

On a regional level, if we plan in a vacuum without reference to the legitimate political and community conflicts which are inevitable in a free society, we shall not satisfy ourselves or any interest groups or authorities. If we fail to plan at the regional level, then every decision point in the system becomes a potential source of confrontation and breakdown, and it is not possible to make plans for smaller units within the region. The microplanning at the level of the school, family of schools and community *needs* the framework provided by plans and policies for the system as a whole. If at the system level we plan realistically, facing the fact that there are few authoritative bases on which we can rely with safety (fiscal, legal, philosophic, academic or political), and we recognize the need to plan openly, involving all groups who may be affected, then we will be better able to harmonize long-term goals with the need for acceptance right now. We must recognize the need to be credible to all who may affect a decision even *after* the decision has been made. We will need to learn to focus on issues, not just on strategies.

PANEL STATEMENT

Planning is obviously not a science. If it is an art, it seems to me to be one of the political arts. However, educational planning must not be seen as either a new panacea or a new ritual. The measure of its success cannot be the smoothness with which the board or its officals do their business, or the personal acceptance of the planner by those he serves. Success must be judged in terms of an increase in the confidence, effectiveness and productivity of all whose job it is to see that youngsters get the best possible educational opportunities.

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NOTICE TO MEMBERS

The Editorial Board plans to have journal issues featuring certain planning problems and areas of interest. It invites, in particular, articles on planning: higher education, campus and school facilities, problems of declining educational systems, problems of education for the handicapped, education of youth for the labour market, curriculum for ethnic and other minorities, and pre-school and child care. The Board is especially interested in reports of research, evaluation of the effectiveness of various planning techniques, and of problems of integrating various programs. Send articles, comments on these themes and the journal to:

> The Editorial Board, *Educational Planning*
> c/o Dr. Cicely Watson
> OISE
> 252 Bloor Street West
> Room N624
> Toronto, Ontario
> M5M 1V6

The International Society of Educational Planners

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The Society was founded on December 10, 1970, in Washington, D.C. Over fifty local, state, national and international planners attended the first organizational meeting.

Since then its growth has demonstrated that there is need for a professional organization with educational planning as its exclusive concern.

Purpose

The ISEP was founded to foster the professional knowledge and interests of educational planners. Directly and indirectly it is also concerned with the state of the art of planning.

Activities

The activities of the Society are those of most professional associations: it publishes a newsletter and a journal, holds an annual conference, sponsors training workshops, conducts professional liaison with related organizations and encourages research.

Commissions

The Society has three commissions the chairmen of which sit on the Board of Directors: Research, Training and International Relations. Discussions have also been held on the feasibility of establishing commissions for the specialized interests of sub groups of its members, such as a commission on Manpower Planning, Facilities Planning or Institutional Planning.

The device of the commissions is used to advise the Board on an activity of continuing interest to the Society, but it is expected that the number and interests of the commissions will change over time.

Membership

Regular Membership: residents of United States, Canada, Europe, New Zealand, Australia and Japan — $15.00   residents of other countries — $8.00
Student Membership — $5.00   Institutional Membership — $75.00
Sustaining Members — $50.00

Send applications to the Secretary of the Society: Dr. Hal Hagen, International Society of Educational Planners, Mankato State College, Mankato, Minnesota 56001